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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is an analysis of the long-term trajectory of democracy in the 
Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic with a focus on class relations, revolutionary 
struggles and coups d’etat over the last century. I argue that two factors have intertwined 
to determine the trajectory of the political regime: social movements and competition 
within the power bloc. I make four main arguments, which diverge from the existing 
literature on democratization.  
First, by using a two-dimensional conceptualization of democracy, I argue that 
during the last century, the Turkish political regime, far from being ‘trapped’ in the 
‘unconsolidated’ domain, experienced four different modalities of democracy. I 
conceptualize coups, not as symptoms of democratic immaturity, but as means of regime 
transition. 
Second, I challenge the argument that a weak civil society and the absence of 
social dynamics explain the fragility of Turkish democracy. I identify two waves of 
revolutionary movements -- from 1912 to 1930 and from 1974 to 1998 -- that have 
impacted the regime and vice-versa. 
Third, in contrast to the widely used Weberian “center-periphery” analysis, I trace 
three cycles of capital accumulation in the last century, with a different group assuming 
the hegemonic role in each: (1) the palace-centered bureaucracy, (2) the party-centered 
bureaucracy, and (3) a coalition between the capitalist army and Istanbul capital. Each 
cycle gave rise to a competitive period within the power bloc (a crisis of hegemony) that 
politicized society and paved the way for coups.  
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Finally, I explain the interaction between social movements and competition 
within the power bloc. The nature of the resolution of each crisis within the power bloc 
depended on the nature of social struggles. Right now, Turkey is in the middle of a new 
regime crisis, the resolution of which will again depend on the nature of social struggles.  
The empirical foundations of the dissertation are built on a wide range of primary 
and secondary sources, including official statistics as well as two major databases 
compiled by the author from Turkish newspaper reports and other published sources on 
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To Mehmet Amca, 





I came to Hopkins in 2000, one year after Abdullah Öcalan’s imprisonment and 
trial. As I stated in my letter of application, I had a specific question for the dissertation. I 
argued that extensive proletarianization of Kurds will shape the future of the Kurdish 
question as we knew it: on the territory of the national struggle, the guerilla warfare will 
cede its place to an Intifada style uprising; and in the west, Kurds, the major component 
of the new proletariat employed mainly in the informal sector, will be the engine of the 
struggle for democratization. 
Indeed, in 2003, I had already completed the field work in Yenibosna for the 
dissertation, wrote a chapter and presented it at the Institute of Global Studies at Johns 
Hopkins. But then... 
Then, as a result of a “vortex of combined circumstances”, I shelved that project 
and started this historical study. Although the agents and conspirators responsible for this 
change weren’t pleasantly remembered during the last decade, now I think it was a 
correct decision to change my dissertation topic. I thank all of them. 
Although having a life span of a decade, ironically, this study has been written in 
one year as the sum of five separate intense periods of writing. The reason for this was 
my priorities and preferences that can be inferred from the conclusion of this study. 
I wrote the proposal that can be considered the dormant form of the first chapter, 
in May-June 2004. The first draft of the second chapter was written in March 2008, the 
draft of the fourth chapter in September 2012. Right after the heydays of the Gezi 
uprising, I came back to Baltimore, between June 2013 and January 2014. I reformulated 
the whole argument, that implied the rewriting of all drafts from scratch, and wrote a 
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detailed synopsis. Finally, between July and August 2014, I wrote all the chapters at 
hand. I regret the fact that I did not have the necessary time to work on Chapter 3 as 
much as I did on other chapters. Although the chapter provides a minimally plausible 
argument, I implore the reader to consider the argument of that chapter as a set of 
working hypotheses. 
Contrary to misunderstandings that label him as a theorist of the world-system, 
longue durée, and hegemonic competition or worse still the rise of China, and blur the 
very originality of his thought distinguishing him from Immanuel Wallerstein and Andre 
Gunder Frank, Giovanni Arrighi was a great dialectician. He was able to identify the 
specificity of each cycle of capitalist accumulation, and show how each cycle contained, 
negated and at the same time superseded, the previous one, and demonstrate that the 
dissolution of each cycle was the very result of its strength and achievement. What made 
me come to Hopkins was the epilogue of The Long Twentieth Century. I consider myself 
extremely lucky to have taken his classes and joined his conversations during my 
presence in Baltimore between 2000 and 2003. 
If this dissertation has any academic strength, it is no doubt because of Giovanni, 
who was at the same time my joint advisor. Not because of his approval but because of 
his disagreements. From day one, he, as my joint advisor, found the argument of this 
study very banal, my conceptualization boggy and my arguments unconvincing. In this 
sense he transformed me into a person who started to draw circles and arrows on all kinds 
of blank paper, followed by marching into Giovanni’s room and forcing him to a 
discussion. The source of the disagreement, as can be traced in Chapters 1 and 5, was my 
distinction between revolutionary and reformist movements. While writing and thinking 
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about the dissertation, his comment that “A more dialectical conception of historical 
processes is not necessarily more accurate than a less dialectical one”, haunted my mind. 
Not only his intellectual harshness but also his “good heart”, and our shared memories 
will accompany me till the end of my life. And I am sure I am not the only person to have 
these imprints and feelings. 
Anybody would notice the impact of my other joint advisor, Beverly Silver’s 
Forces of Labor on the data collection process of this book. Without Beverly’s 
meticulous contribution to my proposal, I wouldn’t have received the grant from the 
National Science Foundation, so crucial to begin the research. She read and commented 
on the synopsis and did not complain about my bombardment of final versions of 
chapters. 
Beverly was my protective shield against all kinds of administrative problems. 
Thanks to her solutions and interventions, I was able to survive all kinds of 
administrative crises. In the summer of 2012, when I was technically homeless, she 
shared her library carrel, her office, and even her desk with me. 
Joel Andreas read my proposal super-carefully, and gave me confidence in the 
academic value of my two axes. He also read and commented on the synopsis. I’m afraid 
I did not incorporate his final suggestions concerning the axes of inclusion. 
During the time when I was outside the US, Linda Burkhardt, Jessie Albee and 
Terrie Lovern solved all my departmental problems. And I am grateful to them. 
Amy Holmes read and corrected the proposal several times. Aslıhan Tüdeş, Sinan 
Çelik, Gökhan Karaman, Nihal Uzan and Engin Gürbüz worked for the data collection 
project. Emre Altan helped supervise the data collection. After the depletion of NSF 
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money, Aslıhan worked voluntarily and completed the digitization of missing 
newspapers. Doğuş Çakan collected the images for the 2005-2010 period, and Nurcan 
Dağ coded the 2005 articles. In February, Erdem Yörük and İlhan Can Özen visited my 
office in MacCaulay at midnight and renamed the file names of the digitized newspaper 
articles. The early data for Armenian uprisings came from Şefika Kumral’s review of the 
relevant literature in February 2009. Daniel Pascuiti answered patiently my questions 
about Excel. Without Sezen Bayhan, access to the library of Boğaziçi University would 
have been too complicated. Finally, Murat Özgün drew the cube in Chapter 5. 
After moving to Turkey in 2003, my address in Baltimore for my occasional visits 
was the house in Oakenshawe. Thanks to Rolande Glicenstein’s generosity, friendliness 
and humor, this address became not only an oasis but also a true home. I will not only 
miss our “kibbutz” but also our heated discussions concerning American politics.  
During my self-imposed prison term in Baltimore, Stephanie Koziej and Amritha 
Lal brought me news from the outside world. Without Stephanie’s questions, invitations, 
songs, and invitations, my life in Baltimore would be a lot less tolerable. 
Throughout this process, regardless of where I was, I was always together with 
Kıtan Eren, Vacide, Necla, Tülin and Yaşar Tunca, Nejla Torun, Firdevs and Emin 
Eyüboğlu, Sevinç Özer, Songül and Rafet Yılmaz, Sengül and Adnan Yurtsever, 
Nazmiye and Muzaffer Akyüz, Nimet Yazıcı, Ali and Gazel Özdemir. I am grateful to 
them and their memories. 
As regards “friends”… Without their informed, patient, and courageous struggle, 
without their candidacy to truly revolutionary human practice, everything in this 
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dissertation would be meaningless. I can only apologize for my absence and promise to 
compensate for it.  
For a slow writer like myself, writing up all the chapters on such a tight schedule 
would have been technically impossible. However, this dissertation is at the same time 
the product of a family enterprise: Laila Bushra, Yener Eren, Mualla Eren and Gülistan 
Eren. My sister Devrim Eren and my beloved niece Lara Julia Rana Seitz, joined us from 
Hamilton, New Zealand, with their joy and support. 
During the last two months, Yener Eren was the research assistant responsible for 
the library and the political parties. Without Mualla Eren, it would have been impossible 
to update the database from 2005 to 2014. After my frustration with Microsoft Office’s 
drawing utilities, she learned Adobe Illustrator in two days and improved the quality of 
my figures dramatically. Almost everybody speaks positively about their parents, but 
mine surprised all first-hand observers this summer with their skills and stamina. 
Gülistan Eren was the organizer; she was not only part of the data collection 
group, but also secured its smooth and permanent functioning. In the final phase, she 
assumed full control, mobilized all family resources, and coordinated the entire write-up 
process. She designed and formatted the document and spent several sleepless weeks in 
front of the computer. 
Laila Bushra was the hidden and real hero in the family. When I was in 
Baltimore, she skyped me every other day. Given this study’s focus on Turkey, Laila was 
the last person to read and comment on it. But she did it and she did it very well. She read 
all the synopses more than five times, came to Istanbul in July, spent three weeks with 
me, and carried my files to London, San Francisco and Lahore. Suffice it to give the 
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number of files in my hard disk containing (laila-ed.) phrase: 167. In an era of 
selfishness, escapism and tiny calculations, Laila showed what true friendship is. 
Certainly, the responsibility for this dissertation is completely mine. However, I 
can’t exaggerate the collective character of this work. Therefore, I ask the permission of 
my family members around the world to dedicate this work to somebody else: Mustafa 
Oktay, Mehmet Amca. 
Long time ago in the mid 1980’s, our house was filled with my father’s friends, 
political activists, union organizers, journalists and directors - agents and products of the 
68 generation like my father and mother. I grew up observing the long arguments of all 
these people with Mehmet Amca. Since his expulsion from East Berlin, he had been their 
professor and had also become mine. Those debates created the intellectual stimulus and 
fundamentals necessary for this study. One of those days, I revealed to them my intention 
of writing a book about “my fathers’ friends”. They liked the idea and constantly joked 
about it. But I was serious and a careful eye will notice that this study is indeed a book 
about my father’s friends and a response to their debates. 
I hope Mehmet Amca will accept my dedication as a sign of gratitude for his 
labor and a belated attempt to compensate my absence at the conversation table.  
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Chapter 1  
Democracies, Coups and Social Struggles 
“All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is 
unhappy in its own way”  
(Anna Karenina) 
Introduction 
Depending on which indicators one uses, there are two possible assessments of 
the Turkish political landscape. From one perspective, the regime seems to be in 
perpetual chaos. Turkey can be described as the country of coups and assassinations, 
regime crises, and constitutional changes. Between 1789 and 1922, five of the eight 
Ottoman Sultans were dethroned by coups or insurrections. During the parliamentary 
monarchy period between 1908 and 1922, five of the twelve grand viziers were deposed 
by coups and three others were assassinated. The balance sheet of the Republican period 
is not very different. Five out of a total of sixteen politicians who served as chief 
executives for longer than a year were political prisoners at one time- either before or 
after their tenures. Another one was recently sentenced for life but has not been 
imprisoned yet. Of the remaining ten, one was hanged, another assassinated eight years 
after his tenure, and a third one died from a suspicious heart attack. As for the 
constitutions, since 1908, the Ottoman Empire (and later the Turkish Republic) has been 
ruled under five different constitutions. And again for the last one decade, the 




Fear of military coups is not a thing of the past. The specter of a coup is still 
haunting Turkish politics. The present Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan has accused the 
opposition of having plotted a coup in December 2013. The opposition has countered by 
alleging that it is Erdoğan who is planning a civilian coup like Hitler, who ended the 
Weimar Republic. Ironically, at the most heated point of this debate, Erdoğan opened the 
door for the release of fifty generals who had been imprisoned after being accused of 
plotting a coup, by calling the trials themselves a part of the conspiracy. Five years ago, 
however, it was Erdoğan who proudly claimed to be the prosecutor of these trials. 
From another perspective however, Turkey has a stable democratic life with 
strong historical roots. The national parliament has convened regularly for 100 out of the 
last 106 years of the empire-republic. Over this period, there have been twenty seven 
elections, of which twenty were competitive. Peaceful transfer of political power from 
one party to another is generally seen as one of the key characteristics of democracy. 
Since 1950, half of the elections (50%) have transferred power from the governing party 
to parties of the opposition. Compare this with 41% in the United Kingdom, 30% in 
Sweden, and 25% in Germany. Turkey has also been more advanced than many 
European countries regarding suffrage. In 1876, an almost universal suffrage for men was 
granted. Until 1918, 80% of all males of voting age could vote, whereas the same figure 
was 40% for the United Kingdom. And Turkey joined the camp of universal suffrage in 
1934, more than ten years before France, Belgium, and Italy. 
This seemingly contradictory coexistence of stability and instability has been one 
of the most striking puzzles for students of Turkish democracy. Most authors- regardless 
of their different emphases on the stable or unstable, or democratic or autocratic elements 
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of the Turkish regime - have tried to solve this puzzle by relegating Turkey to the grey 
zone of unconsolidated or defective democracies, situated between real democracies and 
dictatorships. Actually, Turkey has not been alone in this zone. Most of the countries 
which are considered ’different’ from the democracies in Western Europe and North 
America, are similarly classified as ‘defective’ democracies. Turkey is considered to be 
either trapped in this domain or progressing slowly and painfully towards the democratic 
ideal. The defective character is explained generally by referring to the absence of a civil 
society or middle classes or the presence of a strong state tradition in Turkey, or to the 
ideological framework of Turkish political elites. 
This study of the trajectory of regime changes in Turkey proposes and seeks to 
substantiate an alternative framework. Although the immediate targets of my critique are 
the historical and sociological accounts of the Turkish regime, I also challenge the three 
assumptions of the literature on democratization, which can be formulated as follows:  
 1) Democracies should be classified under two categories: advanced and 
underdeveloped.  
 2) Coups are incompatible with democracies, and their presence should be 
considered as the absence of democracy.  
 3) Social struggles have only a one-dimensional and undifferentiated impact on 
democratization.  
This chapter begins with a review and critique of these three assumptions. The 
critique of each assumption helps clarify the conceptual framework of the study. In the 
second part of the chapter, I summarize the arguments that I put forward to explain the 
puzzle of democracy in Turkey. The final part consists of the research design and the 




“Nothing is so treacherous as the obvious” wrote Joseph Schumpeter (1962) when 
he was questioning the socialist credo of being the stalwart defender of democracy (p. 
235). “Until about 1916 the relation between socialism and democracy would have 
seemed quite obvious to most people and to nobody more so than to the accredited 
exponents of socialist orthodoxy. It would hardly have occurred to anyone to dispute the 
socialists’ claim to membership in the democratic club”. Yet according to Schumpeter, 
developments after the Russian Revolution revealed that the socialists had a much more 
ambivalent attitude towards democracy, casting doubt on the obviousness of the link. The 
same can be said for the link between Schumpeter’s own conceptualızatıon of democracy 
and the current democratızatıon literature. Seventy some years after the publication of his 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy the link between the procedural definitions of 
democracy – the dominant approach in contemporary theories of democratization - and 
Schumpeter’s own definition is considered obvious. Schumpeter is considered to be the 
founding father of procedural theories. And yet, the relationship between adherents of the 
procedural definition and Schumpeter’s own definition is even more ambivalent than that 
between socialists and democracy. 
For Schumpeter (1962) the democratic method is the “institutional arrangement 
for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by 
means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (p. 269). All other factors, like 
unfair and fraudulent elections, constrained individual liberties, or depriving certain 
segments of population of electoral rights are irrelevant to determining whether a regime 
is democratic or not. Based on Schumpeter's definition, a regime where only a quarter of 
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the population votes and where only two parties compete for governmental posts would 
still be considered a democracy.  
The advantage of his minimalist definition, Schumpeter believed, is its realism. 
The classical definition of democracy - the rule (kratos) by the people (demos) - was, he 
argued, unclear and unfeasible in at least three different senses. First, kratos never 
represented all persons in a society. Those who are below or above a certain age, 
mentally unfit or cannot support themselves have frequently been deprived of voting 
rights. Second, the notion “rule by the people” does not clarify how the rulers actually 
execute their functions. Direct rule is technically unfeasible if not impossible, unless one 
is talking about small cities. Third, the notion of a government representing the general 
will of the people is equally problematic because it is impossible to formulate a general 
will out of a multitude of contradictory beliefs and desires (Schumpeter, 1962, pp. 243-
256). In contrast, Schumpeter believed that his minimalist definition has the merit of 
distinguishing really existing democracies from other types of regimes. In this way, it 
would be possible to use democracy as a concept in real-life spheres other than fiction 
and political phraseology (pp. 269-273).  
Formulating his beliefs during the tumultuous period between 1916 and 1922, 
Schumpeter was concerned not just with conceptual clarity, but also with articulating his 
disbelief in the people’s capacity to rule themselves. In particular, his aristocratic political 
inclinations were deeply disturbed by the Austrian workers movement (Medearis, 2001, 
pp. 19-64). Just before the Russian Revolution, he advised prominent Austro-Hungarian 
aristocrats to apply the British method of gradual transition to democracy. In this way, it 
would be possible to retain aristocratic domination in the emerging democracy. Later, 
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during the heydays of the revolutionary council movement, Schumpeter as finance 
minister realized the threat posed by the workers who did not limit their political 
participation to voting but additionally demanded active control of economic activities. In 
1919, Schumpeter considered the Austrian councils to be a more democratic and viable 
alternative to Soviet democracy in Russia. The Soviets’ capacity for ruling themselves 
increased his animosity towards attempts at mass sovereignty (Medearis, 2004, pp. 462-
467). 
While Schumpeter was wary of socialist attempts to expand popular control over 
all kinds of economic and administrative activities, he was simultaneously a keen (and 
rather cynical) observer of the way the parliamentary system really operated. And 
interestingly, in his cynical analyses of parliamentary politics, most of his ammunition 
came from Lenin’s criticism of the parliamentary system (Medearis, 2004, p. 465). 
Although both men were keenly aware of the sham character of parliamentary 
democracy, the political conclusions they drew from this observation were diametrically 
opposed. Whereas Lenin argued that democracy for the masses could be achieved only by 
smashing the parliamentary state apparatus and giving sovereignty to Soviets, 
Schumpeter was a realist and therefore content with limited democracy1. 
According to Huntington (1989), Schumpeter’s definition of democracy became 
dominant in American academia with the publication of Robert Dahl’s book titled 
‘Polyarchy’ in 1971 (p. 24) . In this book Dahl reserved the name democracy for an ideal 
political system, in which the government was completely responsive to its citizens. 
Political regimes that fulfill only two requirements of a democracy -inclusion and 
1 For Lenin’s evaluation of parliamentary democracy see (Lenin, 1974 (1919)). 
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contestation- are designated as polyarchies (pp. 2-16). Although democracy is 
unquestionably preferable to a polyarchy, the rest of Dahl’s book is devoted to an 
analysis of which factors lead to the emergence of polyarchies and secure their survival. 
The book summarizes its conclusions in the form of advice to policy makers. 
In his study of US democracy promotion strategies, Robinson (1996) documents 
how US policy makers from the late 1970s onwards were interested in promoting 
democratization processes throughout the world while preventing their potential 
radicalization. The emergence of the literature on democratization was mainly the 
product of this concern. According to Robinson, Dahl’s conceptualization of democracy 
was the theoretical backbone of the booming democratization literature. Having the 
ideological shield of this literature, Robinson (1996) claims, American policy makers 
could limit the political transitions in Latin America and Eastern Europe within the 
confines of elite competition (pp. 56-72) . Whereas the concept of polyarchy functioned 
as a euphemism to legitimize political systems with minimal mass participation and 
control, the critics of these regimes used such names as “limited democracy”, “controlled 
democracy”, “low intensity democracy”, and “restricted democracy” (p. 60). 
Robinson has correctly emphasized the continuity between Schumpeter’s 
definition of democracy and Dahl’s definition of polyarchy. As he demonstrates, both 
these definitions were used by US policy makers to lower expectations about democratic 
regimes. However, with his focus on the similarities, Robinson misses Dahl’s major 
revisions of Schumpeter’s minimalist definition. The first revision is the separation of the 
ideal notion of democracy from the down-to-earth polyarchies. With this conceptual 
dualism, Dahl re-introduced the classical doctrine of democracy in the theoretical sphere, 
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albeit in the guise of an ideal-type. According to Schumpeter, the ideal of the classical 
doctrine of democracy does not carry any political and scientific meaning, but for Dahl 
(1971)  it functions as a yardstick to measure the relative ‘democraticness’ of a regime (p. 
8) .  
The second revision is even more important. Although Dahl (2006) is in line with 
Schumpeter’s procedural definition, he considers Schumpeter’s criteria for democracy 
insufficient (p. 131). To be classified as a democracy by Dahl (1971) , a regime should 
satisfy eight conditions: “1. Freedom to form and join organizations 2. Freedom of 
expression  3. Right to vote  4. Right of political leaders to compete for support   
5. Eligibility for public office  6. Alternative sources of information  7. Free and fair 
elections 8. Institutions for making government policies that depend on votes and other 
expressions of preference” (p. 3). Actually, this second revision follows from the first 
one. Once the democratic ideal is not rejected as fictive nonsense and becomes a 
yardstick to measure the amount of relative democracy, the presence of competitive 
elections for choosing the executive office becomes insufficient for classifying a regime 
as a democracy.  
Recalling Schumpeter’s closing words in the fourth part of his book, “In any case, 
that democracy will not mean increased personal freedom. And, once more, it will mean 
no closer approximation to the ideals enshrined in the classical doctrine” (Schumpeter, 
1962, p. 302), the contrast between Dahl and Schumpeter becomes more evident. 
Whereas Schumpeter decreases expectations about democracies for the sake of realism, 




Followers of Dahl have continued to pose additional criteria for distinguishing 
democracies from autocracies: the absence of veto power by the unelected (Schmitter, 
1991, p. 81); reserved domains of authority and policy making (Valenzuela, 1990); rule 
of law (J. J. S. Linz, Alfred, 1996); alternation of governing parties (Przeworski, 2000, 
pp. 25-29); horizontal accountability (G. O'Donnell, 1998); and basic economic and 
social security (G. O'Donnell, 2004). In this way, scholars working on democratization 
have moved away step-by-step from Schumpeter’s definition back to what he had termed 
as the classical doctrine of democracy. Scott Mainwarring’s (2001) description of 
Schumpeter’s definition as “subminimal” shows the distance covered in this journey (p. 
38).  
This conceptual distancing from Schumpeter has certainly been noticed by 
scholars (D. Collier & Levitsky, 1997; Michael Coppedge, 2007; Møller & Skaaning, 
2013). Coppedge interprets the addition of new criteria as the ‘thickening’ of the concept 
and underlines the division of labor between the thick and thin definitions of democracy. 
Thinner definitions have no problems of applicability and in this way research with a 
large number of cases can be conducted (Michael Coppedge, 2007, pp. 110-112). On the 
other hand, the need for a thick concept is seldom justified. Collier and Levitsky (1997) 
consider the formulation of more precise definition as an attempt to “seek to avoid the 
problem of conceptual stretching that arises when the concept of democracy is applied to 
cases for which, by relevant scholarly standards, it is not appropriate.” (pp. 443-445). But 
they do not explain what specifically makes these very cases inappropriate for being 
labeled as democracies. A similar gap exists in Coppedge’s (2007) justification:  
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“Because more and more developing countries now satisfy the rather minimalist 
existing requirements for democracy, it is difficult not to notice that some of these 
political systems have disturbing characteristics that seem intuitively inconsistent 
with democracy. Some scholars therefore remind us of components of democracy 
that have been dropped or taken for granted in the past fifty years and quite 
understandably call for them to be restored or made explicit” (p. 217).  
No information is given about what is “intuitively inconsistent” with democracy. 
According to Mainwarring, accepting Schumpeter’s criterion as a sufficient condition for 
democracy will not “do justice to the word” (Mainwaring, Brinks, & Perez-Linan, 2007, 
p. 133). 
The scholarly body of work on democratization- as well as development- is the 
offspring of the literature on modernization. Given this, an analysis of the development 
literature sheds helpful light on the literature on democratization. 
In their analysis of worldwide industrialization efforts, Arrighi et al. (2003) draw 
upon Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of illusio (pp. 21-22). According to Bourdieu, to catch up 
with social groups with higher cultural capital, groups with lower cultural capital start to 
invest their resources to obtain the credentials with which the superior groups legitimize 
their superiority. Bourdieu calls this strategy as illusion because it does not improve the 
social status of the previously inferior groups but simply results in the overabundance of 
hitherto precious credentials and the blurring of the lines of distinction between superior 
and inferior groups. To protect their status, groups traditionally associated with higher 
cultural capital change the rules of the game of status attainment, and engage in a new 
symbolic struggle.  
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According to Arrighi et. al (2003), up until the 1960’s, being industrialized was a 
precious credential with which the high income countries explained the differences in the 
wealth of nations. However, the waves of industrialization after the 1960’s did not 
decrease inter-country income inequality, precisely for the reasons Bourdieu refers to. 
When too many countries started to industrialize, the United States and other high-
income countries switched from industrialization to financialization, leaving the rest of 
the world with the devalued industrial capital. Countries that were able to financialize 
their economy could not only distinguish themselves from the industrial world 
symbolically, but also reap the economic benefits of being financial centers where the 
profits of industrial capital were transferred.  
A similar movement can be observed in the process of democratization. Up to the 
late 1980’s, democracy was the distinguishing feature of wealthy capitalist countries, and 
with the democracy promotion strategies explained by Robinson (1996), all countries 
were encouraged to democratize in the same way that they were encouraged to 
industrialize. But in the early 1990’s, with the dissolution of Latin American dictatorships 
and collapse of the Soviet Union, being a ‘democracy’ lost its distinguishing capacity and 
helped only to blur the lines between high income capitalist countries and the rest of the 
world. It was at this time that academics writing about democratization tried to 
distinguish traditional democracies from the new ones, engaging in what in Bourdieu's 
terms could be called a new symbolic struggle. Of course, unlike the switch from 
industrial to financial capital, the distinctions within formal democracies did not produce 
immediate economic benefits for the North American and Western European countries. 
However, changing- or narrowing- the definitions (and thereby the rules of the game) not 
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only helped to preserve the symbolic superiority of formerly democratic countries, but 
also gave them moral justification for intervening in the political affairs of the new 
democracies. 
The outcome of these symbolic struggles in the academic literature was an 
inflation of the number of categories into which democracies fulfilling Schumpeter’s 
criteria were (re)classified. One of the initial solutions was to use the adjective 
‘unconsolidated’. It underlined the fact that the transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy in these countries was not yet complete. Although unconsolidated regimes 
were on the democratic path, a retreat was always a possibility, or worse, they 
experienced frequent attempts to restore the authoritarian order. To rephrase the widely 
used definition of Juan J. Linz and Stepan (1996) democracy was still not “the only game 
in the town”. The ‘unconsolidated’ feature also referred to the troubled characteristics, or 
relics from the authoritarian past, of these regimes, such as laws constraining civil 
liberties or institutions with which the military can intervene in the political process. 
From the mid-1990’s onwards, scholars started to question the adjective 
‘unconsolidated’ as well. O’Donnell (1996) criticized its teleological character and 
indicated that it implied a transitory status for unconsolidated democracies. According to 
him democracies in Latin America belonged to a different species- which he called 
“delegative democracies” (1994). Objecting to the all-purpose use of “democratic 
consolidation”, Andreas Schendler (1998) suggested restricting its usage only to issues 
related to the survival of democracy. Merkel (2004) used the term “defective 
democracies”, which Mainwaring (2007) rejected with the argument that a ‘defective’ 
democracy is not a democracy at all and suggested “semi-democracy” instead. Over the 
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last decade, attempts at classification dropped the name of democracy altogether and 
started to consider these regimes as variants of authoritarianism: competitive 
authoritarianism (Levitsky, 2010), semi-authoritarianism (Ottaway, 2013), electoral 
authoritarianism (Diamond, 2002; Schedler, 2009) and semi-dictatorship (Brooker, 
2000). 
Sub-classification and ranking attempts reached their apogee with Møller and 
Skaaning (2013) and Merkel (2004), who tried to synthesize existing classifications. 
Møller creates four different categories of democracies. Regimes satisfying only 
Schumpeter’s criteria are classified as minimal democracies; the ones with fair and 
inclusive elections are named as electoral democracies; the additional presence of civil 
liberties without deficiencies would promote these regimes to the rank of polyarchies. 
Finally, if a regime also satisfies the rule of law criterion, then it is considered a liberal 
democracy. Merkel similarly distinguished five different types of democracies: regimes 
satisfying all necessary conditions (inclusive elections, civil and political liberties, 
horizontal accountability and effective power to govern) are grouped under embedded 
democracies. If certain segments of the population are excluded from polls, then the 
regime is an exclusive democracy; if constitutional norms are frequently violated then we 
have an illiberal democracy. The powerlessness of the legislature and the judiciary vis-a-
vis the executive is the sign of a delegative democracy. And finally, lack of effective 
power to rule indicates a domain democracy.  
These definitional variants have been imported into the scholarly literature on the 
nature of the Turkish political regime. Acemoglu (2014) and Aknur (2012) consider 
Turkey to be an ‘unconsolidated but consolidating’ democracy in the original sense of the 
13 
 
word, whereas Heper (1992), Özbudun (1999), Öniş (2009) and Aydin-Duzgit (2013) use 
the concept to highlight the authoritarian elements of the Turkish regime and its troubled 
character. Romano (2006), Somer (2014) and Tugal (2013) consider Turkey to be a 
‘semi-democracy’. Turkey is according to Eder (2013) a ‘suboptimal democracy’, 
according to Yılmaz (2014) a ‘defective’ one, whereas Yalçın (2006) and Özel (2003) 
prefer the adjective ‘illiberal’. McLaren and Cop (2011) try to explain the failure of 
Turkish democratization and when Kirişçi (2014) comments on the recent municipal 
election results, he talks about the victory of ‘electoral democracy’ but not of ‘liberal 
democracy’. 
Counting 550 different adjectives utilized to distinguish between democratic 
regimes, D. Collier and Levitsky (1996) warned comparativists about the danger of 
miscommunication resulting from the competition to find a new famous phrase to 
describe the same phenomena. In 2005, Armony and Schamis (2005) criticized the 
“terminological Babel”. Today, it can be argued that the potential dangers they indicated 
have become part of the scholarly reality. One of the starting points of this study, 
however, is the argument that the real danger is not miscommunication and fruitless 
competition amongst the students of democratization but their unchallenged consensus on 
the conceptualization of democracy. Regardless of the apparent disagreements about the 
exact terms or designations, all of them establish insurmountable walls between the 
regimes of the global North and South. It is this consensus which represents in three 
senses a regression from Schumpeter’s earlier definition. 
To begin with, the main merit of Schumpeter’s definition was its realism. 
Developing additional necessary conditions for democracy reduces its applicability to 
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most of the newly emerging democracies. Table 1-1 compares the distribution of regimes 
in the world according to Møller and Skaaning (2013). Only 15% of the states with a 
population of more than one million are completely democratic and this corresponds to 
27% of the regimes which are classified as a sort of democracy. Moving from the number 
of states to population as the basis of comparison decreases the percentage of liberal 
democracies to 11.1% of all regimes (20% of all democracies). Hence, depending on the 
basis of comparison, deficient democracies constitute 70-80% of all democracies- not to 
mention the regimes classified as autocracies. 
TABLE 1-1 DISTRIBUTION OF VARIOUS FORMS OF DEMOCRACIES 
 Liberal Polyarchy Electoral Minimal Autocracy 
Number  
of States** 
24 18 12 32 73 
Percentage  
in all Regimes 
15.1 11.3 7.5 20.1 45.9 
Percentage  
in Democracies 
27.9 20.9 14 37.2  
Population 
(millions) 
785 344 1939 928 3107 
Percentage  
in all Regimes 
11.1 4.8 27.3 13.1 43.7 
Percentage  
in Democracies 
19.6 8.6 48.5 23.2  
Source: Møller and Skaaning (2013) ** with population larger than 1 million 
The second virtue of Schumpeter’s definition is its openness to operationalization, 
enabling us to distinguish autocracies from democracies. Actually, as Schumpeter (1962) 
concedes, providing a clear-cut distinction between these two regimes is not possible 
even with his definition: “there is a continuous range of variation with which the 
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democratic method of government shades off into the autocratic one by imperceptible 
steps” (p. 271). And with each additional criterion invented by his adherents, the problem 
of finding a cut-off point has become even more difficult. 
If the problem were essentially a problem of measurement and finding the right 
cut-off point, it would not be doomed to a regression but might spark off a productive 
debate concerning the measurement of certain concepts. However, the crux of the 
problem lies somewhere else. Since the additional categories are not introduced out of 
theoretical necessity but invented to justify the argument that Northern democracies are 
different from- and superior to- the Southern ones, they are inevitably loaded with 
contradictions. A look at the United States and Germany, constituting half of the 
population of liberal democracies according to Møller, should illustrate the point. 
According to Møller (2013) , these two countries have highly inclusive elections with 
integrity (p. 148). Concerning inclusion, in Germany approximately 8.4% of the voting-
age population is excluded from the polls2. In the United States, given the large number 
illegal imigrants, non-resident citizens, and felony disenfranchisements, this ratio is 
probably even higher3. In contrast to these paradigmatic cases of liberal democracy, 
Turkey, “the deficient democracy”, deprives less than 1% of the voting age residents 
from electoral rights. Moreover, in spite of what happened during the counting process in 
the 2000 presidential elections, the US electoral system is still classified as a system with 
2 Calculated from Johnson (June 6 2009) 
3 There is no accurate calculation of voting-age legal and illegal residents in US without voting rights. 
However, according to IDEA (2014) the voting age population in United States is approximately 241 
million. Rytina (2012) estimates the number of legal residents as 13 million, whereas Passel (2013) 
estimates the number of illegal immigrants to be around 11.7 million. Assuming the proportion of adults in 
these populations is not different than the US ratio -76.3%-, there are 18.9 million non-citizen adult 
residents. Adding 5.9 million citizens (The Sentencing Project (2010)), who are disenfranchised because of 
their felonies, to this number will give around 10.3% . However, the record-level difference between the 
registered voters (194 million) and voting age population (241 million) the proportion of disenfranchised 
people in United States indicates that even this is an underestimation IDEA (2014). 
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high integrity. Armony (2005) gives other examples from France and Italy: the reserved 
prerogatives of the French presidents blur the distinction between France and so called 
unconsolidated democracies, and Berlusconi’s Italy could be easily classified as a 
delegative democracy. Sweden has been ruled for 63 years by the same Social 
Democratic Party, most of the policies of European states are decided by unelected 
bureaucrats, and in Great Britain during the Thatcher era, political power was 
concentrated in the hands of the executive office (pp. 115-118). 
To turn to the third advantage of Schumpeter’s definition, because of the way 
“deficient democracies” are conceptualized, it is not possible to analyze the political 
process in a dynamic way. In most of the studies, unconsolidated or semi-democracies 
are treated like a laundry bag where all countries not fitting the ideal type are lumped 
together without any differentiation. Countries are grouped together in this category not 
because of what they have in common-rather their common denominator is what they 
don’t have compared to the democracies of the North. So the regimes are conceptualized 
to be either in a slow and painful (or sometimes rapid and astonishing) one-dimensional 
transition to the liberal democratic camp, or mostly caught in the trap of semi-
democracies. In the latter case, despite many political changes, the regime remains 
essentially the same. 
Compared to the widespread carelessness in the use of notions like semi-
democracies or unconsolidated democracies, Merkel’s attempt to distinguish amongst 
defective democracies could be considered an improvement, even though he builds his 
sub-categories in line with the former approach. However, after establishing a checklist 
with four conditions, he defines one subtype of hybrid democracy for each missing 
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condition, making it possible to link each version of the defective democracies to 
embedded democracy - the central concept - in a way not different from the consolidation 
approach. If the defective democracy succeeds in fullfilling the missing condition(s), it 
would be promoted to the rank of embedded democracy. Conversely, if the embedded 
democracy fails to satisfy one of the criteria, it is considered to be a specific type of 
defective democracy, depending on the missing attribute. Since hybrid types are not 
linked to each other, there is no room for a transition from one version of defective 
democracy to another. 
In other words, artifically seperating Northern democracies from Southern ones 
conceives change, at best, as a teleological transition to liberal democracy or does not 
conceptualize change at all. Although Schumpeter did not attempt to classify different 
forms of democracy or autocracy, his definition is more suitable to explain variation and 
change compared to all the post-1970 definitions. The motivation to distinguish Northern 
democracies from the Southern ones produced a grey zone within which the movements 
and transitions cannot be theorized. Schumpeter’s advantage is the absence of this self-
imposed grey zone. To get rid of all the conceptual barriers, what needs to be done is to 
return to Schumpeter’s minimalist definition and refuse to treat Nothern democracies as a 
different or special species.  
A return to Schumpeter’s definition does not prevent one from comparing the 
relative ‘democraticness’ of various regimes. Actually, from his definition and implicit 
discussion throughout the book, it is possible to infer two distinct variables with which 
one can map various regimes with a democratic claim: the competitive struggle and the 
power to decide.  
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Schumpeter’s (1962) understanding of political competition is not different from 
that of economic competition. In the economic sphere, monopoly is a competition-free 
environment. However, the presence of perfect competition, where everybody is free to 
enter every industry or sector is neither desirable nor possible. The same is true for the 
political sphere. What distinguishes democracy from other regimes is not the degree of 
competition but the type of competition; that is, electoral competition. Electoral regimes 
differ from one another in terms of the degree to which the government can be 
challenged. Democraticness in this sense is therefore gradational. It is important not to 
confuse the freedom to challenge the government by electoral means with the presence of 
civil liberties. Certainly, the extent of individual freedoms is interrelated with the degree 
of democraticness. However, democracies do not guarantee civil liberties, and therefore 
the extent of civil liberties cannot be interpolated from the extent of democratization. The 
indicator of democraticness is the freedom to compete “for political leadership by 
presenting himself to the electorate” (p. 272).  
The second constitutive dimension of Schumpeter’s (1962) definition is the power 
to decide. When he compares constitutional monarchies with the parliamentary ones, he 
states that the presence of elections is not sufficient for a regime to be classified as a 
democracy since the parliaments “lack the power to impose their choice as to the 
governing committee” (p. 270). In an ideal democracy, the electorate elects all ministers 
directly. Since, according to Schumpeter, this is only possible at the local level, he 
considers the ability to elect the president directly an indicator of an ideal type. Even 
British parliamentarism, with a more indirect procedure for electing politically the most 
powerful person (the prime minister) could be considered an ideal case. In contrast, 
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France where the members of the parliament have a greater capacity to resist the prime 
minister–but the prime minister has no prerogative to dissolve the parliament--is 
considered to be a deviation from the democratic ideal. 
Nevertheless, parallel to Schumpeter’s (1962) position on perfect competition, the 
logical extreme of this dimension - a regime where the elected have the power to decide 
about everything - is again neither possible nor desirable. In contrast, the success of the 
democratic method depends on the self-restraint of the elected not to interfere in issues 
which require expertise, and in the existence of a bureaucracy, that is “strong enough to 
guide and, if need be, to instruct the politicians who head the ministers”, i.e., “it [the 
bureaucracy] must be a power in its own right” (p. 293). For this reason, Schumpeter 
does not hesitate to designate the United Kingdom in the 19th century, where the House 
of Lords had the power to reject any bill proposed by the House of Commons, as 
democratic. Concerning this dimension, his understanding of democracy is again 
gradational. Regimes where aristocrats can block the elected and where the bureaucrats 
can instruct them are still called democracies (pp. 273-280). 
Figure 1.1 shows the two dimensions of democracy according to Schumpeter’s 
definition. Since maximum freedom to compete electorally and maximum power to 
decide are unattainable, they are referred to as impossible democracies. If the competition 
or the power to decide falls below a certain degree, then we enter the domain of 






procedures. The procedural dimension is related to the studies of democratic transition 
and the behavioral dimension is related to the studies of democratic consolidation.  
This study draws upon Munck’s definition of the regime, but only partially. 
Munck’s behavioral dimension is related to the consolidation of democracy, and as 
argued in the previous section, our study is based on the rejection of the concept of 
consolidation. So the behavioral dimension identified by Munck is not part of the analysis 
of the Turkish regime in this study. 
Munck states that the first two aspects of the procedural definition refer to 
people’s relationship with governmental institutions, whereas the third aspect refers to 
inter-governmental distribution of power. He proposes a two dimensional model and 
states that if the first two aspects refer to the vertical dimension of the procedural 
definition, the last one refers to its horizontal dimension. His conceptualization of the 
procedural definition is parallel to the two dimensions mentioned in the previous section. 
How can one distinguish different types of the same regime? According to Munck 
(1996), the comparative politics literature uses two different methods: neutral addition 
and creation of hybrid forms. In neutral addition, an additional criterion is used to 
distinguish different forms of the same regime. The hybrid form approach, on the other 
hand, considers different forms of regimes as poles and defines subtypes of regimes in 
terms of closeness or remoteness from the poles (pp. 16-20).  
This study differs from Munck in its usage of the criteria to differentiate between 
various types of democratization. To differentiate democratic regimes from one another, I 
employ Schumpeter’s two criteria - that he uses to distinguish democratic regimes from 
non-democratic ones - in a slightly modified form. Exclusion and inclusion, and the 
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balance between the elected and appointed (non-elected) constitute the two axes of my 
conceptual grid.  
Inclusion is one of the two dimensions in Dahl’s (1971) conceptualization of 
democratic regimes. For Dahl the basic measure of inclusion is the extension of suffrage. 
Historically, suffrage has certainly been an important demand of the struggle for 
democratic rights. However, I do not use extension of suffrage as the criterion for 
measuring the inclusiveness of a democratic polity for two reasons. First, the suffrage 
criterion is not used consistently, with the clearest example being that of women’s 
suffrage. As Paxton (2000) reminds us, considering women’s suffrage as a criterion for 
democratization would change the results for most of the research in the literature. 
Switzerland was the first country to recognize universal male suffrage but recognized 
universal suffrage only in 1971, seven years later than Sudan, and was the last in 
Europe.4 Second, the relationship between extension of suffrage and democratization is 
also contingent. In Britain, enfranchisment of working classes went hand in hand with 
democratization of the country, whereas in Bismarckian Germany, Bonapartist France, 
and Kemalist Turkey, universal suffrage was the harbinger of a subsequent authoritarian 
period.  
Although Schumpeter considers the freedom to participate in the electoral process 
as a measure of the democraticness of a regime, he does not give any hint about its 
operationalization. I use the barriers against party formation as the indicator of this 
variable. The more parties compete for elections without any restrictions, the more 
4 With the exception of the principality of Liechtenstein. In Liechtenstein, women’s right to vote in national 
elections was granted as a result of the 1984 referandum. Previously, there had ben three referandums in 
1968, 1971 and 1973 on the issue of women’s suffrage (Paxton, Bollen, Lee, & Kim, 2003, p. 98). 
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inclusionary the regime becomes. Conversely, the regime becomes more exclusionary as 
more constraints are imposed on parties. In this way we can rank various regimes along 
an exclusion-inclusion axis. To determine the regime’s position along the inclusion and 
exclusion axis, I look at banned or outlawed political parties. A high ratio of outlawed 
parties to the number of parties participating in the elections signifies an exclusionary 
regime. Along this axis we can mark five possible locations: (1) no competition (zero 
parties) (2) single party regime (3) a multi-party system with a large number of outlawed 
parties (4) a multi-party system with a low number of outlawed parties, and (5) a multi-
party system without any legal barriers to party formation. A move from (1) to (5) is a 
move from complete exclusion (EX) to complete inclusion (INC) and vice versa. 
The second axis actually corresponds to what Munck defines as the horizontal 
relationship between different governmental positions. However, Munck uses it to 
distinguish democracies from non-democracies, whereas this study uses the criterion to 
distinguish amongst different forms of democracies. 
Valenzuela (1990) distinguishes consolidated democracies from unconsolidated 
democracies by emphasizing the absence of tutelary prerogatives and reserved domains 
for the military (pp. 7-11). Przeworski (1988, pp. 60-61) and Merkel (2004, p. 41) also 
consider effective power to govern as a condition of democracy. However, no specific 
research so far has used this criterion to differentiate different forms of democracies from 
one another. 
Mazzuca (2010) distinguishes between two different concepts: access to power 
and exercise of power. He claims that most of the literature on democratization 
concentrates on access to power: freedom of press, suffrage, free and fair elections, and 
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freedom of organization among others. But the exercise of political power is as important 
as the access thereto. To use Mazzuca’s terminology, the EL-NEL axis in this study is not 
about the access to power but its exercise. While examining the exercise of political 
power however, Mazzuca uses Weberian categories and distinguishes between 
clientalistic and bureaucratic regimes (pp. 341-343).   
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Figure 1-2 Theoretically Possible Regimes 
 
In contrast to Mazzuca and Valenzuela, what I distinguish in this study is the 
power of the elected representatives. Simply put, the minimal condition for a democracy 
is elections. There are again five possibilities: (1) nobody is elected (2) the elected have 
no executive or legislative powers but provide merely consultative services (3) the chief 
executive is elected but his control over the bureaucratic apparatus is limited (4) the 
bureaucracy is subordinate to the elected (5) all important posts in the bureaucracy are 
assigned as a result of elections. In this way we can create a second axis with the poles of 
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maximum electoral control (EL) and maximum control of the appointed or non-elected 
personnel (NEL). 
For a concrete analysis of regimes based on this conceptualization, it is possible to 
imagine a 5x5 table as in Figure 1.2. Given the limits of democracy under capitalism, 
Column A and Row 5 do not refer to cases possible for actually existing bourgeois 
democracies. The four squares B4, B3, C4, C3 are possible modes within this type of 
democracy. We can name these modes as inclusionary parliamentary, exclusionary 
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hand, provides a more abstract view and enables us to distinguish between different 
modes of democratization without taking non-democratic periods into account. We 
cannot see the temporary transitions but we can define and compare different modes of 
democracy.  
 As can be seen, the criteria used to locate the regime are not formal rules but the 
practice of the operating institutions. However, that does not mean that formal rules are 
unimportant. On the contrary, the very notion of the modality implies that each mode of 
democracy has a “different spirit” and a different set of laws, even if the spirit cannot be 
directly read from the laws. For this reason, I consider a new constitution as the definitive 
sign of a new regime. For the narrative of each regime then, I consider the formation of a 
new constitution as the starting point of a new phase. 
Figure 1-4 periodizes important turning points in Turkish political history which I 
discuss in Chapter 2 in detail. For now, it is sufficient to underline the two main 
arguments of this study on Turkish democracy. First, contrary to the portrayal of the 
Turkish regime as a stagnant, trapped, defective democracy, it is a dynamic regime, that 
has over time experienced all four modes of bourgeois democracy. Second, its course 
cannot be summarized as a slow democratization process, but a patterned de-
democratization process. To understand the reasons behind this pattern, the next step 
should be the clarification of the relationship between coups and democracy. 
Coups d’Etat and Democracies 
 In their research on worldwide coups between 1950 and 2010, Powell and Thyne 
(2010) define coups as “illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within 
the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive.” (p. 252). This definition is the starting 
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point for this study, but it does not include autogolpes (self-coups). In Andrew Arato’s 
(2003) words an auto-golpe is a “coup or revolution carried out by a legitimate authority 
in place” (p. 423). Peruvian president Fujimori’s suspension of the parliament in 1992 is 
the best known example of an autogolpe. Despite their undertheorized status, auto-golpes 
constitute 40% of all democratic breakdowns between 1950-2004 (Maeda, 2010, p. 
1130). This study includes an extended version of autogolpes into the domain of coups. 
Hence not only dissolving parliaments but also ending competition among parties by 
outlawing all forms of parliamentary opposition is considered a coup. The definition of 
the coup therefore is: illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the 
state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive or to dissolve institutions, mechanisms and 
organizations necessary to change the sitting executive by electoral means. 
An important assumption of the current literature on democratization is the 
incompatibilty of democracy with coups. Beginning with McAllister’s (1961) and 
Huntington’s (1962) notion of the “praetorian state,” coups were seen as typical 
symptoms of unstable regimes “oscillat[ing] between extreme democracy and tyranny” 
(Huntington, 1965, p. 417). Since Juan Linz’s  Breakdown of Democratic Regimes 
(1978), coups are considered to be typical examples of democratic breakdown Muller 
(1985); Schedler (1998, p. 97). Although Mainwaring (2001, p. 49) and Przeworski 
(2000, p.68) have respectively discussed the 1979 coup in Paraguay and the 1960 coup in 
Turkey which resulted in a democratic regime, the literature is generally silent on 
democratic consequences of coups with the exception of Varol’s article (2012), the 
historical context of which I discuss in the conclusion. 
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The assumed incompatibility of democracy with coups can also be observed in the 
attempts to define consolidated democracies, the condition for which, according to Linz 
(1990), is democracy being “the only game in the town,” and for Przeworski (1991) 
“when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions.” (p. 26). Munck 
(1996) has a weaker sufficient condition- no categoric rejection of the democratic norms 
(p. 6). 
The extensive literature on democratic breakdown provides a variety of 
explanations for the collapse of democratic regimes. For Huntington (1965) it is the result 
of over-politicization of the military and over-mobilization of the society. O’Donnell 
(1978) has explained the rise of authoritarianism with the unsustainability of the populist 
developmentalist project. In Linz’s model (1978), democratic breakdown is the outcome 
of a chain reaction involving economic or political crisis, opportunistic attempts of 
opposition parties to deepen the crisis, and finally a loss of the population’s faith in the 
democratic method. For Collier and Hoeffler (2005), the most important variable is 
poverty, which explains Africa’s leadership in the league of coup-vulnerable countries. 
Classifying coups as categorically anti-democratic and explaining their 
occurrence with different forms of crises leads one to the conclusion that democracy can 
flourish only in crisis-free environments. Not surprisingly, this was also one of the basic 
tenets of the modernization literature. In Some Social Requistes of Democracy, one of the 
earliest articles specifying the necessary conditions for democracy, Lipset (1959) argued 
that democracy could be the crowning step of a social differentiation process. 
Przerworski (2000) has recently affirmed this argument with a modification: there is not a 
necessary link between democracy and economic prosperity. However, the survival 
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chances of democracy in wealthy countries are much higher compared to those with a 
lower GNP per capita (pp. 136-137).  
Although the literature on the damage done to democracy by coups in the 
developing world is immense, so far nothing has the been written on the emeregnce of the 
Fifth Republic in France and the transition leading thereto 5- yet another indicator of the 
double standards in evaluating democracies of the global North and South. De Gaulle’s 
rise to presidency would have been unthinkable without Pierre Lagaillarde’s coup on 
May 13, 1958. However, the outcome of this coup was again a democracy with an 
institutional setting much less favorable to the Communist Party of France. If coups are 
so antithetical to democracy, how could the 1958 coup function as the midwife for 
another democratic regime? The same question can be posed for the 1960 coup in Turkey 
and mutatis mutandis for the one in 1980. 
Turkish political history poses two other challenges to the classification of coups 
as categorically anti-democratic. If democratic regimes and coups belong to different 
worlds, one would expect the post-coup, alegedly ‘new’ regimes to be qualitatively 
different from their predecessors. Yet in 1946 , the transition from the so-called Kemalist 
authoritarianism to a multi-party democracy took place without a single constitutional 
change. How can a smooth transition like this be explained? An equally smooth transition 
in the other direction also needs explanation. With the 1997 coup, the army was able to 
topple the government- again without a single constitional change. How can democratic 
and allegedly dicatorial regimes operate within the same legal constitutionally 
5 Ben-Eliezer (1998) could be considered as the only exception. However, even he does not consider it a 
coup but a revolt (p. 324).  
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framework? All these counter examples show that the relationship between coups and 
democratic regimes is far more complicated than is ususally assumed. 
The incapacity of democratic regimes to solve economic and political crises is 
also underlined by Schumpeter (1962). However, unlike his contemporary followers, 
Schumpeter did not see temporary dictatorships irreconcilable with the democratic 
principle. In cases of emergency, the democratic method of competetitive struggle for 
leadership can temporarily cede its place to monopolistic leadership practices. A 
temporary monopolistic practice would mean merely a suspension of democracy, 
whereas a monopolistic practice without a time limit would mean its abrogation (p. 296). 
Although Schumpeter does not mention coups even once, his distinction between 
suspention and abrogation of the democratic principle enables one, as this study does, to 
distinguish two different types of coups: one that ends the regime and one that protects it. 
However, the absence or presence of a constitutionally defined legal time limit should not 
be the criterion. If shifting from competitive to monopolistic leadership is constitutionally 
permitted, the switch to monopolistic rule should not even be considered as suspension of 
the democratic principle, but as an integral process of the democratic system. A 
suspension should be something exogenous to the institutional rules of the regime, like a 
coup or autogolpe violating the constitution. In this sense, the difference between 
abrogating and suspending democracy should be searched somewhere else. Regime 
changes could be a better alternative criterion. Coups that change or abolish the 
constitution should be considered as abrogative coups, whereas coups which simply 
bypass or freeze the constitution should be considered as protective coups- aimed at 
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protecting the status quo in terms of balance of power amongst the major actors of the 
regime. 
Furthermore, not all coups that abolish the old constitution signal the beginning of 
an autocratic period. As in the case of the 1960 and 1980 coups in Turkey, it could well 
be that coups abolishing an established demoratic regime would form another one, albeit 
with a different institutional configuration. Hence it is possible to establish three different 
categories of coups:  
1. Autocratic Coups: coups that replace a democratic regime with an autocratic one. 
2. Protective Coups: coups that aim to preserve the social and political balance in the 
existing regime. 
3. Transformative Coup: coups that not only abolish the existing regime but also 
found a new one. 
Abandoning the simplistic equation of coups with breakdown of democracy and 
identifying the role played by coups in crisis resolution and regime changes enables us to 
discover a pattern in Turkish coups over the course of the twentieth century. Since the 
1908 Revolution, which was a transformative coup itself, every transformative coup had 
been followed by a protective coup.  
Differentiating the coups according to their role in regime protection and change 
does not help specify the conditions which lead to coups and secure the latter’s success 
(or failure). Similary, the relationship between the coups and the direction of regime 
change also remains unexplained. To answer these questions, coups and regime crises 
should be linked to the competition within the power bloc, and to revolutionary 
movements of workers and oppressed nationalities.  
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Democracy and Social Struggles 
 
To map the literature concerning the link between democracy and social struggles, 
two questions need to be asked: 1) Is there an intrinsic link and positive relationship 
between social mobilization and democratization? 2) Is there a positive relationship 
between centralization of capital and political power and revolutionary movements? 
Depending on the affirmative or negative answer to each question, it is possible to define 
four distinct positions. 
Marx 
Marx’s answer to both questions is determined by his understanding of the main 
dynamics shaping the modern bourgeois society. For him, the separation of the political 
from the social is characteristic of modern bourgeois society, distinguishing it from the 
feudal society where both notions were inseparable (1975m, pp. 232-233). The 
emergence of the state as an entity separate from the society is related to the 
emancipation of private property and the emergence of the bourgeoisie as a separate 
national class (1998, p. 99). Modern bourgeois world consists of two realms: a Hobbesian 
civil society, where private interests reign; and a repressive republic with the claim of 
regulating the bellum omnium contra omnes. Regardless of its separateness from the 
social and its claims about universality, the state as a repressive entity serves the needs of 
the property holders. 
True democracy for Marx was the end of this divorce, a reunification of the 
political and the social, but this time, in contrast to the feudal society, under freedom 
(1975f, pp. 87-91). Since the emergence of the bourgeois republic is strictly connected to 
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the rise of private property (pp. 175-177), this reunification should involve not only the 
dissolution of the political realm - the state - but also the civil society (p. 191). In Marx’s 
early articles, the dissolution of civil society involves democratization of private property 
(Draper, 1977, p. 91), which was later labeled in Capital as “expropriation of the 
expropriators” (1975b, p. 750). 
Along similar lines, in his early writings, Marx considered universal suffrage a 
sufficient condition for the dissolution of the abstract bourgeois republic. Accordingly, 
once the property-less masses acquire the right to vote, the alienation between state and 
civil society would be overcome. This perspective helps explain Marx’s benevolent 
attitude towards the Chartists in Britain. However, with his increasing involvement in 
communist politics, he began to consider abolition of the existing state apparatus as 
necessary (1975e, pp. 411-412). No doubt certain democratic rights can be won under 
capitalism, but their presence does not change the politically undemocratic nature of the 
regime. For example, while writing about Lincoln, Marx described the American political 
regime as a “democratic humbug” (1975j, p. 562) and likened the functioning of the 
British parliament to a “safety valve for the effervescing passions of the country” . He 
subsequently wrote about the ‘embourgeoisment’ of the workers via parliamentary 
activities. 
Nevertheless, for Marx, although true democracy cannot be realized under 
capitalism, the significance of really existing democracy is more than being a safety 
valve. In Manifesto of the Communist Party, he refers to “the battle of democracy” as a 
battle for political power, and capitalism produces and reproduces the battle of 
democracy on an ever-growing scale. In this battle, the bourgeoisie and the workers have 
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different demands and different methods. Whereas the former group can accumulate 
wealth and aspire to membership of the ruling class, the latter is under constant threat of 
dispossession (1975l, pp. 504, 492-506). 
The bourgeoisie’s struggle for democracy is in one sense a struggle for becoming 
part of the ruling coalition and to increase its power therein. Their political demands vary 
from representative government and a powerful parliament to a republic and a cheap state 
with a light bureaucracy (1975i, p. 486). 
The struggle for becoming the ruling class is not a struggle between two 
homogenous classes –the feudal classes on one side and the bourgeoisie on the other. In 
the Manifesto, Marx outlines the most general outcomes of capitalist development, but 
refers to the struggle of different bourgeois factions against each other in his analysis of 
concrete historical periods. For example, in Class Struggles in France, he portrays the 
attitude of various bourgeois factions towards the state in a more nuanced way. Whereas 
the nascent segment of the bourgeoisie - the industrial bourgeoisie - prefers a cheap state, 
the relatively older faction of the bourgeoisie - the financial aristocracy as the main 
creditor of the state - has an interest in a huge state with immense indebtedness. As a 
result, financial segments of the bourgeoisie also build alliances with the aristocracy and 
big landed proprietors. Marx observed a similar competition in the power bloc in England 
between the Whigs- the aristocratic and more industrially oriented segments of the 
bourgeoisie - and the Tories, consisting mainly of big landowners (1975h, pp. 327-331) 
In contrast to the competing sections of the bourgeoisie, the workers are 
concerned with resisting exploitation and increasing their organizational capacity to 
improve their economic conditions. Participation in the political system and seeking 
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representation in the parliament are all a part of this struggle. Hence the workers’ 
democratic struggle is centered on inclusion and on the right to contest. The purpose of 
political activity is to decrease the level of exploitation or at least to hold it at tolerable 
levels (1975c, pp. 335-337; 1975l, pp. 492-493). 
To gain the upper hand within the ruling coalition, the bourgeoisie cannot struggle 
by itself. It needs either to mobilize the workers or manipulate an already present 
mobilization. But to mobilize the workers, the bourgeoisie needs to promise political 
inclusion. As stated in the Manifesto: “At this stage, therefore, the proletarians do not 
fight their enemies, but the enemies of their enemies, the remnants of absolute monarchy, 
the landowners, the non-industrial bourgeois, the petty bourgeois. Thus, the whole 
historical movement is concentrated in the hands of the bourgeoisie; every victory so 
obtained is a victory for the bourgeoisie.” (p. 496 ). 
Nevertheless, this tactic is not peculiar to the bourgeoisie. Other segments of the 
ruling bloc use the same method. If the relationship between the Anti-Corn Law League 
and Chartists in Britain is an example of the former case, the relationship between 
Bismarck and Lassalleans in Germany is an example of the latter. Engels in The Prussian 
Military Question and the German Workers' Party, an article written under Marx’s close 
supervision, summarizes the attitude of the decaying and emerging segments of the ruling 
classes:  
The feudal and bureaucratic representatives of the declining society appeal to the 
workers to join them in attacking the blood-suckers, the capitalists, the sole foes 
of the worker; the bourgeoisie make it clear to the workers that they jointly 
represent the new social era and therefore have a common interest at least with 
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regard to the declining, old form of society. At about this time the working class 
then gradually becomes aware that it is a class in its own right with its own 
interests and its own independent future (1975n, p. 69). 
However, the workers’ struggle also assumes revolutionary forms. This 
possibility denotes the second type of workers’ movements. Whereas the demands of the 
first type are limited to economic improvement or political demands such as voting 
rights, the second type of movements make political demands concerning the future of 
the regime. In this sense, the demands resemble the bourgeoisie’s demands but are more 
radical. The political goal of such movements need not be the dictatorship of the 
proletariat; even the demand for a republic can be revolutionary (1975a, p. 285).  
Another important component of the revolutionary movements is the petty 
bourgeoisie, a class consisting mainly of urban artisans and peasants. Unlike workers, 
who are the “special and essential product” of capital accumulation, the petty bourgeois 
“decay and finally disappear in the face of” the same process. The antagonistic 
relationship between capital accumulation and class survival explains the explosive and 
revolutionary character of petty bourgeois movements. However, since petty bourgeoisie 
is a class with no future, its movement does not have a specific character. Allied with a 
proletarian movement it can be revolutionary; otherwise, especially in rural areas, the 
destabilizing movement can rapidly cede its place to a craving for order.  
A final note about the petty bourgeoisie should be about its constant reproduction. 
Although the traditional petty bourgeoisie is constantly ruined, “a new petty 
bourgeoisie…[is]… formed, which hovers between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie 
and continually renews itself as a supplementary part of bourgeois society” . Since capital 
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accumulation fuels the renewal and decay cycle constantly, the revolutionary dynamic 
does not leave the sphere of social struggles.  
The final component of movements with a revolutionary character is the 
nationalist movement, which was the most prominent category of revolutionary 
movements during the 19th century. Since nation-state is the typical state form under 
capitalism, capital accumulation goes hand-in-hand with nationalist aspirations and 
encourages them. These movements can do both: either destabilize pre-capitalist empires 
(as in the case of Polish nationalism and Russia) or weaken capitalist empires (as in the 
case of Irish nationalism and the British) (1975k, pp. 473-476)6. 
However, it is important to note that there is not a Chinese wall between these two 
movements. On the contrary, the bourgeoisie’s mobilization of workers for the first type 
of movement paves the way for the second type of movement. A glance at what Marx has 
written on suffrage movements will reveal this connection. Despite being critical of the 
parliamentarist movements in Britain and France, and of their degeneration, Marx 
recognized the revolutionary potential of movements for enfranchisement. 
Whereas the first type of workers’ movement arises out of the competition within 
the ruling bloc, the second type alarms all factions of the bourgeoisie and leads the 
parliamentary faction of the ruling class to surrender to the authoritarian bloc. Under such 
a circumstance, the authoritarian bloc has sufficient backing for an assault on the 
workers’ movements and can move the regime towards a more exclusive position.  
6 Up to the 1860’s Marx and Engels did not consider all nationalist movements progressive or revolutionary 
and distinguished between progressive movements like Polish nationalism and reactionary ones like Slavic 
nationalism Rozdolski (1986). However as Anderson (2010) demonstrates, starting with his 1853 New 
York Tribune articles, Marx seemed to drop the category of non-historic people. 
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Thus, by now stigmatising as “socialistic” what it had previously extolled as 
“libérât”, the bourgeoisie confesses that its own interests dictate that it should be 
delivered from the danger of its own rule; that, in order to restore tranquility in 
the country, its bourgeois parliament must, first of all, be laid to rest; that, in order 
to preserve its social power intact, its political power must be broken; that the 
individual bourgeois can continue to exploit the other classes and to enjoy 
undisturbed property, family, religion and order only on condition that their class 
be condemned along with the other classes to similar political nullity; that, in 
order to save its purse, it must forfeit the crown, and the sword that is to safeguard 
it must at the same time be hung over its own head as a sword of Damocles 
(1975g). 
It can therefore be stated that the battle of democracy has two interrelated 
dimensions. On the one hand, it is a struggle among different factions of the power bloc 
to increase their relative shares in the control over the state apparatus. On the other hand, 
it is a struggle of oppressed masses for their political rights. The politicization of the 
former radicalizes the latter. In contrast, radicalization of the latter creates a disincentive 
for the former. One can even say that an ebb in the latter is a necessary condition for the 
former (1975d, p. 48). 
This sketch of Marx’s understanding is sufficient to answer the two questions at 
the beginning of this section. As regards to the first question, there is an indispensable but 
not immediate link between capital accumulation and democratization. The accumulation 
of capital sparks off at least five different forms of social struggle involving different 
social actors: 1) between the declining and the rising classes (Bourgeoisie-Aristocracy) 2) 
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between the aristocratic and nascent factions of the rising classes (Financial and 
Industrial Bourgeoisie) 3) between workers and factions of the ruling classes 4) of the 
decaying petty bourgeoisie 5) of an oppressed nation. Moreover, the struggles of the last 
three segments can assume either a reformist or a revolutionary form depending on their 
attitude towards the factions of the ruling classes and other oppressed social groups. The 
trajectory of democracy in a given polity is dependent on the course of these five 
struggles. 
The second question can be answered by remembering the four dynamics of 
revolutionary movements: 1) mobilization of workers and petty bourgeoisie as a result of 
conflicts within the power bloc 2) increasing class polarization 3) decay of the petty 
bourgeoisie and 4) spread of nationalist aspirations. Contrary to widespread beliefs, 
centralization of capital was not the end of competition for Marx Elliott (1980); Williams 
(1987, p. 10). Hence what should be expected is not the lessening but escalation of 
struggles within the power bloc. Similarly, since centralization of capital is accompanied 
by polarization between classes, the rise of revolutionary workers movements and 
eruption of petty bourgeois movements should also be the consequence of this process. 
As regards to the centralization of the state, what is important for Marx is not an increase 
in the repressive capacity of the state, but developments in the communications and the 
transport technology, which increase workers’ capacity to unite and resist (1975l, p. 493). 





For Max Weber, democracy is a generic term which has a broader meaning than 
today’s procedural theorists attribute to it. The notion of democracy is closely related to 
equality, and democratization refers to the leveling of social differences. In other words, 
in the process of democratization, the politically privileged segments lose their position 
and previously excluded groups acquire the right to access state power. Hence each 
process of democratization involves usurpation of power and inclusion of certain 
segments of the plebes (1961, p. 236). It is important to note that democracy is not a 
modern phenomenon. Weber refers to two different democratization processes, one in 
Antiquity and the other in the Middle Ages7.  
 In On the Situation of the Constitutional Democracy in Russia, where he 
reflected on the future of democracy rather pessimistically, Weber specified four factors 
responsible for the birth and survival of democracy in Western Europe 1) the capacity to 
expand overseas and being influenced by the winds from overseas 2) the specific 
economic and social structure of European countries 3) the rise of rationalism and 4) the 
Protestant ethic (1994a, pp. 69-70). Downing (1993) summarizes the features Weber 
considered specific to European economic and social structure as the rule of law, 
autonomous towns, decentralized military organization and citizenship rights (p. 4). 
Among these factors, the one related to social struggles is the self-administering towns 
because Weber explained their emergence with political revolutions, which are the key 
for each democratization process. To defend themselves, the elites in cities needed to arm 
the politically excluded segments and this military dependence led to political inclusion 
7 If we include his observations about the November Revolution in Germany and October Revolution in 
Russia, we have to refer to three democratization processes. 
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(1961, pp. 240-241). Hence if one adopts a very long historical perspective stretching 
from Antiquity to the twentieth century, Weber definitely considers social struggles 
important for democratization. 
Having witnessed two revolutions in Russia and one in continental Europe, and 
being personally involved in the German Revolution, Weber was certainly aware of the 
existence and impact of strikes and peasant unrest. Since the Social Democratic Party in 
Germany was split evenly between the reformist and revolutionary wings, he was also 
aware of the differences between reformist and revolutionary mass mobilization, and 
actively supported the former wing (Mommsen, 1990, pp. 111-112). One of Weber’s 
central assumptions was the conflictual character of any society and he also observed the 
importance of collective social action in resolving these conflicts. Having strong liberal 
convictions, Weber was mostly, but not always, for the right of strike. Similarly, in 
Imperial Germany he was one of the rare Akademiker who recognized the importance of 
SPD for democratization. He considered social action and party politics as countervailing 
forces which could prevent – or at least check - bureaucratic domination in the political 
sphere (Mommsen, 1992a, pp. 65-67). 
Nevertheless, although collective social action, and various forms of social 
conflicts that are not limited to class conflict have an important role in the functioning of 
a democratic regime, Weber does not explain democratization in the last five hundred 
years by drawing upon social mobilization. Socialist parties could certainly play a role in 
the establishment of parliamentary democracy. However this role could not be 
accomplished by mobilizing the masses but by controlling their mobilization within 
limits and channeling their interests in politics to the parliamentary negotiation process. 
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Whereas class struggle was non-essential in promoting democratization, its escalation 
always blocked the road to democratization and destabilized existing democracies 
(1994c, pp. 124-125). In this sense, democracy had firmer roots and a more stable 
character in regions where negotiations outweighed open struggle (Mommsen, 1992c, p. 
11). 
The essentially negative role of mobilization in the modern phase of 
democratization for Weber is related to two mutually reinforcing tendencies: 
centralization and concentration of capital and centralization and concentration of state 
power, which result in different forms of expropriation. The former separated the small 
producers from the means of production and implied their loss of control over the 
production process. The latter, known generally as bureaucratization, entailed the 
“separation of the official from ownership of the means of administration” (Weber, 
1978a, p. 222). However, this separation implied much more than the monarch’s loss 
over the state apparatus, or the disappearance of the autonomous domains of the feudal 
nobility. It meant simultaneously the pacification and de-politicization of the citizenry as 
a result of the increasing distance between state and citizen and the growth of the 
bureaucratic apparatus (Held, 2006, p. 139). Hence, in contrast to Bürgers in 
Ständestaaten, the enfranchised masses during modern democratization processes did not 
join the political system as active participants but only as voters, following the 
demagogues as lambs following the masters a la Nietzsche8. He named this new type of 
democracy as plebiscitarian democracy and considered its emergence as an inevitable 
outcome of capitalist development. 
8 For Weber’s Nietzschean perspective on the condition of masses under plebiscitarian regimes see 
(Warren, 1988, pp. 34-35,44). In contrast Mommsen (1992b, p. 186) claims that Weber did not share the 
Nietzschean disdain of the masses. 
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According to Weber, the only way to limit the scope of bureaucratization or slow 
down its domination of the political sphere is to strengthen the parliament as an 
independent institution where a class of professional politicians can negotiate with each 
other and produce legislation relatively independent of the mandate of their voters. Given 
the modern configuration of the political field, mass mobilization would not politicize 
masses but on the contrary create a greater incentive to follow the demagogues. That also 
explains Weber’s criticism of the “irresponsible” radicals in the SPD, who dismissed 
parliamentary activities and preached mobilization. 
Actually, Weber was aware that modern democratization does have an alternative: 
direct democracy, abolition of the parliamentary and bureaucratic institutions, and active 
involvement of citizens in all political affairs. Being aware of how closely this alternative 
resembles the Marxist vision, Weber describes this hypothetical process as “the 
expropriation of the expropriated” in the political sense (Weber, 1994b, p. 315). 
Nevertheless, for him, this is only a theoretical alternative and given the enormous size of 
polities and complexities of political decision making process, this alternative has no 
applicability. Regardless of the intentions of its defenders, any project towards this goal 
would not go beyond hopeless attempts to restore the early periods of parliamentarism 
and would eventually result in an even more bureaucratic regime (1978b). 
According to Weber, revolutionary movements, the greatest threat to democracy, 
could not thrive everywhere but only where the landed aristocracy could resist or 
dominate capitalist expansion by taking advantage of the centralized state structure to 
protect their class interests. The combination of a dominant aristocracy or a patrimonial 
authority, with a weak bourgeoisie provided the most fertile soil for revolutionary 
46 
 
movements (1995). In this sense, only in the early stages of capitalist development could 
social unrest have a negative role in democratization, it has no future with the progress of 
capitalist development and bureaucratization. This explains why Weber’s answer to both 
questions we posed above is negative.  
Schumpeter 
Schumpeter shared Weber’s belief in the absence of a necessary link between 
social struggles and democratization. To begin with, the democratic method was the 
outgrowth of the capitalist civilization and stamped with the characteristics of the 
bourgeoisie (1962, p. 296). Hence by definition, workers, peasants, and oppressed nations 
had no role in the emergence and advance of the democratic method. Schumpeter even 
explains the extension of suffrage in Britain, which is not essential for his understanding 
of democracy, less with the militancy of workers and more with the flexibility and 
leniency of the upper classes (p. 297).  
Second, when he summarizes the history of the success of capitalism, Schumpeter 
notes that “the world of the lord and the peasant was destroyed primarily by political—in 
some cases revolutionary—action.” What he has in mind here is the economic world of 
the lord and the peasant. The peasant had never had a distinct political sphere but the lord 
had the political world as well. However, between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, 
Schumpeter does not observe a political battle but a symbiosis . This view is also in 
harmony with his portrayal of the bourgeoisie as a humble, non-militarist, and almost 
pacifist class, narrowly focused on economic activities and having no political ambitions 
at all (pp. 126-129). Naturally then, the ascendancy of the bourgeoisie, and hence of the 
democratic method cannot be explained by a struggle and movement-centered approach. 
47 
 
Likewise, Schumpeter (1962) shares Weber’s belief that with the growth of 
population and advent of industrialization, the days of participatory democracy were long 
over. Hence the trend was not towards politicization of the citizens but their de-
politicization. When workers entered the arena of bourgeois democracy they acted not as 
active agents with a desire to restructure the complete political system but as passive 
voters whose main concern was to improve their economic condition by electing a proper 
leader (pp. 256-268). 
Schumpeter (1962) also had an economic explanation for the subsequent de-
politicization he prognoses. He agreed with Marx that class polarization would lead to 
revolutionary outbreaks, which would jeopardize the survival of the democratic method. 
Yet he challenged Marx’s prediction concerning the link between capitalist development 
and pauperization and argued that capitalist development would have the exact opposite 
outcome, namely class convergence (p. 134). Thus for Schumpeter revolutionary 
movements were a symptom of the underdevelopment of capitalist development rather 
than being its consequence. Hence, although not completely written off from the list of 
possibilities, revolutions according to Schumpeter are unlikely events to occur in the 
future of capitalism.  
Tocqueville 
The origins of Weber’s distrust of the role played by social mobilization during 
modern democratization can be traced back to Tocqueville. As a veteran deputy during 
the 1848 Revolution and the author of one of the most widely-read books on the French 
Revolution, Tocqueville was no foreigner to social unrest. In fact it is his extensive 
48 
 
knowledge and probably his immediate experience of the Revolution that caused him to 
cast doubt on any positive outcome of mass-mobilization. 
In many respects, Tocqueville was Weber’s predecessor. He was the first to 
define democracy as the “equality of conditions” (2009, p. 4), and to argue that 
democracy and liberty are not necessarily connected. Democratization for Tocqueville 
was a recent process, while the emergence of liberty went back to the towns in the 
Middle Ages as Weber would argue later (2011, pp. 22-24). Tocqueville’s definition of 
liberty as a notion with aristocratic origins is also in harmony with Weber’s claim that the 
most democratic states were city states under feudalism.  
Nevertheless, as Kahan (2009) notes, if understood as equality of conditions, the 
antonym of democracy is aristocracy (p. 37). That is why there is not a necessary link 
between democratization and social mobilization. In the absence of an aristocracy, as the 
American example demonstrates, democracy flourishes by itself without any social 
struggles. “In America, democracy is given over to its own inclinations. Its pace is 
natural, and all its movements are free” (2009, p. 313). In Europe on the other hand, since 
there were “two opposing principles,” the advent of democracy necessitated a struggle 
against the aristocracy. However, as the British example shows, neither mobilization of 
masses nor complete annihilation of the aristocracy was a necessary condition for the 
substantial elimination of feudalism (2011, p. 25). In fact, it was not the strength but the 
weakness of the aristocracy that led to social unrest and eventually to a successful revolt 
in France.  
Tocqueville’s fears about administrative centralization of the state structure as a 
potential threat to liberty adumbrated Weber’s concerns about the consequences of 
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bureaucratization. Whereas Weber thought that the parliament, as the representative of 
private capital, could be the only force to balance the bureaucracy, Tocqueville attributed 
the same function to the civil society- namely the organizations and associations 
functioning as a buffer between the state and the individual. 
Despite all these similarities however, Tocqueville differed from Weber in 
evaluating the consequences of state centralization. Contrary to Weber, he conceived it 
not as a pacifying and depoliticizing dynamic but a politicizing and mobilizing one. In 
fact, the primary reason behind the French Revolution was the over-centralization of the 
state that led to politicization of even the problems of daily life. Thus, although he 
differed in his explanations, Tocqueville shared Marx’s belief that increasing 
centralization would result in an increase in revolutionary activities. 
Contemporary Studies on Democratization 
After Tocqueville and Weber, the majority of scholars of democratization situated 
themselves in the line between the two, and chose to ignore the impact of social unrest on 
the trajectory of democracy altogether. Only a tiny albeit influential minority chose an 
alternative path. While they agreed with Weber’s prediction concerning the diminishing 
likelihood of revolutionary political transformations, they differed from him in their 
emphasis on the role of social mobilization. 
In his historical comparison of six different processes of modernization, 
Barrington Moore (1993) challenged Tocqueville’s and Weber’s arguments concerning 
the possibility and desirability of gradual democratization. As Moore showed, even 
British democratization -the most proximate case to the gradualist ideal type - involved 
revolutionary mobilization. Accordingly, revolutionary struggles and policy changes are 
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indispensable to the same process. In this sense, the evolutionary development of 
parliamentarianism in the 18th and 19th centuries could not be understood without taking 
into account the English Civil War that weakened the position of the crown vis-à-vis the 
nobility. Similarly, taking the American Civil War into consideration would challenge the 
Tocquevillian explanation of democracy in America flourishing in the absence of class 
struggles solely by its own dynamics. Moreover, in his discussion of Japan and Germany, 
Moore argued that countries with stronger aristocracies able to defend their privileged 
position and a peasantry unable to mobilize, namely with social structures less favorable 
for class struggle, followed the fascist road to modernization. Although revolutionary 
struggle did not guarantee a democratic regime –communism was the alternative path- its 
absence left fascism as the only option. 
 Moore’s explicit emphasis on the class struggle led some of his followers to call 
him a Marxist (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, & Stephens, 1992, p. 23; Skocpol, 1973, pp. 1-
2). Although Moore was closer to Marx when he considered the relationship between the 
bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy as the key variable to understand the course of 
democratization, he was closer to Weber-Schumpeter when he saw peasant mobilization 
as the main revolutionary dynamic in explaining modern political change. Weber, and 
especially Schumpeter, considered the bourgeoisie and also workers as market-dependent 
and economically minded classes. By neglecting the role of workers in revolutionary and 
reformist struggles for democratization and in paving the way for a fascist counter-
revolution, Moore was in agreement with Schumpeter and Weber, who consider 
revolutions as an atavistic type of social change. Finally, Moore conceived democracy 
not as a terrain of class struggle but as one of the destinations of modernization 
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depending on the type and intensity of class struggles. In this sense, he occupies an 
intermediary position between Marx and Weber, recognizing the importance of class 
struggles in democratization, but having no room for them in capitalist-democratic 
regimes. 
In their historical comparative study of democratization in Europe, British settler 
colonies, and South and Central America, Rueschemeyer et.al (1992) develop a nuanced 
version of Moore’s account by synthesizing it with Goran Therborn’s (1977) article about 
the role of the working class. They agree with Moore that the landed aristocracy is the 
most consistent and persistent anti-democratic class, but they attribute to it a much 
weaker role in the struggle for democracy (Rueschmeyer1992, pp. 141-142). Like 
Therborn, they argue that the working class is the key protagonist in democratization. 
However, unlike him, they underscore that the workers’ struggles by themselves are not 
sufficient for democratization and inter-class alliances are necessary for successful 
democratization. Finally, unlike Therborn, they consider the presence of strong socialist 
or radical movements inhibitory to democratization. These movements and especially 
their demands intimidate the middle-classes - a potential ally in the struggle for 
democratization -and isolate and weaken the workers politically. Hence for successful 
democratization, workers have to compromise with the bourgeoisie and refrain from 
demands concerning economic equality. After all, democracy is a class compromise. 
In their analysis of the emergence of fascist and authoritarian regimes in Western 
Europe during the inter-war years and coup regimes in Latin America, Rueschmeyer et 
al. have room for the breakdown of fragile as well as restricted democracies. Even though 
their analysis also underlines the relationship between revolutionary movements and 
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democratic breakdown, in their conceptualization the outcomes of capitalist development 
–a denser civil society and a balance of class forces tilting towards the subordinate 
classes - will not only make authoritarian regimes in advanced capitalist countries more 
unstable but also make a reformist transition to democratic socialism more possible. 
When they are pessimistic about the future of Latin American democracies, it is not 
because of the dynamics inherent to the capitalist economy or bourgeois society that pave 
the way for a new revolutionary uprising, but due to external variables like the absence of 
strong states or the interference of transnational capital .  
A different conclusion concerning the relationship between democratization and 
revolutionary movements has been drawn by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and 
Przeworski (2009). Pressed with revolutionary threats, elites grant democratic reforms 
just to preserve their class dominance, and these reforms help in co-opting the rebellious 
segments. Seen from this perspective, democratic advances are the product of the 
dynamics of capitalist development, but democratization of the system drops the 
revolutionary option from of the agenda of the working class. 
Amongst all the explanations concerning the impact of labor unrest on regime 
change, the clearest distinction between revolutionary and reformist movements can be 
found in Giovanni Arrighi’s (1990b) Marxist Century American Century and various 
related articles. Arguing that Marx has two different explanations for labor unrest, 
Arrighi distinguishes between reformist unrests that result from growing workers’ power, 
and revolutionary ones that originate from the bourgeoisie’s unfitness to rule. 
Accordingly, in advanced capitalist countries where workers had workplace bargaining 
power and capitalists had already depleted the semi-proletarian labor reserves (Arrighi & 
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Silver, 1984), workers used their leverage not only to extend their economic rights but 
also to democratize the system. Reformist movements thus became part of the political 
regimes in these countries. In countries with large non-proletarian reserves, where the 
workers lack workplace bargaining power, the condition of workers could only be 
improved by the acquisition of state power with the help of the non-proletarian segments. 
Hence these countries became fertile grounds for revolutionary movements which 
resulted in bureaucratic socialist regimes. In between these two types were countries like 
Germany and Italy, where the labor movements was strong enough to disrupt capitalist 
accumulation, but not strong enough to bargain against capitalists, and the outcome was 
fascism (1985). 
According to Arrighi, the fact that reformist movements were dominant in core 
countries and revolutionary movements were limited to semi-peripheral and peripheral 
zones of the world-economy does not mean that peripheral and semi-peripheral zones 
were doomed to autocracies. On the contrary, capital migration from the global North to 
the South would empower workers in the workplace and give fuel to reformist 
movements aiming at democratization (1990a; 1984). Following the same line of 
argument, Silver (2003) explains democratization in Brazil, South Africa and South 
Korea with labor’s increasing workplace power. Overall though, despite their effort to 
distinguish different types of revolutionary movements, these explanations also see 
revolutionary unrest as the result of insufficient capitalist accumulation and resilience of 
pre-capitalist social categories. 
In his account of democratization and de-democratization, Charles Tilly (2007) 
incorporates contentious movements into the processes underlined by Weber. For Tilly, 
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democratization depends on three conditions: the elimination of autonomous bases of 
power by the nation-state, the elimination of categorical political inequalities dividing the 
population, and the emergence of trust networks connecting people with different cultural 
identities and socio-economic backgrounds. Depending on the direction of these 
processes, one can speak of democratization or de-democratization. Contentious political 
action generally accompanies or precedes both processes and revolutionary movements 
can move the regime in either direction. However, Tilly also states that democratization 
combined with increasing state capacity tends to decrease the likelihood of revolutionary 
movements and limit contentious politics to the domain of peaceful social movements. 
Contemporary Literature on Democratization 
Contemporary literature on democratization does not consider social movements 
as a key variable for democratization. Citing the leading figures of this literature 
including Huntington, Rostow, Linz, and Diamond, Bermeo (1997) underscores the 
consensus concerning the fear from the masses. Some of them like O’Donnell and 
Valenzuella appreciate the importance of popular mobilizations in destabilizing 
authoritarian regimes. However, they too concede that beyond a certain threshold, 
movements pose a threat to the regime and consolidate the authoritarian coup coalition. 
Given that the founding fathers of the contemporary literature on democratization 
were preoccupied with the rise of authoritarian regimes in the 1960’s and 1970’s, their 
attitude towards popular mobilization is not surprising. Social movements being 
threatening to the status quo has been one of the tenets of democratic breakdown theories. 
Accordingly, although popular mobilization does not necessarily have a positive impact 
on democratization, its radicalized versions almost always have a negative one on the 
55 
 
transition to and consolidation of democracies. In this sense, contemporary literature is on 
the same grounds as Tocqueville, Schumpeter, and to a certain extent Weber, as far as 
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Figure 1-5 Theorists of Democratization Categorized 
 
Like Tocqueville and Schumpeter, recent writers do not see an intrinsic 
connection between popular mobilization and the trajectory of the regime. The spread 
and radicalization of movements harm the regime, but their emergence is not the result of 
social conflicts related to the battle of democracy. The crisis is instead external. For 
O’Donnell, it is a crisis of accumulation in which the economic demands of the popular 
classes cannot be fulfilled; for Huntington (1968, p. 196) it is an institutional crisis 
whereby the speed of institutional development cannot keep up with the speed of social 
change and development; for Linz (1978, pp. 50-55) anything can be the cause of the 
crisis. In all of these accounts, once there is a crisis, it has a political impact on the 
mobilization of non-elites, and vice versa the movements can deepen the crisis. However, 
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since the crisis and the subsequent mobilization have no inherent causal connection with 
previous struggles for democratization, they are exogenously related to the dynamics 
which change and reproduce the regime. 
Depending on an affirmative or negative answer to the questions at the beginning 
of this section, it is possible to define four distinct positions in the literature as presented 
in Figure 1-5. For Schumpeter, there is not a necessary connection between popular 
mobilization and democratization. Although extensive social mobilization undermines 
the pillars of bourgeois society, the advance of capitalism decreases the likelihood of 
revolutionary movements and hence secures the stability of the system. In a democratic 
regime, Weber ascribes to social protest a balancing social function that countervails the 
bureaucratic dominance. Yet social protest is not necessary for democratization and can 
be avoided by skillful and responsible politicians. Similarly, neither capitalist 
development nor democratization leads to politicization. On the contrary, thanks to 
bureaucratization, both processes result in the pacification and de-politicization of the 
citizenry. Tocqueville shares with Weber and Schumpeter the belief concerning the 
absence of an intrinsic relationship between social mobilization and democratization. 
However, for him, capitalist development and more importantly the centralization of the 
state apparatus pave the way for revolutionary movements. Most of the contemporary 
democratization literature falls between Weber and Tocqueville given its neglect of social 
mobilization or its conceptualization of social movements as an exogenous variable. A 
minority of scholars in this literature diverge from the Weberian-Schumpeterian line in a 
direction opposite to Tocqueville. Namely, they consider political mobilization of 
workers and peasants for democratic rights as a necessary component of democratization. 
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However, unlike Tocqueville and together with Weber and Schumpeter, they consider the 
rise of revolutionary movements and resulting domestic political instability not recurrent 
but transient features of capitalist development. 
One of the central theses of this study is that the puzzles of the trajectory of 
Turkish regime change cannot be explained by these approaches unless one refuses the 
existence of the puzzle and relegates Turkey to the category of defective democracies. To 
make sense of the regime changes in Turkey, one has to distinguish different cycles of 
capitalist accumulation that involve different constellations of power bloc and class 
struggles. Struggles within the power bloc and between the classes are not only related to 
each other, but also shape and are shaped by the coups- the midwives of regime change. 
Without considering social mobilization intrinsically related to regime changes and 
without acknowledging the capacity of capitalist accumulation to create and destroy 
reformist and revolutionary movements, in other words without answering the questions 
at the beginning of the section affirmatively like Marx, such a dynamic understanding is 




Figure 1-6 The Framework of the Study 
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Figure 1-6 summarizes the framework of this study in its most abstract form. 
Capitalist development promotes two different dynamics simultaneously: competition 
within the power bloc and mobilization of workers and oppressed nations. Competition 
within the power bloc politicizes the society, as a result of which mobilization of workers 
and oppressed nations intensify. With intensified mobilization the movements start to 
acquire a revolutionary character. At the same time, competition within the power bloc 
encourages political pursuits in search of a change in the balance of power between the 
parliament and the bureaucracy. Eventually this change occurs via a transformative coup, 
which leads to further politicization of the society and prepares a fertile ground for 
revolutionary movements. However, escalation of revolutionary mobilization threatens 
the power bloc and applies cohesive pressures on the latter. In addition to revolutionary 
activities, consolidation of the new ruling coalition as a hegemon decreases the 
competition as well. Concurrently, revolutionary movements strain the inclusionary 
regime. If popular movements are successful, then a revolution occurs and completely 
different dynamics start to shape the regime. If movements are not strong enough, then a 
different type of coup moves the regime in the exclusionary direction. The new regime 
eradicates the threatening movements. Nevertheless, neither competition within the 
power bloc nor popular unrest can be buried forever. Capitalist development, which has 
been re-fueled by the creative destruction of the previous hegemonic bloc, promotes both 
dynamics in a new cycle. Additionally, the stamping out of revolutionary movements 
clears the ground of obstacles to competition and therefore accelerates the rise of a 




The shortcomings of alternative approaches dismissing the interaction between 
regime changes and constantly regenerated revolutionary mobilization become more 
obvious when one looks at how the Turkish regime change is concretely explained. What 
follows is a summary of these accounts  
Historical Explanations of Turkish Regime Change 
Studies on the trajectory and causes of regime change in Turkey can be classified 
into two categories: liberal and Kemalist. The two categories certainly have many loaded 
associations. And, as is the case for most broad categories, the adherents of each do not 
necessarily share the same perspectives and explanations about social problems; nor do 
they have similar political attitudes. Nonetheless, those in the same category do share an 
important common denominator which provides analytical clarity for the purposes of this 
study: their opinion about the role of Mustafa Kemal, the RPP, and the army in the 
development of Turkish democracy. To put it simply, Kemalists claim that Mustafa 
Kemal, the RPP and the army played a sine qua non role in the establishment and 
protection of a democratic regime in Turkey. Liberals hold the opposite view, and 
consider them among the biggest obstacles to democratization. Historically, the Kemalist 
approach set the precedent. It emerged in the 1930s, lived its heydays in the 1960’s, and 
managed to survive until the mid-1990s. The birth of liberal theories corresponds to the 
late 1960’s and with the demise of Kemalism since the 1990’s, these theories now enjoy 
an uncontested supremacy in the academia. The purpose of this section is to show that the 
theoretical and empirical foundations of liberal accounts of democracy are as weak as the 
Kemalist ones. I argue that the liberals’ neglect of popular unrest - a major factor in 
shaping modern Turkey and the nature of its regimes - is responsible for this weakness. 
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The Kemalist Approach 
Although Mustafa Kemal was proud of the fact that his actions were not deduced 
from fixed dogma or frozen principles (Aydemir, 1991, p. 474), the regime he founded 
needed an ideology for its reproduction. The Kadro movement, comprised of prominent 
intellectuals of the era like Yakup Kadri, Vedat Nedim, and Sevket Sureyya, was the first 
well-known and most consistent attempt to formulate this ideology through their 
periodical of the same name (Türkeş, 2001, p. 464). Although Kadro was closed down by 
the regime after two years of publication, the principles it formulated remained intact and 
were subsequently propagated by state institutions. 
The Kadro movement did not espouse a theory of democratization. It rather 
justified the existence of single-party rule in Turkey. The basic assumptions of the Kadro 
movement can be summarized as follows: Turkey had a different social structure from 
the western countries and Soviet Russia. The essential difference lay in the absence of 
modern classes. Both the parliamentarian regimes in Western Europe and the Soviet 
regime in Russia were different versions of class dictatorships. To reach the classless 
society, the Turkish Republic should not follow either of the two paths, but establish a 
regime where the state is completely autonomous from the classes and fight against pre-
capitalist classes who constitute the biggest obstacle to a classless society. What was 
therefore necessary was a strong state, a strong party, and a strong leader (Türkeş, 1998, 
pp. 105,112-113). 
One factor in the emergence and persistence of single-party dictatorship in Turkey 
was the [British] hegemonic crisis and the bellicose conditions of the era. However, 
Kemalism did not pass away even after the consolidation of the US hegemony and its 
defense of so-called democratic regimes against the Soviet Union. Ironically, American 
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promotion of development studies -which went hand in hand with its anti-communist 
struggle and is generally referred to as the Princeton Project- solidified Kemalist 
dominance in the academia (Kansu, 1997, p. 11).  
The Princeton project’s main concern was to theorize the passage from traditional 
to modern society. And being a successful example of modernization, Turkey naturally 
attracted its attention. What the Princeton School saw in Turkey was rapid urbanization, 
industrialization, secularization, and the replacement of traditional values with universal 
ones (Lerner, 1958). Certainly, the development of democracy was also an important part 
of the modernization process and with the new wave of authoritarianism –the 
multiplication of single-party regimes between 1952 and 1970- the endurance of the 
multi-party system in Turkey attracted even more attention. Still, the modernist-
developmentalist paradigm of this school was in harmony with the Kemalist assumptions. 
Single–party rule was a temporary but necessary price to be paid for development and 
was euphemized as a “tutelary democracy” (Weiker, 1973, pp. 3-4). Accordingly, 
Turkish modernization depended strictly on Mustafa Kemal’s and the RPP’s vision and 
their tenacity in applying radical reforms. Moreover, Mustafa Kemal, far from being 
against democracy, was its true believer. His approval of the founding of the two 
opposition parties PRP and FP, in 1925 and 1930 respectively, was evidence of this belief 
(Lewis, 2003, pp. 225-226). No surprises then, that although these parties were banned a 
few months after their founding, these examples are labeled “Turkish experiments in 
democracy” (Ahmad, 1977). Finally, the establishment of a multiparty regime in 1946 
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was taken as another sign of Ataturk’s and RPP’s commitment to democracy (Abadan-
Unat, 1979, pp. 13-14)9. 
The military, according to this school, was a guarantor of modernization and the 
accompanying democratization process. Whenever religious or other forms of reactionary 
coalitions attempted to hinder modernization, the army acted with its responsibility to 
protect the principles of the Republic. Hence, the military coup in 1960 was not an 
indicator of the anti-democratic inclinations of the army. Quite the contrary, it was to put 
democracy on the right path. The retreat of the army to the barracks one year after the 
coup, and its urging for the preparation of a new constitution with checks and balances 
and an emphasis on social and political freedoms, provided more proof of its democratic 
commitments (Özbudun, 1995, pp. 251-252; Rustow, 1964, p. 368). 
Another version of Kemalism was developed by Doğan Avcıoğlu - a well-known 
socialist of the 1960’s. Avcıoğlu was critical of parliamentary democracy encouraged by 
the United States and dismissed it as “Philippine type democracy”, where votes are 
bought and sold like any market commodity (Avcıoğlu, 1969b, pp. 247-255, 519-224; 
1980). The army should remember its historically progressive role and take over the reins 
of power together with socialists to end the ‘sham democracy’. The purpose of the new 
government should be to foster the non-capitalist path propagated by the Soviet Union 
(1966; 1969b, pp. 477-480). 
The Liberal Approach 
Avcıoğlu was neither a theorist of democratization nor particularly fond of a 
democratic regime. However, his views on democracy are important for our analysis 
9 For an extensive literature review see (Kansu, 1997, pp. 9-12)  
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because they initiated a debate amongst the socialists, which would later provide ample – 
albeit unacknowledged - ammunition to liberals in their critique of Kemalism. İdris 
Küçükömer, a member of the Turkish Labor Party and a professor of Economics, wrote a 
book titled Düzenin Yabancılaşması (Alienation of the Order), which scandalized his 
Kemalist opponents. For Küçükömer (1994b) , capitalism had failed to develop under the 
Ottoman Empire because of the structural impediments- from population pressures to 
land distribution patterns (pp. 29-53). As a consequence, a civil society that would bring 
the state under its control could not emerge either, and this meant the state’s supreme 
control over all aspects of the society (Küçükömer, 1994a, pp. 49, 55-56). For 
Küçükömer, the Kemalist bureaucracy, especially the army, inherited the Ottoman 
conceptualization and tradition of the state and the single-party dictatorship was its 
manifestation. Hence, the army, the RPP, and Mustafa Kemal were not endorsers of the 
democratic ideal but impediments to its realization. Moreover, all social groups in the 
country resisted the absolutist agenda of the bureaucrats at every opportunity: whenever 
they had a chance to vote, they supported opposition parties whose agenda was evidently 
more religious than republican. That was the basis of Küçükömer’s (1994b) second 
claim: despite their parlor, the self-proclaimed leftist parties were actually rightist and 
conservative in that they were blocking the development of capitalism and democracy. 
The parties with a rightist parlor, on the hand, carried the opposite character and appealed 
to the democratic aspirations of the people (pp. 67-82). 
While Küçükömer’s thesis challenged Kemalist tenets, his account was 
problematic in several ways. First of all, he did not explain why the people registered 
their protest only as voters and only when they found a chance to vote. Second, he did not 
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explain why and how parliamentary democracy comes and goes. As a corollary, in its 
absence, people sat on the passive side of the equation of democracy. The agent which 
‘brought about’ democracy and took it back was again and only the army. 
The second stage of the development of liberal theories started in the 1970s with 
Şerif Mardin’s articles Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire and 
Center-periphery Relations: a Key to Understand Turkish Politics. Mardin framed 
Küçükömer’s “absence of capitalist development and permanence of the despotic state” 
argument into a Weberian rationalization-and-centralization context. Following Weber’s 
comparison of western absolutist monarchies with Oriental despotisms, Mardin (1969) 
concluded that the absence of civil society under the Ottoman Empire should be the 
starting point in understanding the unstable character of Turkish democracy (pp. 279-
280)10. His main contribution, however, was the introduction of two concepts –center and 
periphery- to this debate. ‘Center’ referred to the Sultan and his Kul’s (statesmen 
considered as his slaves) whereas the ‘periphery’ denoted all kinds of social groups 
outside the center. The Ottoman Empire’s difference from the western absolutist regimes 
lay in the fact that in the absence of private property and feudal rights-and-duties 
mechanisms, Ottoman control of the periphery was much more direct, absolute and 
without any legal guarantees (Mardin, 1994, pp. 34-37). 
As a result, whereas the periphery in western societies could encroach on, or 
integrate into, the center with a complicated set of legal negotiations, there was a 
permanent cleavage between the center and the periphery in the Ottoman Empire. In the 
10 In his later articles, Mardin softens the Weberian dichotomy between western and eastern societies, and 
claims that elements of civil society –like a different guarantee of private property for peasants under the 
umbrella of the Sharia- can be found in the Ottoman Empire. However, he continues to claim that the 
essential social relations that could bring about civil liberties were definitely missing (1987, pp. 12-13). 
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absence of legal negotiations which formed the institutional basis of western civil society, 
the relationship between the center and the periphery depended on de facto power 
relations: a center pressing for total control of all aspects of society and a periphery 
craving for autonomy and making use of any opportunity for separating from the center. 
In the constant struggle between these two poles, the center enjoyed incomparable 
advantages and therefore always won the struggle. It had accumulated wealth, power, and 
a vastly superior organization. The various peripheral groups not only had cleavages with 
the center but also lacked any kind of stable bonds with one another. This low capacity 
for coordination would later be used by the liberals to explain the absence of large-scale 
social unrest under Ottoman rule. 
From the beginning of the 20th century onwards, young military officers’ 
attempts to speed up the centralization and rationalization process aggravated the tension 
between the center and the periphery. The center abolished the rights previously granted 
to the periphery like autonomy in taxation and religious practice, and self-administration 
of local affairs. The periphery, on the other hand, tried to resist the centralist and 
secularist pressures by making use of religion, although this resistance was unsuccessful 
due the lack of organization and communication within the periphery (Mardin, 1994, pp. 
35,50,53). After 1945, however, successful peripheral politics became possible with the 
expansion of market relations and communication networks. Populist parties which used 
religion as the umbrella ideology of the periphery started defeating bureaucratic parties of 
the center in almost all the elections .  
The periphery, being a “center-centered” category, contained various social orders 
and classes. The bourgeoisie, local rural notables, peasants, and urban workers were all 
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members of this all-encompassing category. Yet, in Mardin’s account, the determining 
element in this heterogeneous category was the relatively organized order: first the local 
notables, later the rising bourgeoisie. And the center-periphery struggle was actually the 
struggle of these two groups with the center. The peasants and workers could not become 
an active force in this struggle owing to their lack of organizational resources. What they 
did was to merely vote for the relatively organized sectors in the periphery. Further, the 
periphery’s struggle did not produce any democratic outcome in the western sense 
because once some group from the periphery conquered the center, as in the case of the 
bourgeoisie after the Second World War, or found a place in its mechanisms, as in the 
case of the local notables during the early years of the Republic, they replaced their 
peripheral identity with the value system of the center and defended the dominance of the 
center as strongly as its earlier members. 
After Mardin, the major theoretical work from the liberal perspective was Çağlar 
Keyder’s State and Classes in Turkey, in which he combined Mardin’s framework with a 
world-systems perspective to develop an historical account of capitalist development in 
Turkey. In Keyder’s (1987b) account, what prevented the development of the civil 
society in Turkey was less the insufficient advance of capitalism and more the formation 
of the Turkish nation-state, which was based on drastic population engineering (pp. 198-
199). At the beginning of the 20th century, non-Muslims had an approximate 20% share 
in Turkey’s population but after the Armenian massacre and the population exchange 
with Greece, this proportion decreased to 2.6% –a process which meant the annihilation 
of Turkey’s historical bourgeoisie and the destruction of its civil society. Eventually, to 
secure its foundations, the state needed and created a new bourgeoisie. From its birth to 
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its consolidation and development, this new class was directly dependent on the resources 
provided by the state and therefore never dared to challenge the political status quo 
openly. 
Keyder (2011) explicitly states that workers and peasants played an insignificant 
role in shaping the Turkish regime. The absence of peasant radicalism was a consequence 
of the dominance of petty-commodity production relations in the rural areas. The absence 
of feudal bonds and landless peasantry, except in the Kurdish region, and high land-labor 
ratio enabled the ruling classes to connect peasant population to the system through 
market mechanisms. This high land-labor ratio gave credibility to the enrichment promise 
of the populist parties during the boom years of the world-economy. And even during 
recessionary times, the state could use the abundant land resources to sustain an urban 
populism by distributing land to migrant workers. That is why, up until the mid- 1990’s, 
Turkey had not experienced full proletarianization and a large-scale labor movement. 
Unlike Küçükömer and Mardin, Keyder (1987b) also attempted to explain the 
transformation of the political regime and the birth of the multi-party system. It was not 
domestic pressures but the expectations of the United States that led the bureaucrats to 
give up the single-party system (pp. 114-115). Consistent with his explanation, Keyder 
ended his book with the hope of increasing influence of the European community on 
Turkey. Seventeen years later, in 2004, in another attempt to interpret the ruling party 
Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) rapid reforms with the goal of democratization, 
Keyder (2004) again referred to the EU as the main factor (pp. 77-81). 
Following the liberal framework developed by Küçükömer, Mardin and Keyder, 
scholars produced a plethora of studies concerning the link between the strong state 
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tradition and the unstable character of democratic regimes; and between the dependent 
bourgeoisie and reproduction of military hegemony in the political sphere. Although 
studies in the 1980’s and 1990’s focused mainly on the causes of the unconsolidated 
character of Turkish democracy, the mood and the research questions have changed since 
then with the much-lauded political reforms and the proposals and commitments of the 
JDP. In the last decade, an increasing number of scholars have started to theorize the 
causes of the most recent wave of democratization. In these accounts, either the EU’s 
pressure on Turkey, or the rise of a new bourgeoisie in Anatolia which is not as state-
dependent as the hegemonic Istanbul bourgeoisie, are used as major explanatory 
variables.  
Despite their seemingly antagonistic accounts, the common denominator of 
Kemalist and liberal approaches is their neglect of the link between social struggles and 
regime change. Hence, in Figure 1.5, the representatives of both approaches share the 
same zone: the triangle between Weber, Schumpeter and Tocqueville. In the Kemalist 
account, the uprisings - especially during the early periods of the Republic - are nothing 
but [traditionalist] reactions to Kemalist modernization. Similarly, the liberal approach 
claims that a weak civil society could not and did not produce strong social movements 
which could change the course of the political struggle. This neglect of the importance of 
social mobilization creates difficulties for both approaches. 
Since the Kemalists start the history of Turkish democratization with Mustafa 
Kemal and his reforms, they cannot explain the presence of democratic practices before 
Kemal. Secondly, those who supported the so-called populist politicians were not the 
rural community but the most urban segments of the Turkish population. Hence the 
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Kemalist explanation for the appeal of populist policies with “backwardness and local 
bonds” has no explanatory power. The biggest problem for the civil society approach is 
the obvious negative correlation between expansion of democratic rights and the strength 
of the civil society in Turkish history. Democratic reforms have been instituted when the 
civil society was least powerful, and coups have occurred when the civil society was 
relatively more powerful. 
The Argument Concerning Social Struggles and Regime Change 
The trajectory of Turkish political regime is determined by a complex but 
patterned set of interactions amongst competing factions within the power bloc; reformist 
and revolutionary mobilizations; and transformative coups in different directions. Figure 
1.7 summarizes these interactions that are the product of different cycles of accumulation, 
each with a distinct hegemonic coalition. In order to trace the social origins of regime 
change in Turkey, this study distinguishes three different hegemonic coalitions within the 
power bloc of Ottoman Empire-Turkey: 
1. Palace-centered bureaucracy (1878 – early 1900s) 
2. Party-centered bureaucracy (1925-1946) 
3. The Army as Capitalist – Industrial Capital (1971-1997) 
Although the capitalist class has not always managed to become part of the power 
bloc, it has always played an active role in the rise and demise of each hegemonic 
coalition. Each hegemonic period was followed by a competitive period, whereby the 
nascent and traditional segments of the capitalist class entered into a fierce struggle: 
1. The competition among the non-Muslim bourgeoisie, the Muslim bourgeoisie and 
the bureaucracy (Early 1900-1925) 
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2. The competition among the army, commercial-capital, and industrial capital 
(1946-1971) 
3. The competition among the finance capital in Istanbul (ex-Istanbul capital), the 
nascent Anatolian bourgeoisie (new industrial capital) and the army (1997 – 
Today) 
Each competitive period has four basic properties. To begin with, all of them 
involve a struggle concerning the balance between the bureaucracy and the parliament. 
Second, in order to become the hegemon, aspiring factions of the power bloc need to 
invoke the support of the working class and/or oppressed nations. To obtain this support, 
inclusionary promises and policies are necessary. Hence each regime change along the 
horizontal axis of the conceptual grid involves an inclusionary move along the vertical 
axis. Third, escalation of the competition within the power bloc politicizes workers and 
oppressed nations as well. This politicization results in first the rise of reformist and later 
revolutionary movements. Finally, all regime changes along the EL-NEL axis happen as 
a result of a transformative coup that further increases the politicization and mobilization 
of workers and oppressed nation. 
So far in Turkish history, the competition within the power bloc has triggered two 
transformative coups and two cycles of revolutionary movements. The first one was a 
cycle of separatist movements between 1912 and 1930 following the 1908 coup. The 
second cycle between 1974 and 1998 followed the 1960 coup and was a combination of 





Figure 1-7 Cycles of Accumulation, Revolutionary Movements and Regime Change in Turkey 1908-2014 
 
During each cycle of unrest, the growing intensity of revolutionary movements 
increased pressure on the regime and eventually paved the way for a transformative coup 
towards the exclusionary pole. In this sense, the coups in 1921 and 1980 targeted the 
revolutionary movements in the first and second cycle and produced a more exclusive 
regime with restricted political competition to fight them.  
To sum up, according to the argument of this study, the regime’s trajectory is 
shaped by a series of crises: crises in the power bloc and revolutionary crises. The coups 
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in Turkish history are not signs of the immaturity of Turkish democracy but a means of 
solution of the said crises. The resolution of the crisis within the power bloc, as it was in 
1908 and 1960, reconfigures the ruling coalition, but bribes and mobilizes the masses and 
paves therefore the way for a revolutionary crisis. If revolutionary movements fail, the 
way out of the crisis, as the examples of 1921 and 1980 coups show, is a repressive 
regime change, which eradicates the revolutionary movements and opens the door to 
renewed competition, and eventually to a new crisis within the power bloc. Right now, 
Turkey is in the middle of a new regime crisis. After tracing all the interactions leading to 
regime changes in their historical context, possible scenarios for the solution of the 
present crisis will be discussed in the concluding chapter. 
Research Design 
The research conducted for this study rests on the observation of three processes: 
the trajectory of the regime, the intensity of the reformist and revolutionary movements, 
and the competition within the power bloc. Because of their conceptual remoteness from 
one another, each of these dynamics required a different data source and measurement 
technique. 
As regards to competition within the power bloc, this study relies mainly on 
secondary sources providing in-depth case studies for various periods of Turkish political 
and economic history.  
To trace the regime along two dimensions, two distinct variables needed to be 
measured: the relative power of the elected vis-a-vis the appointed and the relative 
inclusiveness of the regime. There was no available data source for the former. In The 
Handbook of National Legislatures Fish and Kroenig (2009) develop an index to 
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compare the prerogatives of the parliaments all over the world. Similarly Pennings (2000) 
compares parliamentary control over the executive office. My study could not utilize 
these datasets for two reasons. First they are not historical and provide a comparative 
snapshot of relative powers of the parliament. Second, the basis of measurement is not de 
facto powers of the institutions but the de jure ones, which portray an unrealistic portrait 
of the power of the Turkish parliament. Another potential data source was the annually 
published Freedom in the World reports. Each year, Freedom House assigns a 
functioning of the government score between 0 and 12. The checklist with which the 
score is determined includes questions concerning the governments’ capacity to really 
rule the country. However, leaving aside the criticism of the ideological bias (Giannone, 
2010) of these reports and the fact that this data set does not go to periods earlier than 
2006, only two of the twelve questions are related specifically to governmental capacity- 
in determining the sub-score. In the absence of a consistent and historical quantitative 
data source comparing parliamentary power, I have considered the historical practices of 
the institutions with prerogatives to veto legislations. For periods before 1960, I relied 
mainly on secondary sources. For the post-1960 period, I made use of statistics 
concerning the number of vetoes and cancellations of the legislations by the non-elected. 
Given the definition of competitiveness of a regime, to measure its position along 
the EL-NEL axis was relatively easy. Combining the information from TBMM , Tunaya 
(1952), Aykol (2009) and M. Kaynar (2007) I have prepared a list that enabled me to 
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calculate the party-ban ratios -the number of banned parties as a ratio of the number of 
founded parties11- for different constitutional periods. 
Regardless of one’s evaluation of the theoretical framework and historical theses 
of this study, one of the main contributions of this study is the dataset it uses for tracing 
the intensities of various forms of social unrests between 1945 and 2014. Until now, 
authors who have written descriptively about social movements in Turkey have used 
official strike statistics as evidence for the rise and demise of the labor movement (Çetik 
& Akkaya, 1999; Güzel, 1983, 1993). Official strike statistics can give information about 
the relative militancy of trade unions. Yet the data provided by these statistics cannot be 
considered sufficient for several reasons. First, our framework also emphasizes the role of 
movements other than labor, including Kurdish and student movements, in explaining the 
trajectory of the Turkish regime. Second, even for labor movements, the official strike 
statistics do not record important manifestations of labor unrest, such as political 
demonstrations organized by trade unions, or protest actions by the more than 90% of the 
Turkish working class that is not unionized. Finally, because it was illegal to strike until 
1963, there is no official strike data for the pre-1963 period.  
The source of information for the established dataset is the national daily 
Cumhuriyet. Using newspapers as a source for compiling data about social unrest has 
become a fairly widespread and developed methodology in the social sciences. Among 
the examples of those who have used newspapers to construct time series on social unrest 
one can count Korzeniewicz (1989), McAdam (2010), Paige (1975), Silver (2003), 
Tarrow (1989) and Tilly (1978). However, starting with Danzger (1975) the quality and 
11 Parties that are liquidiated by their founders within the first year of their founding, or parties that do not 
participate in elections are not included in the list. 
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the reliability of the newspaper data have been questioned (p. 582). Although not 
discouraging its usage, Ortiz et. al (2005) advise that the two important biases of 
newspaper data- selection and description bias - should be taken more seriously. After 
reviewing criticisms regarding the biases, Earl, Martin, McCarthy, and Soule (2004) 
argue that data obtained from newspapers can still fulfill the accepted standards of quality 
in the field as long as they are not used in an unexamined fashion. Similarly Barranco and 
Wisler (1999) and Silver (1995, p. 31) underscore that newspaper data are a reliable 
source for detecting long-term waves in social protest analysis.  
Cumhuriyet is the only Turkish newspaper which has been published since 1945. 
Since the initial research goal was to analyze the regime change from 1946 onwards, I 
scanned the newspapers only for the period between 1946 and 2004. Since none of the 
newspapers in Turkey are indexed to detect the mentions of social protest, I relied on the 
titles and first paragraphs of the news items. If I found predetermined keywords 
indicating a social unrest action, the article was digitally recorded and the protest event 
was recorded in the database. Following Silver (1995), I based the methodology on the 
assumption that events that are mentioned more frequently are more significant than the 
less-mentioned events, and recorded mentions rather than events (pp. 25-26). The data 
collection procedure can be found in the Appendix A and B. 
For the pre-1945 period I have referred to literature on the political and social 
history of that period. In contrast to the post-1945 data, the information collected here is 
about events not about mentions. All events –not mentions- recorded in these studies are 
included in the database. The list of reviewed books can be found in the Appendix E.  
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In both databases, it is not only the events but also their location, demands, action 
repertoires and identity of the protesters that are recorded. Additionally, violent incidents 
and clashes with state security forces are recorded. 
Organization of Chapters 
The second chapter presents the history of regimes by locating them at different 
positions in the conceptual grid, and the history of successful and failed attempts to 
change the regime.  
The third and fourth chapters introduce the independent variables: competition 
within the ruling bloc and social movements respectively. I distinguish two big waves for 
revolutionary movements, and three for inter-capitalist competition. I then locate 
different periods of Turkish social struggles into the table presented in the previous 
section. 
The fifth chapter discusses the correlation between revolutionary social struggles 
and successful and failed attempts to change the regime. I classify the regime-change 
attempts into four groups depending on their success and failure, and the presence or 
absence of a revolutionary movement. I demonstrate that whereas revolutionary 
movements pave the way for exclusionary moves, reformist movements accompany 
struggles along the EL-NEL axis. Finally, an attempt to make the regime inclusive or to 
change its location along the EL-NEL axis can only be successful in the absence of 
revolutionary movements.  
The sixth chapter presents the different mechanisms through which social protest 
and competition within the power bloc have a combined impact on the regime. 
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Accordingly, I distinguish four different mechanisms in the four different zones –
introduced in the previous subsection- responsible for regime change. 
Finally in the conclusion, I summarize the arguments developed in this 
dissertation, and revisit the political history of Turkey. I argue that Turkey is about to 
complete its second big wave of regime change, and is at the doorstep of a new political 




Chapter 2  
Regress of Democracy: Trajectory of the Turkish Regime 
1908-2014 
In its seven hundred year-long economic and 
political life, with its current form and mode of 
government, Turkey, after getting over the dynasty 
period and after being subjected to many reforms and 
regulations on governmental level, set foot on 
bourgeois democracy  
(Program of the Turkish Communist Party) 
This chapter presents the history of Turkish political regimes in four different 
phases by locating them in different positions in the conceptual grid, and the history of 
successful and failed attempts to change the regime. I start by discussing my reasons for 
selecting 1908 as the starting point of the analysis. The following four sections depict 
first the relevant characteristics of each phase, and then discuss successful and failed 
coups and inclusionary attempts in each phase. The final section brings the narrative 
together and provides a summary of the trajectory of Turkish regimes as the rise and 
demise of two ruling coalitions. 
The Birth Certificate 
Like all histories, the history of the Turkish regime needs its own birth certificate. 
When was Turkish democracy born? Depending on one’s conceptualization of 
democracy, this question can be answered in five different ways by referring to different 
turning points in Ottoman-Turkish history. In 1808, Sultan Mahmud II signed an 
agreement called Sened-î İttifâk (Charter of Alliance) with the local notables. For the first 
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time in Ottoman history, the Sultan made an official concession to a social group. 
Alternatively, one can refer to the year 1876, when Sultan Abdülaziz was dethroned after 
a palace coup and the first Ottoman Constitution Kanun-ı Esasi (Basic Law) was 
promulgated. One year later, the short-lived Chamber of Deputies – analogous to the 
lower house of the legislature - convened for the first time. A third answer could be 1908, 
when the July 24 Revolution reconstituted the parliamentary monarchy and the first 
multi-party elections were held. Another popular, and probably the most widely believed, 
answer is October 29, 1923, when the Ottoman Empire was officially liquidated and 
Turkey was declared a Republic. Finally, in 1950, for the first time in Turkish history, an 
opposition party won governmental posts as a result of competitive elections. 
Students of constitutional development in Turkey are divided over the causes and 
historical significance of the 1808 Charter. It was signed right after a successful uprising 
in the Ottoman palace army at a time when the survival of the Sultan depended on 
military backing of the local notables. Some interpret it as an imposition by the notables 
(İnalcık, 1995, p. 132), while others consider it to be a tactical maneuver, with which the 
Porte sought to force the notables to concede to its centralistic claims (Shaw & Shaw, 
1977, p. 2). Others have seen the charter as a temporary modus vivendi only a few years 
before Mahmud II’s fateful centralist move (Tanör, 2004, pp. 51-52). In terms of its 
significance also, the charter has been interpreted in different ways: as an Ottoman 
version of the Magna Carta (Ahmad, 1984, p. 6; Akşin, 1997, p. 91); the first significant 
document regarding Ottoman democratization (Toprak, 2007, p. 29); a failed attempt to 
establish a feudal order (Berkes, 1973, p. 510); a documentation of the negotiation 
process between centralist and decentralist aspirations (Kemal H Karpat, 1972, pp. 253-
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254); a written expression of the apogee of decentralization (Quataert, 2008, p. 49); and 
lastly, an over-rated document in terms of its role in Ottoman-Turkish democratization 
(Ortaylı in Önsoy, 1986, p. 32). 
For a study that combines the emergence of Ottoman democracy with its long-
term trajectory and changes, 1808 could be the starting point as it signaled a retreat from 
decentralization. However such research is beyond the scope this study. Our starting 
point should be the beginning of democracy, not the beginning of a process leading to 
democracy. So the absence of an assembly, let alone a parliament, makes 1808 unsuitable 
as a starting point for an analysis of democracy. In fact, according to critics of the Magna 
Carta thesis, the absence of an assembly-like institution was the key distinction between 
the Magna Carta and the Sened-î İttifâk (Akşin, 1992, pp. 121-122; İnalcık, 1995). 
The assembly defined in the 1876 constitution had very limited legislative 
powers, which can only be negatively defined, namely by referring to its right to withhold 
approval of the Sultan’s legislative proposals (Tanör, 2004, p. 141). However, this was 
not the fundamental weakness of the parliament in this period, because it forced the 
Ibrahim Edhem Pasha cabinet to resign even with its limited prerogatives. In fact, the 
short life of this parliament is indicative of its desire to control Sultan Abdülhamid 
(Tunaya, 2003, p. 15). The missing element in this period was competitive elections. The 
deputies of the first Ottoman Assembly were not chosen by the general electorate but by 
provincial councils (Devereux, 1963, pp. 200-203)12.  
The thesis that democracy is the result of the proclamation of the Turkish 
Republic is closely related with the political motivation to portray Mustafa Kemal as the 
12 Hasan Kayalı (1995, p. 267) doubts whether the election results would have been different had the 
deputies been elected through a popular vote. 
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unique revolutionary in Turkish history (Kansu, 1997, pp. 23-25). Given our definition, 
the changes in 1923 did not start the democratic process. Quite the contrary. Even before 
the declaration of the Republic there had been three competitive multi-party elections in 
1908, 1912, and 1919 respectively. And as I discuss in the subsequent sections, the 
declaration of the Republic reversed the democratic process by shelving competitive 
elections for more than twenty years.  
Finally, Çağlar Keyder (1987b) considers the 1950 elections to be a watershed for 
the Turkish regime, as they changed the rules of the game and incorporated the masses 
into the political process (p. 117). But the claim that an opposition party acquired the 
chief executive post by popular vote for the first time in 1950 can only be considered 
valid if we start Turkish political history with the declaration of the Republic in 1923 and 
regard the previous era as the dark ages. Which it was not. The opposition party acquired 
the executive post by popular vote formally with the 1908 elections and actually with the 
1912 elections13.  
Moreover, there is nothing intrinsic in our definition of democracy which requires 
the transfer of power (from the incumbent) to the opposition party. According to 
Huntington (1991), the necessary condition for a consolidated democracy is not one but 
two transfers of power from the governing party to the opposition (p. 263). Lijphardt 
(1999) rightly argues that these theses are developed within a majoritarian 
conceptualization of democracy. If we apply the turnover condition to European 
13 The Liberal Party that was supported by the Porte suffered a defeat against the Committee of Union and 
Progress (CUP) in the 1908 elections (Akbayar, 2008, p. 167; Fevzi Demir, 2007, 127-37). Yet, it shortly 
became obvious that deputies elected from CUP’s list had only formal loyalty to this party. The result of 
the 1912 elections, however, was a total victory for the CUP. For the competition in the 1908 elections see 
Kansu (2000, pp. 272-351). Kayali (1995, pp. 273, 279) on the other hand, claims that the 1908 elections 




                                                          
countries, he continues, the number of democratic countries declines dramatically. This 
observation is correct for Turkey as well. 
 “The twentieth century”, writes Feroz Ahmad (1993) “opened for Turkey on 23 
July 1908 with the restoration of the Constitution of 1876 that had been shelved 30 years 
earlier by Sultan Abdülhamid.” (p. 32). Indeed, the Constitutional Revolution of 1908 
was not only the starting point of a new century, but also of the democratic political 
regime in Turkey. By establishing a political structure in which competitive elections are 
used on a continued basis to assign some of the executive, legislative, or judicial posts, 
the 1908 Revolution laid the grounds for democracy in Turkey. 
As Kansu (1997) rightly observes, the 1908 Revolution is seldom interpreted as a 
historical turning point. It is generally considered to be the starting point of the 
democratic regime but only of the “Second Constitutional Period”, which degenerated 
into despotism after a few years (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005, pp. 27-28; Lewis, 1961, p. 207). But 
there are some exceptions. Tunaya considers the Second Constitutional Period as a 
laboratory of Turkish politics and traces multi-party politics in Turkey to the 1908 
Revolution. Similarly, Zürcher and Karaömerlioğlu are critical of studies of 
democratization that wipe off democratic practice between 1908 and 1925.  
True, the election regulations of 1908 had many procedures to exclude the 
majority of the adult population, especially women and non-tax payers. Additionally, it 
was a two-tier system which increased the possibility of state intervention in elections by 
pressurizing and/or bribing the secondary voters. Still, from 1908 onwards, elections for 
the executive and legislative posts became not an exception but a rule for the Turkish 
political regime (Kansu, 2001, p. 368).  
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The fact that electoral democracy was not an exception but a rule can also be 
observed by looking at the time interval between elections. Between 1908 and 2007, 
Turkey has had an election almost every four years, and this interval does not change 
significantly between different periods of the regime. The longest interval between two 
elections has been six years. Moreover, out of the 26 elections held, only 6 were closed to 
competition. Another indicator in support of this claim is the continuity of the Turkish 
parliament. Since 1908, the parliament has been held in abeyance only for seven years 
and even during these times, the junta leaders felt the need to explain that the suspension 
was only temporary (Kansu, 2001, p. 369) . 
From its first encounter with democracy in 1908 onwards, Turkey’s regime was 
open to, and compatible with, multiparty elections as well. Even during the “one-party” 
rule between 1925 and 1945, competing parties were founded, albeit for short periods of 
time. Although these parties never survived to participate in the general elections, they 
took part in local and municipal elections. Besides, for most of the one-party period, there 
was no law against the formation of opposition parties. The only legal means through 
which the state could prevent the formation of new parties was delaying the approval 
process. It is only after 1938, with the new Law of Associations, that state permission 
became requisite for the formation of a political party. However, even during this 
process, there were neither legal nor structural barriers against competitive elections. 
What prevented them were the repressive policies of the Republican People’s Party 




TABLE 2-1 PHASES OF TURKISH DEMOCRACY 









I 1908-9 1913 1918 1920 11 4 0.36 
II 1920-21 1925 1946 1960 40 21 0.53 
III 1960-61 1971 1973 1980 21 16 0.76 
IV 1980-83 1997 1999  34 29 0.85 
        
Table 2-1 summarizes the trajectory of the Turkish regime. Over the course of the 
last century, the Turkish regime has passed through four phases of democracy. Each 
period starts with a coup and the formation of a constitution. And within each phase, we 
witness first a protective and then a transformative coup. Given the cautious approach of 
the democratization literature to anything related to Mustafa Kemal, it is not conventional 
to classify the political developments in 1920 and 1925 as a coup. However, as I show in 
the subsequent sections, they satisfy the definition of a coup developed in the previous 
chapter.  
The four phases spread over a century can be conceptualized within two 50-year 
periods as the broader categories. The first fifty years correspond to a period when 
elected institutions were dominant. The last fifty years, on the other hand, represent a 
period of bureaucratic dominance. Each long period begins as an inclusive period and 
later becomes exclusionary. Finally, the ratio of democratic to non-democratic years is 
much higher in the second half of the fifty years.  




Phase 1 1908-1920 
The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) was a secret society, comprised 
mainly of military school students and young officers. The officers had graduated from 
the most westernized schools of the Empire and were therefore most influenced by the 
political currents from Europe (Ramsaur 2007, pp. 31-37). After several waves of 
persecution under Abdülhamid’s rule, the CUP managed to expand its organizational 
capacity and political influence by uniting with another organization called the Ottoman 
Freedom Society, comprised mainly of low-ranked officers and bureaucrats (Hanioğlu, 
2001, pp. 210-217)14. The leading cadres of the CUP shared a blend of Ottomanism, 
Islamism and nationalism to varying degrees and not necessarily a homogenous ideology. 
Their common denominator and uniting factor was the fear of the Empire’s disintegration 
as a result of separatist insurrections backed by the Great Powers (Ramsaur et al., 2007, 
p. 48). The memories of the Balkan revolts of the 1870’s were still fresh, and the 
Macedonian nationalist agitation convinced them that it was not an issue of the past. The 
CUP held Abdülhamid’s autocratic regime responsible for the growing threat of 
disintegration and considered parliamentary monarchy as a panacea15 (Hanioğlu, 1995, p. 
170; Kansu, 2001, pp. 360-361; Ramsaur et al., 2007, pp. 48, 113-115; Tunaya, 2004). 
The CUP’s social base was in the Balkans- the most urbanized and industrialized region 
of the Empire (S. Aydın, 2001, p. 124; Sohrabi, 1995, p. 1417). On the eve of 1908, 
14 Aydın (2001) claims that there were not one but two CUP’s. The first comprised of intellectually oriented 
military and medical students; the second included more down-to-earth and somewhat narrow-minded low-
ranked soldiers and bureaucrats in the Balkans. The first defended an Ottoman citizenship, whereas the 
second group promoted Turkish nationalism. The former were inclined to build closer ties with Britain and 
France whereas the latter were pro-German (p. 126). Sohrabi (2002) on the other hand, considers such 
distinctions as the dominant approach in the Young Turks’ historiography, as they portray Mustafa Kemal 
as the superior revolutionary (p. 49). 
15 Hanioğlu (1995) argues that beneath the parliamentarist discourse of the CUP, one can discern its true 
agenda: “A strong government, the dominant role played by an intellectual elite, anti-imperialism, a society 
in which Islam would play no governing role, and a Turkish nationalism.” (p. 211) 
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despite being weak in Istanbul, the CUP had strong roots in some parts of Anatolia, and 
was able to exercise influence over the army in the Balkans. 
 





























Figure 2-1 Transitions in Phase 1 
 
The crisis which led to the end of Hamidian despotism erupted in 1906, after a 
drought forced the Porte to increase taxes, setting off massive food riots and tax revolts in 
Anatolian cities including Erzurum, Trabzon, Kars, Van and Sivas (Aytekin, 2013, p. 
323; Emiroğlu, 1999, pp. 159-163, 173-174, 201-218; Kansu, 1997, pp. 29-72; Kars, 
1997, pp. 19-42). A similar discontent was spreading amongst the lower echelons of the 
military (Kansu, 1997, pp. 81-81; Kars, 1997, pp. 53-57). The revolution was triggered 
by the Reval meeting between Britain and Russia in June 1908. It was interpreted by the 
CUP as a rapprochement between the two Empires based on a consensus on partitioning 
88 
 
the Ottoman Empire16 (Ahmad, 1999, pp. 17-18). The CUP used its influence in the army 
to sever the connection between the Porte and the Balkans, and demanded that 
Abdülhamid re-convene the parliament. The growing intensity of the uprising in 
Macedonia that incorporated collective actions as diverse as armed demonstrations, 
collective telegrams to the Porte, and military disobedience, left Abdülhamid with no 
choice but to replace the cabined and announce a timeline for elections (Hanioğlu, 2001, 
pp. 265-275; Kansu, 1997, pp. 86-101).  
The political change in 1908 was both a coup and a revolution. In terms of the 
concrete action, it was a coup. The level of mass mobilization was incomparably lower 
than mass revolutions of the same era elsewhere, say the Russian Revolution of 1905 or 
the Iranian Revolution of 1906 (Lenin, 1977 (1908), p. 222). More importantly, those 
who initiated and led the regime change were part of the state apparatus and relied on 
their power within that apparatus (Sohrabi, 1995, p. 1409).  
Kansu has argued that 1908 was a revolution and not a coup because the CUP’s 
actions were backed by popular mobilization, and the military action was directed by the 
central committee of the CUP. Zürcher’s (2010a, p. 38) findings support Kansu’s claim: 
during the unrest period, dissident military officers did not command their own troops but 
organized separate bands of volunteers17. 
  
16 For the varying degrees of importance attached to the Reval meeting in the CUP’s historiography see 
(Zürcher, 2010a, pp. 34-35) 
17 Hanioglu (2001, pp. 221-227) documents that forming bands outside the army and cooperating with 
those already founded by non-Muslim revolutionaries, together with assassinations, was a major tactic in 
the CUP’s strategy to restore the constitutional order. 
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TABLE 2-2 SUCCESSFUL AND FAILED COUPS IN THE FIRST PHASE 
Nevertheless, despite a rich repertoire of collective action in 1908, the key 
component of the CUP’s strategy was military action. This is also why Hanioğlu calls 
CUP’s strategy a military insurrection. The course of events in 1908 was also in line with 
the CUP’s strategy and the Third Army in Salonica was the center of action. The CUP 
was influential in the Second Army in Edirne as well (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 278). 
As regards the bands, their role in the events of June-July 1908 was neither to 
march to İstanbul to oust Abdülhamid nor to establish an alternative center of 
administrative power that would replace the bureaucracy. Notwithstanding a few isolated 
events, neither Kansu nor Hanioğlu portray a split in the army or an open clash between 
the bands and the army. The regular army’s role in the June-July events had been 
Date Agent/Cause Method Success 
1908 July Low ranked officers, CUP Blocking the communication between 
Balkans and the Porte Yes 
1909 Mar  High ranked bureaucrats and 
monarchist opposition 
Mutiny in the army, surrounding the 
parliament No 
1909 Apr High ranked officers and CUP Regular Army marched to Istanbul 
Yes 
1912 Aug Low Ranked Officers and 
monarchist opposition 
Memorandum (Coup Threat)  
Yes 
1913 Jan CUP  Storming the government building 
Yes 
1913 Aug CUP Outlawing all parties except the CUP 
Yes 
1918 Dec Sultan Dissolution of the parliament/Decree 
Yes 




precisely its conscious passivity, with the purpose of demonstrating Abdülhamid’s 
helplessness in Macedonia. Moreover, as Hanioğlu (2001) shows, the CUP headquarters 
did not limit the regular army to the role of a passive observer (p. 273). The army had 
instructions, in case of Abdülhamid’s insistence on not calling elections, to march to 
İstanbul with the volunteer bands to depose the Sultan18. In other words, Sultan 
Abdülhamid was forced to reconvene the parliament under the threat of being deposed by 
the insubordinate Third Army. Seen from this perspective, whether the Third Army was 
under the control of civilians19 or not does not change the fact that a part of the state 
apparatus was used to overthrow the chief executive20. Once this feature is underlined, it 
is not difficult to note that the political change in July 23 fulfills the criteria for a coup 
d’état as defined in the previous chapter. 
In terms of the transformation of the political regime however, 1908 was a 
bourgeois revolution. And the most if not the only successful bourgeois revolution 
between 1905 and 1911 (Sohrabi, 1995). To begin with, together with the subsequent 
coup in 1909, it transformed the political regime radically by reducing the role of Sultan 
to symbolic activities, and by re-establishing the assembly - the basic instrument of a 
bourgeois democracy - on a firm basis (Tanör, 2004, pp. 193-217). From this period 
onwards, the parliament and competitive elections became the norm in Turkey. In this 
way, 1908 paved the way for the bourgeoisie to become part of the ruling coalition. 
18 As we shall see, the events in 1909 confirmed that this plan was not the product of wishful thinking but a 
concrete assessment of the situation. 
19 Neither the CUP nor its internal headquarters responsible for practically leading the insurrection, were 
civilian. In 1908, two thirds of all CUP members were soldiers (Zürcher, 2010b, p. 101). (Hanioğlu, 2001, 
p. 229) lists members of the Internal Headquarter of the CUP: three of them were soldiers (–two majors and 
one captain), one was the head of the Salonica Post Office, and Manyasizade Refik Bey was the only 
civilian member. 




                                                          
One major political player in the new regime was the CUP, which had centralism 
as its primary purpose. At first it defended a cosmopolitan brand of centralism: granting 
basic rights to all minorities would secure the unity of the Empire. So it stayed away from 
nationalism and tried to pursue a pro-British foreign policy. Later, after the Balkan wars, 
the CUP changed its policy to a combination of Islamism and nationalism and pursued a 
pro-German policy (Ç. Keyder, 1987b). 
The second important protagonist of this period was the coalition of monarchist-
decentralist forces. Some of them were members of the traditional ruling clique. The 
other sections were comprised of disillusioned CUP members. Although certain scholars 
like Kansu (2000) and Akşin (1994) have labeled these political groups as 
counterrevolutionaries, not all of them, not even the majority, were counterrevolutionary 
in the sense of aiming to return to the absolutist regime. As Ahmad (2001) rightly 
indicates, an important section of these groups was liberal, wanting a parliamentary 
regime without the CUP. But all of them were disturbed by the centralist vision of the 
CUP and their common denominator was the fear of a new form of despotism - a 
parliamentary one - replacing Abdülhamid’s absolutism21 (p. 102). Hence the common 
goal of these forces was to topple the CUP. 
March 31 Uprising 
The 1908 coup was the beginning of the bourgeois revolution but the 
constitutional changes came one year later in response to the uprising in March. The 
uprising can be seen as the eruption of political tensions simmering between the CUP and 
21 After the failure of the 1909 coup, and with the increasing number of disillusioned ex-CUP members, the 
coalition became more decentralist and less pro-absolutist. Nevertheless, it retained the putschist elements 
till the end of the period. 
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the monarchist-decentralist coalition since the revolution in 1908. It began with a clash in 
the cabinet between the CUP and Grand Vizier Kâmil Pasha supported by the 
monarchist-liberal coalition. Kâmil Pasha not only dismissed the pro-CUP faction in his 
cabinet but also tried to exile their leading members to various foreign posts. The CUP’s 
response was to unseat the Kâmil Pasha Cabinet by a vote of confidence (Ahmad, 1993, 
pp. 35-37). Meanwhile, a liberal journalist Hasan Fehmi who had been critical of the 
CUP was assassinated. Since the murder was attributed to the CUP, hundreds of 
thousands gathered at his funeral and turned it into an anti-CUP demonstration (Kansu, 
2001, pp. 72-75). Four days later, the March 31 uprising started as a military rebellion in 
the 4th Battalion of the army. In a few hours the parliament was surrounded by the rebel 
soldiers supported by students of religious schools, and several deputies were lynched. 
An important section of deputies escaped to the Balkans where the CUP had political 
supremacy. But the rest remained in Istanbul and continued with their parliamentary 
activities, electing a new cabinet which was approved by the rebelling factions and the 
monarchist bloc (Ahmad, 2001, pp. 79-81, 85-90). 
The March uprising is one of the most controversial issues of late Ottoman 
history. Concerning the initiators of the uprising, Akşin has divided the various groups 
identified in the literature into three categories- 1) Abdülhamid 2) the liberal opposition 
and 3) the CUP22- and considers the second group as the most likely culprit (1994, pp. 
229-230). Kansu describes the uprising as a counterrevolutionary coup attempt conspired 
by the monarchist opposition (Avcıoğlu, 1969a, pp. 61-68), while Avcıoğlu (1969a) has 
analyzed it as the project of British Imperialism (pp. 61-68). In contrast, Hale (1994, pp. 
22 Those who hold the third line claim that after having provoked the mutiny, the CUP used it as a pretext to 
topple Abdülhamid and to silence the opposition. 
93 
 
                                                          
40-41), Swenson (1970, p. 176) and Alkan (1999, p. 429) underline the spontaneous 
character of the uprising and explain it with the tension between the modern and 
traditional sectors of the Ottoman army. 
Tensions there may have been, but the grievances of the dissident soldiers should 
not obscure the political motives of the coup. As Kansu (2000) has documented 
extensively, the rebellion was supported and encouraged by the high-level monarchist 
Pashas in collaboration with the liberals (pp. 75-125). And reminiscent of the 1908 
Revolution (coup), the army pressured the government with its passivity. It did not 
attempt to suppress the mutiny, and tried to demonstrate the helplessness of the 
Unionists23. However, in contrast to the coup in 1908, this attempt was crushed before it 
completed its first week. The Third Army, under the influence of the CUP, marched to 
Istanbul and deposed the new cabinet with a counter-coup. Afterwards, the parliament 
together with the upper house decided to depose Abdülhamid and enthrone Mehmed V 
(Akşin, 1994, pp. 66, 94, 211, 221-223). 
The Position of the Regime 
Despite empowering the parliament to an unprecedented degree, the 1908 
Revolution did not touch the legal structure of the regime. The failed coup strengthened 
the hands of the CUP vis-à-vis the Sultan and made it possible to change the constitution 
according to the post-1908 balance of power. Two weeks after the failed coup attempt, 
the lower house started discussing the requisite changes in the constitution and after a 
three-and-a-half-months long crisis-ridden negotiation process, the upper and lower 
23 Kansu considers the reluctance to disperse the rebels in the context of the monarchist conspiracy whereas 
Akşin (1994, pp. 52-53) explains it with the helplessness of Hilmi Pasha, the new Grand-Vizer appointed 
with the uprising. 
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houses agreed upon a radical constitutional change. Out of the 119 articles, 21 were 
changed, 1 was abolished, and 3 additional articles were appended (Eroğul, 2010, p. 111; 
Tanör, 2004, p. 192). The substance of the constitutional changes was more important 
than their number though, as the parliament acquired a formal status, reflecting its de 
facto power. Although the parliament had already been functioning as a legislative body, 
until 1908 it had merely been an advisory council which could use its legislative powers 
only if the Sultan permitted. With the new changes, the parliament acquired proper 
legislative prerogatives (Tanör, 2004, pp. 192-196). As noted by Tunaya (2003), these 
changes did not merely modify the old constitution but brought a new constitution -a 
change from absolutism to parliamentarianism (p. 21).  
From a formal perspective, categorizing the 1909 regime as a regime dominated 
by elected representatives would be unacceptable for two reasons. First, the Sultan still 
had veto rights which he could use to delay- though not block- any legislative process. 
Second, the 1909 changes did not deprive the Assembly of Notables (the upper house of 
the legislature) from its veto rights and prerogatives enabling them to propose laws 
(Tanör, 2004, pp. 194-195). The assembly comprised of people, generally with a career in 





TABLE 2-3 PARLIAMENTS AND BUREAUCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 
Period Deposed the Head  









1908-1920 Yes Yes - 
Assembly of the 
Notables 
1920-1960 Yes Yes 0 None 













     
Actually, the only institution that could check the legislative powers of the lower 
house was the Assembly of Notables. And the latter’s activities were not of minor 
importance between 1908 and 1912. In the first year of legislation, it modified 10 of the 
53 legislative proposals coming from the lower house. The most important among them 
was the proposal concerning the amendments to the constitution. Although the legislative 
proposals from the parliament covered 120 articles –including proposals to transform the 
upper house into an elected body and curtailing its prerogatives- the Assembly of 
Notables approved only 22 of them and postponed discussions of the remaining articles 
without explicitly rejecting them. The notables were similarly active in interfering in 
fiscal regulations and procedures, an issue about which historically all parliaments are 
very sensitive (Demirci, 2006, pp. 186, 391-183).  
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The hyperactivity of the Assembly of Notables is especially striking if one keeps 
in mind Özgişi’s (2011) observation about the passivity of the Senate between 1960 and 
1980 (pp. 101-102). One might be tempted to think that the parliament during the 
constitutional period was even weaker than the one between 1960 and 1980.  
However this is not the case because there is a clear-cut difference between the 
parliaments before and after 1960, which make the parliaments of the former phase more 
powerful than their successors after 1960. As the narrative above indicates, the 
parliament in the first phase was the protagonist of the constitution-making process and 
acted like a constitutional assembly. In contrast, the parliaments established after the 
1960 and 1980 coups were not the agents but the outcomes of the bureaucratic 
constitution making processes. As a result of this difference, the post-1908 parliament did 
not share its sovereignty with the non-elected institutions even in a limited way. Table 2-
4 lists the institutions that have a constitutional right to restrict the law-making 
prerogatives of the parliament. As can be seen, the constitutionally-mandated 
bureaucratic control over the parliament has increased dramatically since 1960. 
It is precisely because the post-1908 parliament was strong that all constitutional 
proposals after the 1909 reform were aimed at curtailing the prerogatives of the 
parliament or finding ways to evade parliamentarian control24. In contrast, especially 
after 1980, the primary focus of parliamentary activity has been to either expand the 
prerogatives of the parliament, or to get around the bureaucratic control mechanisms. 
24 See Ahmad (1969, pp. 71-74) for the parliamentary debates concerning the secrecy of military expenses. 
Ahmad considers these as proof of extensive military control. Just the opposite. This debate demonstrates 
the difficulty of reserving certain privileges for the army. Since the 1960 coup, such parliamentary debates 
have been unthinkable. 
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TABLE 2-4 PHASES AND RATIOS OF OUTLAWED PARTIES 
Although the coup of March 31 was suppressed by the military, it was not the 
military but the parliament that prepared the new constitution. Given the strength of the 
parliament, the primary purpose of the CUP after the constitutional change was to make it 
easier for the executive office to dissolve the parliament (Eroğul, 2010, pp. 96-111). 
The regime from 1908-1919 was an inclusive one. No doubt certain parties were 
outlawed during this period. However, the ratio of the banned parties to the number of 
active parties is lower than that for the 1919-1960 and post 1980 periods (Table 2-4). 
Moreover, if we just focus on the periods when the regime operated on democratic 
principles (authoritarian intervals and transformations not counted), the number of 
banned parties comes down to zero. And the ratios in 1908-1919 and 1960-1980 become 
strikingly similar25 (Table 2-5). 
  
25 The same is true for the 1919-1960 and post-1980 periods. 
Period Active Parties Banned Parties Percentage 
1908 - 1920 20 5 25 % 
1920 - 1960 27 13 48.1 % 
1960 - 1980 18 4 22.2 % 
1980 - 74 35 47.3 % 




                                                          
TABLE 2-5 RATIO OF OUTLAWED PARTIES (DEMOCRATIC PERIODS) 
Period Active Parties Banned Parties Percentage 
1908-1913 
1919-1920 
18 1 5.5% 
1920-1925 
1945-1960 
23 9 39.1% 
1961-1971 
1974-1980 
16 1 6.3% 
1983-1997 
1999-2011 
56 16 28.6% 
Authors Calculation. Source: Appendix D 
    
The freedom to form parties did not imply the presence of democratic rights and 
liberties. Killing journalists and closing down newspapers became a routine during this 
period, and later a tradition (Ahmad, 1969, p. 61; Sohrabi, 2011, pp. 226-264; Topuz, 
2003). Until 1920, with the exception of two short phases (July 1908-April 1909, and 
July-October 1912), Istanbul was permanently under martial law (Köksal, 1996, pp. 20-
25). After an important strike wave in 1908, one of the first initiatives of the CUP had 
been to outlaw strikes (Karakışla, 1998, pp. 201-205). However, despite all these 
restrictions, Turkey has never experienced a parliamentary period that is both inclusive 
and strong before or since this period. Therefore, contrary to the assumptions and 
expectations of the modernization literature, this phase is the most democratic period of 
Turkish political life, and the regime was located at A1 during this period (Table 2-2). 
The 1912-1913 Coups 
From 1909 onwards, the CUP started to lose its grip over the parliament, and its 
primary agenda after mid-1911 was to dissolve the parliament and announce new 
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elections. However, dissolving the parliament was almost impossible and the CUP’s 
attempts to do so merely aggravated the crisis. Eventually, in early 1912, the CUP used 
constitutionally debatable methods to dissolve the parliament and to call new elections. 
Thanks to its extensive use of various forms of coercion and pressure towards both the 
electorate and the opposition party’s candidates, the CUP won a landslide victory and 
almost complete control of the parliament (Fevzi Demir, 2007, pp. 265-289). 
Rather than ensuring smooth sailing however, throwing the opposition out of the 
parliament led the former to use non-parliamentary means to obtain power. Three months 
after the elections, Halâskâr Zabitan (The League of Saviour Officers) - a group of 
officers close to the monarchist opposition - issued a memorandum asking for the 
cabinet’s resignation and the parliament’s dissolution. The move was successful. The 
cabinet resigned and the first task of the new cabinet supported by the opposition was the 
dissolution of the parliament. In this way the regime moved from A3 to C3 (Figure 2-2) 
and became an inclusive regime –none of the parties were banned- without a parliament. 
According to our definition then, the 1912 memorandum was a successful coup (Kansu, 
2000, pp. 398-408; Tunaya, 1998a, pp. 344-345, 357-362). 
The new cabinet started its tenure not with preparations for new elections but by 
persecution of deputies and journalists close to the CUP (Kansu, 2000, pp. 409, 415, 422, 
427). Around that time, in January 1913, a military defeat in the First Balkan War and 
rumors of a humiliating peace agreement gave the CUP an opportunity to execute its own 
long-planned coup. Enver Pasha - a prominent leader of the CUP - stormed the 
government building with the support of some paramilitary troops, killed the Minister of 
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War, and forced the cabinet to resign (pp. 433-441). And thus was the successful 1912 
coup followed by another successful coup. 
Still, in January 1913, the CUP had not yet secured its position and therefore did 
not attack the opposition immediately. The coup leaders’ declared intention was to go to 
the polls again, but they did not offer a timeline for the elections. So despite the promise 
of elections, the regime’s position was still C3 (Figure 2-2). This time it was the 
opposition’s turn to plot a coup. One part of this plot was the assassination of the Grand 
Vizier Mahmud Shevket Pasha. The purpose was to get rid of the CUP by assassinating 
the leading cadre. However, the CUP’s response to the assassination was an autogolpe. 
After the assassination, all parties but the CUP were outlawed and their leaders sent into 
exile (Tunaya, 2000, pp. 517-520). 
With this autogolpe coup the regime moved to C1 (Figure 2-2): it had become a 
single party regime without a parliament, although that was just a temporary position. 
With the confidence of not having a serious opposition, the CUP went to the polls. Not 
surprisingly, all the elected deputies were CUP candidates. The first task of the new 
parliament was to modify the constitution to permit the Sultan - in other words the CUP 
who controlled him - to disband the parliament without any constraint and to reduce the 
number of parliamentary conventions (Eroğul, 2010, p. 103). However, despite its 
weakness, there was a parliament and the fact that it was important can be understood by 
looking at the bargaining process between the CUP and representatives of the minorities. 
Taking the votes of the Christian minorities required extensive bargaining process (Fevzi 
Demir, 2007, pp. 301, 313-329; Erdem Karaca, pp. 85-99). As a result the new position 
of the regime was B1, where it stayed up to the end of the First World War. 
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After the Ottoman defeat in WWI, the CUP leaders fled to Berlin, and the party 
formally dissolved itself, while its deputies formed other parties, just as the returning 
exiles founded new parties. So unexpectedly, the regime became an inclusionary 
multiparty system again for a few months and moved to A3 (Figure 2-2). Nevertheless, 
confronted with a weak CUP but a parliament full of its ex-deputies, the Sultan dissolved 
the parliament and tried to replace it with an advisory council (Tunaya, 1998b, pp. 36-
39). The Porte also banned the CUP’s successor parties on the pretext of their members’ 
involvement in the Armenian massacre- partly because of British pressure and partly due 
its own hostility against the CUP. However, this did not halt the rapid increase in the 
number of political parties and associations. Between October 1918 and February 1919, 
10 new parties were founded (pp. 59, 106, 122). Therefore the regime’s inclusionary 
character did not change- and its new position was again C3. 
 Phase 2: 1920 – 1960 
The first phase of Turkish democracy did not end with a sudden stroke but as a 
result of a series of coups between 1919 and 1920 closely related to the Ottoman defeat in 
WWI. The Mudros armistice and the subsequent occupations created discontent in the 
army. The Porte’s weak position vis-à-vis the Allied Powers and internal separatist 
claims created opportunities for soldiers with political projects and/or ambitions. Those 
who were closely associated with the CUP had been considering resistance against a 
possible occupation. Simultaneously and in cooperation with the CUP, representatives of 
the local Muslim-bourgeoisie organized congresses to articulate their demands. One of 
the frequently applied tactics in the preparations (for a resistance movement) was to 
organize paramilitary forces and attack the Christian forces with the purpose of changing 
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the balance of Anatolia’s population. This was not an original tactic, but one that had 
been applied by the Porte to consolidate the Empire’s position in the Balkans during the 
Balkan uprisings and in Eastern Anatolia during WWI. After the end of WWI, armed 
bands flourished amongst the Christian population as well, partly because of the political 
and ideological climate breeding nationalism and partly for the purpose of self-defense. 
As a result, north and north-east Turkey became a region of unrest that was labeled as the 
“intercommunal conflict” by British imperialists (Dündar, 2008; Kayalı, 2008, pp. 119-
123; Yerasimos, 1989, pp. 40-49; Zürcher, 2003, pp.,120-145). 
 1919-1920 Coups 
Mustafa Kemal was one of the ambitious Pashas during this period who enjoyed, 
at best, a lukewarm relationship with the resistance movement. To fulfill his political 
ambitions, Kemal Pasha’s first choice was to collaborate with the Porte and join the 
cabinet. Once the limitations of this option became clear, Kemal started to develop his 
relations with the CUP-based resistance as well. The fact that he was dispatched to the 
north of Turkey by the Sultan and British Commanders to keep the unrest under control 
facilitated his coordination with the resistance and later strengthened his position therein. 
He joined forces with another general Kazım Karabekir, who was commanding the only 
military division of the Ottoman Empire that had not been disbanded (Zürcher, 2003, pp. 
161-173). 
To turn to the congresses being organized by the Muslim bourgeoisie in 
collaboration with the CUP, their ideological and political composition was quite 
heterogeneous and neither anti-monarchist nor anti-imperialist. Actually, what disturbed 
them about the armistice was not its terms or conditions, but its elastic formulation that 
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could open the door to an occupation of the Anatolian heartland. And what distinguished 
the congress from the Ottoman cabinet was the former’s demand for a more hawkish 
attitude during the peace negotiation process, which could only be accomplished by a 
new cabinet. As far as the functioning of the regime was concerned then, the primary 
demand of the congress was the reconvening of the parliament that was promised by the 
Sultan at the beginning of 1919. The primary obstacle to elections, for Kemal, was the 
Damad Ferit Pasha cabinet. So he channeled the energy of the congress to topple the 
cabinet. This was the first coup attempt of the period, in which Mustafa Kemal and his 
followers severed all communication between Istanbul and Anatolia by relying on the 
generals’ leverage in the bureaucracy and in the army. Eventually the congress was 
successful and forced the cabinet to resign. The first task of the new cabinet was to 
negotiate with the Ankara government and call for elections (Akşin, 1976, pp. 556-590; 





TABLE 2-6 SUCCESSFUL AND FAILED COUPS IN THE SECOND PHASE 
Date Agent/Cause Method Success 
1919 September Mustafa Kemal and 
high ranked officers 
Blocking the communication between 
Anatolia and the Porte 
Yes 
1920 March British 
Occupation/Sultan 
Decree to dissolve the parliament No 
1920 April Mustafa Kemal and 
high ranked officers 
Assembly declares itself as the unique 
representative of the state 
Yes 
1925 June Kemal and RPP Memorandum (Coup Threat) leading to 
Autogolpe 
Yes 
    
Despite its initial relatively modest goal of a simple cabinet change, this coup 
evolved into a transformative coup which opened the door to a new regime. Since the 
1919 elections were boycotted by Liberty and Entente, the major anti-CUP party, the 
parliament was under the influence of the resistance forces. However, in March 1920, 
Britain, unhappy with the resolutions of the parliament and aiming for stricter control in 
Istanbul, raided the parliament and arrested several deputies. This attack gave the Sultan 
the opportunity for a coup attempt that was eventually unsuccessful. Three weeks after 
the British attack, the Porte issued a decree for the dissolution of the parliament which 
was unable to convene because of the formal British occupation. But twelve days after 
the decree, the Kemalists invited all deputies to Ankara and reconvened the parliament in 
Ankara as the legitimate heir of the parliament in Istanbul. To fill the parliament –as 
many deputies were exiled- bye-elections elections were held (Akın, 2001; T. N. Karaca, 
2004, pp. 232-238, 291-316; Kayalı, 2008, pp. 127-129).   
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Figure 2-2 Transitions in Phase 2 
 
Among scholars, there is no a consensus on whether the convention in Ankara 
represents a regime change or not. Goloğlu (2010) considers the fact that there had not 
been any legal change in the period between the 1876 (1909) constitution and the Ankara 
parliament as proof of continuity, and calls this the third period of constitutional 
monarchy. Akşin (1976) uses the same label but considers the 1919 parliament ethnically 
more homogeneous. On the other hand, Tanör (2004) underscores that the new regime, a 
de facto republic, was qualitatively different from the constitutional monarchy (pp. 245-
246).  
Given the definition of a coup employed here, the first point to note is that the 
reconvening of the parliament in April 1920 was qualitatively different from the 
reconvention following the March 31 uprising. The latter was merely a reconstitution of 
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the pre-uprising regime. The Action Army and the CUP had not even changed the Grand 
Vizier for the five days following the uprising- let alone change the institutions of the 
regime (Akşin, 1994). True, dethronement of Abdülhamid as a major constitutional 
change followed the suppression. However, these actions did not move the regime to a 
new position but actually bridged the inconsistencies between its de facto and de jure 
positions. In contrast, the reconvened Ankara parliament in 1920, with its practical 
annulment of the executive office in Istanbul, was not only a de facto coup but also a new 
regime.  
 An Exclusionary Regime 
 While this supports Tanör’s claim of a qualitatively different regime, I do not 
agree that increased parliamentary power set the new regime apart from its predecessor. 
As argued above, the 1908 parliament was also active in the constitution making process 
and did not share its sovereignty with other institutions. Moreover, despite all efforts to 
liken the 1920 parliament to a convention, the practice of the parliament was not different 
from a parliamentary regime (Akın, 2001, pp. 222-226).  
The real differences between the pre-1920 and post-1920 parliaments lay not in 
the strength but in the exclusionary character. As shown in Tables 2.5 and 2.6, almost 
half of the parties were outlawed by the new regime. This is again at odds with the 
conventional historiography that hails 1920 as an important step towards democratization 
in Turkey. On the contrary, it represents an anti-democratic qualitative leap. Between 
1920 and 1960, the power bloc could defend itself by banning or outlawing oppositional 
parties. Generally, this exclusionary character is explained by the military nature of 
Kemalist parties and their leaders. However, as Figure 2-3 shows, the percentage of 
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banned parties during the 1950-1960 sub-phase is approximately the same as the 
percentage in 1920-25 and 1946-50 sub-phases. Even the Democrat Party period that is 
generally not seen as an extension of the Kemalist regime is not very different.  
 
 
Figure 2-3 Percentage of Banned Parties 
Authors’ calculation. Source: Appendix D. 
 
The new regime found its legal expression first in the 1921 Constitution that 
changed the name of the state from Ottoman Empire to Turkey, but did not completely 
renounce the constitutional heritage of the Empire. The legal and institutional framework 
of the new regime was not completed until the promulgation of the 1924 Constitution - a 
flag representing Kemalist victory over the opposition. 
Between 1920 and 1924, the parliament was the epicenter of political struggle. 
However, despite its significance in terms of the number of deputies, the opposition 














dominant wing of the opposition. People with medrese [Islamic school] background were 
part of the opposition, but they had roughly the same weight among the Kemalists. 
Although the majority of the CUP-affiliated deputies were in the opposition, Kemal had a 
significant amount of support from the ranks of the CUP as well. The only common 
denominator was a fear of Kemal’s dictatorial tendencies. Whereas Kemal was able to 
form first a group then the Republican People’s Party in the parliament with help from 
his supporters in the CUP, his opponents remained scattered and weakly organized 
(Demirel, 1995; Finefrock, 1979, p. 16; Zürcher, 2007, p. 41)26. 
 In November 1922, two months after the military victory against Greece, Kemal 
abolished the monarchy using a combination of intrigues, open violations of assembly 
regulations, and military threats (Kansu, 1990, pp. 759-766). In April 1923, he used the 
same methods to force the parliament to dissolve itself and go to elections. The “High 
Treason Law” equated any possible criticism of Kemal’s political program with treason, 
and the assassination of Ali Şükrü Bey, one of the opposition leaders, a few weeks before 
its enactment demonstrated how the law would be enforced. Kemal was thus able to 
intimidate the opposition and contest the elections as a single party27 (Finefrock, 1976). 
Eventually, in June, all but two deputies were elected from Kemal’s list. Three candidates 
of the opposition could overcome Kemal’s resistance and enter the parliament from the 
RPP’s list (Tunçay, 1992b, pp. 56-57). 
26 (Demirel, 2013b) and Tunçay (1992b, p. 42) claim that the opposition was not as loose as the Kemalist 
historiography has presented. However, they do not compare their organizational coherence relative to the 
Kemalists. Furthermore, Demirel claims that the opposition was at the same time an opposition against the 
CUP.  
27 Finefrock (1976, p. 191) describes this law as Kemal’s “final and greatest political coup”. It seems that 
he uses the word coup in a different sense than this study.  
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In October Kemal initiated a crisis of the cabinet and then proposed the 
declaration of the Republic as a solution. With a fait accompli Turkey became the 
Republic of Turkey. In this way, the constitutional role of the Sultan was replaced by the 
president, who was to be elected by the parliament. Out of the 270 deputies, only 159 
attended the session where the Republic was voted and Kemal became its president 
(Finefrock, 1976, pp. 251-257). 
Kansu (1990) defines the declaration of the Republic as a coup d’etat and a 
turning point, establishing a Kemalist dictatorship and signifying the end of liberal 
democracy in Turkey (pp. 1040-1041). However, when he discusses the parliamentary 
debates about certain articles of the 1924 Constitution, he documents the parliament’s 
success in fighting off Kemal’s proposals for extensive presidential prerogatives 
including longer term of service, a suspensive veto, and the dissolution of the parliament 
(pp. 1055-1059). This very capacity to resist demonstrates two things. First, in 1924 the 
regime was not yet a dictatorship. Second, the parliament was the strongest institution of 
the regime, given that even the opposition could find room in it. In sum, the chain of 
coups and counter coups between 1919 and 1920 moved the regime to A3 (Figure 2-2) 
and the 1924 Constitution was the articulation of this new position. 
 The Autogolpe 
Mustafa Kemal was able to get rid of the first group in the opposition with the 
1923 elections. However as the parliamentary debates about the 1924 Constitution 
revealed, this defeat did not mean total elimination of all opposition. A new opposition 
emerged shortly- comprising of his former soldier and party comrades who had supported 
him in his assault in 1923. The ideological inclination of this opposition – like its 
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predecessor - was also towards liberalism and decentralism. Foundation of the Republic, 
abolition of the Caliphate, and the preparation of a new constitution were three important 
issues that led some members of the opposition to resign and found a new party called the 
Progressive Republican Party (PRP). Since the deputies of PRP were already in the 
parliament, Mustafa Kemal could not get rid of them by applying the old tactics (Zürcher, 
2007, pp. 53-78, 150-153).  
Still, the PRP also had a short life. One year after the promulgation of the new 
constitution, the regime experienced its first protective coup. A successful regime change 
towards autocracy occurred in 1925 with the Law for Maintenance and Order (LMO 
henceforth), which put an end to the exclusive-parliamentarian period of 1920-25. The 
justification of the LMO was the Sheikh Said Rebellion in the Kurdish regions of the 
Republic. 
As a result of the LMO’s first article “The government is empowered to prohibit 
on its own initiative and by administrative measure… all organizations, provocations, 
exhortations, initiatives and publications which cause disturbance of the social structure, 
law and order and safety and incite to reaction and subversion.”, the PRP as the only legal 
opposition party was banned seven months after its founding. After this decision, the 
LMO remained intact for another four years (Zürcher, 2007, pp. 119-130, 201).  
Karpat (2010) considers the LMO as a turning point signifying Mustafa Kemal’s 
successful usurpation of political power, and the start of the revolutionary process (p. 
135). For Tunçay (1992b) it is the end of the relatively free regime and for Kansu (1990) 
it is the beginning of the institutionalization of dictatorship. In our conceptual framework 
however, Mustafa Kemal was actually replicating the CUP’s move against the 
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opposition. Kemal’s autogolpe was a protective coup- similar to the ones in 1912 and 
191328. Although the consequence was again a single-party regime, the coup was not 
aimed at changing the regime, but only at stabilizing Kemal’s position and at silencing 
any possible opposition. This also explains the absence of any constitutional changes29. 
Ironically, while restricting inter-party competition, the legal changes made the regime 
more inclusionary in Dahl’s sense. The Kemalist regime recognized women’s right to 
vote in the municipal elections in 1930 and in the national elections in 1934. With the 
1935 elections, 18 women deputies entered the parliament (Gökçimen, 2008, p. 49; 
Tanör, 2004, p. 323). However, none of these changes made the regime more 
competitive. 
The Free Republican Party: A Failed Democratization Attempt 
It is important to note that besides not attempting to change the constitution, 
Kemal was not against all forms of opposition. On the contrary, in order to secure his 
position as the president, he needed an opposition that would prevent his own party from 
becoming too strong. With this goal, Kemal in 1930 tried to encourage the formation of 
an opposition party: the Free Party.  
The short-lived Free Party (FP) period, between August 1930 and November 
1930, is generally taken together with the events of 1925 and referred to as the second 
democratic experiment. However, the political and economic conditions had not 
remained the same for five years. In 1925, the RPP had been challenged by an incapable 
28 Although in a different context, Zürcher (1992, p. 250) also sees a similarity between these coups. 
29 In 1937, the six guiding principles of the RPP were added to the Constitution. Tanör (2004) considers it 
proof of the party-state integration (p. 324). However, this addendum did not imply a change in the actual 
functioning of the regime. The fact is that the Democrat Party did not bother to remove these clauses after 
winning the elections and obtaining an overwhelming majority in the parliament. 
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but real opposition. Five years later however, the opposition had no focus or strength. 
One year after the declaration of LMO, Mustafa Kemal made his final move that was the 
last nail in his opponents’ coffin. All the remnants of the disorganized PRP opposition 
and ex-CUP cadres were accused of plotting the assassination of Mustafa Kemal. In 
1927, confident of his victory, Kemal read his official history of the so called “National 
Liberation War” in the parliament to much applause (Tunçay, 1992b, p. 179; Zürcher, 
2003, p. 255). Certainly, the single party was a party with wings and the liberal wing 
criticized the state-centered policies of İsmet İnönü’s cabinet persistently. Yet, in contrast 
to the PRP, this new liberal wing was loyal to Mustafa Kemal and opposed only the 
prime minister. 
What unsettled the regime in 1930 was the Great Depression, collapse of the 
world market, and popular discontent especially among the small peasantry in Western 
Anatolia -the heartland of Turkish agriculture. Decreasing commodity prices, unequal 
exchange between town and village, and the tax burden increased the indebtedness of the 
peasants and eventually led to their dispossession. Although not exposed as contentious 
actions, the deprivation and anger of peasants and merchants were noticed throughout 
Western Anatolia. Mustafa Kemal’s solution was to funnel this anger through 
parliamentary means and to absorb it before it became explosive. A reliably loyal 
opposition party would serve the purpose. So he pushed the button and asked a close 
friend and ex-prime minister Fethi Okyar to found the opposition party of his majesty –
the Free Republican Party (FRP). After giving interviews about the principles of the 
party, Okyar announced the program and constitution of the party again via newspapers. 
Given the bureaucracy’s tight control over the press at the time, the newspapers’ interest 
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actually reflected Mustafa Kemal’s approval and encouragement of the new party 
(Emrence, 2006, pp. 26-33). 
The adjective Republican in the name denoted the newly-founded party’s loyalty 
to the basic principles of the regime: secularism and a clear stance towards the Sultan and 
the caliphate. What distinguished the FRP from the RPP were its economic policies: its 
criticism of state intervention, tariffs, and taxes. On the political plane, the FRP defended 
the extension of civil liberties, especially freedom of speech. Another important 
difference was its eagerness to embrace the Armenian, Greek and Jewish communities. 
Yet, even before its founding, the party openly declared that its doors would be closed to 
the Kurds who, without being named, were considered traitors to the fatherland 
(Emrence, 2006, pp. 77-88). 
The FRP organized and consolidated itself with astonishing speed. Its first test of 
strength was the municipal elections in 1930. The RPP used all possible advantages of 
the state to coerce the peasants and workers to vote for it, to little effect. The FRP 
obtained significant success – two city municipalities and forty district municipalities - in 
the first direct elections of the Turkish Republic. However, this success also paved the 
way for the FRP’s liquidation. In his struggle to get past the bureaucratic obstacles, 
Okyar realized that Mustafa Kemal was as concerned about the FRP’s success as the 
leading cadre of the RPP. Since the FRP was not a party built by its founder’s own 
initiative, after this insight Fethi Okyar signed the liquidation decree of his own party 
addressed to the ministry of internal affairs. This was the closing scene of the first 
democratization attempt in Turkish history (Emrence, 2006, pp. 163-190). 
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 Successful Democratization and the Fall of the RPP  
After the so-called “Free Party experiment,” the Turkish political regime 
continued to stay in A1 up to the last year of WWII. A country that had preserved her 
non-belligerent stance throughout the war despite constant British pressure, Turkey 
declared war against Germany in the hope of participating in the San Francisco meetings 
in 1945. In May and November of 1945, President İnönü, Kemal’s heir, made two 
speeches which opened the way for a multiparty regime. In these speeches Inonu 
underlined the fact that Turkey deserved a multi-party democracy and promised a change 
from indirect to direct elections and the lifting of legal obstacles to the formation of class-
based parties and associations. The change of the voting system, new laws regulating the 
press and associations, and the elections that immediately followed moved the Turkish 
regime towards the inclusive direction. As I discuss in the third and sixth chapters, within 
the RPP there was certainly a growing opposition that was not afraid of showing its 
discontent openly in the party and the parliament. However, at the beginning, the 
opposition did not have the agenda of forming a separate party and challenging the RPP. 
İnönü’s intention was to purge the opposition from the ranks of his party, encourage its 
leaders to form an alternative party, and keep them under control. Hence throughout the 
transition period, the political initiative lay in the hands of President İnönü (Albayrak, 
2004, pp. 30-33, 46, 57-59). 
After the founding of the National Development Party in late 1945, twelve other 
parties were founded in the following year. However, compared to the 1919-1925 period, 
the regime had not become more inclusionary. Party banning continued to be a common 
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practice. In 1946 alone, four parties were banned and liquidated. (Appendix D). Hence 
the position of the regime was not different from its initial location at A2.  
Among the parties founded between 1945 and 1946, the most important was the 
Democrat Party (DP). The Democrat Party’s leaders had been active in the RPP until they 
were expelled in 1945. In terms of their programs, the two parties were not very different. 
Despite the secular and bureaucratic appearance of the DP, what it was promising was 
growth based on free markets and tolerance of religious practices.  
The DP won the elections in 1950 and governed the country up to 1960. Thanks 
to the majoritarian electoral system, it was over-represented in the parliament and soon it 
became obvious that it would not act as a replacement of the RPP but as an alternative 
force challenging and undermining its supremacy. In 1954, this majority increased in a 
disproportionate way. Between 1925 and 1945, one could talk about a fusion between the 
state and RPP (Demirel, 2013a; C. Koçak, 2009). With its dominance in the parliament, 
the DP started to restructure all bureaucratic apparatuses and started to create its own 
bureaucracy (Albayrak, 2014, p. 309).  
I discuss the underlying causes and the evolution of the crisis leading to the 1960 
coup in chapters three and six respectively. For now, the following summary should be 
sufficient. The DP’s control in the parliament – the strongest institution of the regime - 
had already frustrated the RPP and the bureaucratic segments affiliated with it. However, 
the 1957 elections revealed that the DP, albeit still a majority, had started to lose its most 
important asset, i.e., electoral support. The DP’s retreat raised hopes of the opposition 
and gave fuel to the latter’s electoral mobilization that would eventually lead the DP to 
rely more and more on censorship and police repression to preserve its position. The 
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vicious cycle of mobilization and repression led also to the politicization of the younger 
officers, who thanks to US-sponsored military programs, were acquainted with modern 
warfare techniques and dissatisfied with the traditional minded commanders in the army. 
From 1954 onwards, this exasperation led many young officers to get involved in coup 
conspiracies. The increasing politicization in 1959 encouraged several low-level officers 
to revitalize their coup plans, which they had shelved some time ago. Thus the way was 
paved for a new coup in 1960 (Ahmad, 1977, pp. 151-159; Akyaz, 2002, pp. 88-130; 
Tunçay, 1992a, pp. 184-187).  
Phase 3: 1960 – 1980: An Inclusionary Regime Under Military 
Supervision 
In 1960, a conspiratorial organization of colonels and sergeants deposed the DP. 
The 38-member National Unity Committee (NUC), the official name for the junta, 
dissolved the parliament, but did not ban political parties- not even the DP. However, all 
prominent members of the DP were arrested including the president and the prime 
minister. Moreover, all party activities were frozen. With the new coup, the regime 



























Figure 2-4 Transitions in Phase 3 
 
Immediately after taking power, the junta announced its intention of going to the 
polls. Actually, the junta was not composed of politically homogenous elements and 
included officers who wanted to pursue a long-lasting coup like the one in Egypt and 
Iraq, as well as moderates who did not want to rule the state directly but preferred to 
control it strictly but indirectly via institutions. This tension caused an internal battle 
within the junta which resulted in the defeat of the hawkish faction (Ahmad, 1977, pp. 
162-168; Akyaz, 2002, pp. 40-48). 
At the beginning of 1961, the NUC permitted political activities and after seven 
months the regime moved to C2, where it would stay for another 8 months. During this 
period a new constitution was proposed by an assembly of representatives, who were 
elected from universities, trade unions, occupational organizations, bureaucratic 
institutions and political parties in a corporatist way. The new constitution was ratified in 
June and a new government elected in October.  
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TABLE 2-7 IMPRISONED JOURNALISTS AND PUBLICISTS BETWEEN 1908 AND 2013 
Period 
Phase I Phase II* Phase III Phase IV** 
Duration 
5.5 20.0 16.0 21.0 
Number of Arrested or Sentenced Journalists 
4.0 68.0 3.0 197.0 
Arrests Per Year 
0.7 3.4 0.2 9.4 
 
 
Phase I: August 1908- August 1912 and  
August 1919-April 1920 
Phase II April 1920-April 1925 and May 1945 and May 1960 
 
Phase III: July 1961-March 1971 and  
October 1973-September 1980 
Phase IV: 1984-2013 
* Journalists who were arrested during 1971-73 and released with the 1974 pardon not counted 
 
** 1988 -1996 data is missing 
Calculated from (Albayrak, 2004; CPJ, 1997, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2004a, 2004b, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013; Kabacalı, 1990) 
 
The Position of the New Regime 
Compared to the previous and subsequent constitutions, there was a special 
emphasis on civil and political liberties in the 1960 Constitution. With its 11th article 
stating that basic liberties can be only constrained by regulations that do not contradict 
the spirit of the constitution, it also aimed to preempt repressive policy proposals (Tanör, 
2004, pp. 379-384). However, in spite of this emphasis, the NUC passed a new law 
prohibiting criticism of the 1960 regime, and several journalists were sent to trial on the 
basis of this new law. Similarly, Articles 141 and 142 of the penal code, remnants of the 
prohibitions on communist propaganda, were hanging over all publicists like the sword of 
Damocles (Kabacalı, 1990, pp. 192-209). During this phase, hundreds of journalists and 
authors were prosecuted, although only a few were put behind bars, excepting the coup 
interlude between 1971 and 1974 (Table 2-7).  
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A significant part of the 1960-1980 period passed under martial law (See the 
appendix in Üskül, 1989), although the proportion of political prisoners to the total 
population was lower compared to the previous and subsequent periods (Figure 2-5).  
As usual, Kurds were not amongst the beneficiaries of the new regime. In fact, 
one of the justifications and motivations for the 1960 coup was the fear of a potential 
Kurdish insurrection as a consequence of developments in Iraq. After the 1958 coup in 
Iraq, the new Iraqi president Abdul Karim Quasim invited Mustafa Barzani, the leader of 
southern Kurds, to Iraq and promised regional autonomy. Although Quasim did not fulfill 
his promise concerning autonomy, from that time onwards Barzani found the opportunity 
to organize and increase his political influence not only in southern Kurdistan, but also in 
the northern parts which are within the Turkish borders. Barzani’s mobilization and 
influence did not turn into an active resistance against Turkish forces, but the mere 
possibility of an insurrection fostered unity amongst Turkish colonels and led them to 
speed up the execution of their plans. After the coup, 55 Kurdish landowners who were 
suspected of being part of a Kurdish insurgency, were immediately –even before the 
Democrat Party members - arrested. The number of detainees soon increased to 550 
landowners, all of whom were sent to an internment camp in Sivas, where they remained 
for six months. After six months in Sivas, 495 of them were released without any trial, 
but 55 were exiled to western Turkey, again without a trial (Çiçek, 2010; Ekinci, 2010; 







Nevertheless, according to the criteria in this study, the new regime was the 
diametric opposite of the regime between 1920 and 1960. Whereas the latter was 
exclusionary, this new regime was inclusionary. During its 20 years of rule, only four 
parties were banned (Table 2-5) and only one was banned during the democratic phase of 
the regime (Table 2-6). 
Furthermore, in contrast to the parliamentarian second phase, the third phase 
moved the regime under the control of the non-elected. The new constitution stripped the 
parliament of its de jure privileges. The parliament was no longer the sole instrument of 
national sovereignty. It was only one of them. There were new institutions which could 
block the decisions of the elected legislature. These institutions were the Senate, the 
Constitutional Court and the National Security Council. The members of the Senate were 
elected from among university graduates, who comprised 2% of the total population. 
Members of the junta were natural and lifelong members of the Senate. Finally, the 
president could appoint several members to the Senate. The Constitutional Court could 
block any legislation by deciding that it was unconstitutional, and none of its members 
were appointed by elected representatives. The National Security Council was shaped 
according to the American National Security institutions during the Cold War. Being an 
institution composed of generals and ministers who advise the president and the prime 
minister about threats to national security, it became something more than an advisory 
council, and practically a third component of the executive office.  
The powers of the elected were further curtailed by assigning autonomy to various 
strategic institutions like the Council of State, Chamber of Accounts, state universities, 
public television and radio channels, the Central Planning Agency, and the Central Bank. 
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The most important of these arenas of autonomy was the judicial reserved domain of the 
soldiers. Since 1914, the army had had an autonomous judiciary, but with the new 
constitution it acquired a constitutional status (S. Çelik, 2008, pp. 154-157; Özdemir, 
1989, pp. 87-89, 122-126; Tanör, 2004, pp. 394-400,404, 409-411; Yazıcı, 1995, pp. 46-
58). 
 
Figure 2-6 Number of Cancelled Statutes by the Constitutional Court (1962-2012) 
Source: (Anayasa Mahkemesi İstatistikleri) 
 
Among the three institutions that could curtail the powers of the parliament and 
the cabinet, the Senate was the least important. In terms of its power to block legislation, 
it was even less influential than the upper house had been between 1909 and 1912. 
According to Özgişi, it approved 88.4% of the law proposals coming from the cabinet 
without any changes and rejected only 1.1%. With regards to the proposals made by 
deputies and senators, it was a little less lenient and rejected 11.9% (p. 105).  
The Constitutional Court on the other hand was an important means to block 
legislative action30 (Figure 2-6). In fact, its activism was one of the main concerns of the 
































































                                                          
executive office, including its military partners. Despite the absence of a firm legal 
justification, the Constitutional Court appropriated for itself the prerogative to cancel 
constitutional amendments made by the parliament (Özbudun, 2007, pp. 259-260).  
Of the three, the National Security Council (NSC) was the most important 
institution through which the generals could manipulate and influence the elected 
governments’ policies. It was not only a council where the generals could “convince” the 
cabinet of certain policy proposals, but also an institution through which the military 
could make public admonitions and threaten several social groups including students and 
workers. Even the preliminary steps of 1971 can be traced back to the discussions in the 
NSC (Ahmad, 1977, pp. 199-203). 
 
Figure 2-7 Visibility of the Bureaucracy 
Ratio of news about the National Security Council, Constitutional Court and the Chief Commander over 
the news about the Grand National Assembly. 31 
 
In sum then, with the 1961 Constitution, the regime had become more 
inclusionary, but at the expense of the powers of elected institutions, which had been 
31 To calculate this ratios, I relied a Cumhuriyet’s search engine and searched for the news articles 


















































































                                                          
seriously curtailed (Parla, 2005, pp. 76-80). This also corresponded to an increasing 
visibility of the hitherto neglected representatives of the bureaucracy (Figure 2-7). In this 
way the regime moved to B2 where it would stay until 1980. 
TABLE 2-8 SUCCESSFUL AND FAILED COUPS IN THE THIRD PHASE 
Date Agent/Cause Method Success 
1960 May Low ranked soldiers Arresting the president and 
prime minister 
Yes 
1962 February Colonel Aydemir Surrounding the parliament and 
house of the president 
No 
1963 May Colonel Aydemir Attacking the radio station No 
1971 March 9 Bureaucrats, intellectuals, high 
ranked soldiers 
 Never attempted 
No 
1971 March 12 Chief Commanders of the Army Memorandum Yes 
    
The Failed 1961 and 1962 Coups 
After the 1960 coup, all the key DP figures were arrested. However, the coup did 
not eradicate the organizational basis of the DP. Moreover, on the eve of the coup, 
despite its decreasing popularity, the DP still enjoyed the support of an important 
segment of the population. In combination, these two factors created problems of 
legitimacy for the junta. To the surprise of the NUC, almost 38% of voters rejected the 
new constitution32. Similarly, in the general elections, the total vote of the two heirs of 
the DP was equivalent to their predecessor. It seemed that the coup had been a kiss of life 
for the DP (Karakartal, 2011, pp. 168, 174-167). In 1965, the Justice Party (JP), 
composed of ex-DP members and claiming to be the inheritor of the DP, won 45% of the 
votes and formed the government. In 1969, the JP repeated its electoral success. 
32 Two months after the ratification of the new constitution, Prime Minister Menderes and his two ministers 
were hanged. Curiously, one of their alleged crimes was the violation of the old constitution. 
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The coup leaders, who had at first refused to adopt the radical alternative of 
banning all political parties, tried to find a mid-way by enabling JP members to return to 
political life but ‘instructing’ them about the widespread frustration in the army and 
threatening them with possible military intervention.  
The combination of aggressive verbal pressure with the “lenient” practical attitude 
towards the DP leaders created immense politicization in the army and increased the 
number of groups plotting a coup- some of whom failed. If the second phase provided us 
with examples of both failed and successful democratization, the third phase provides 
examples of failed coups together with one successful protective coup (Ahmad, 1977, pp. 
177-180; Akyaz, 2002, pp. 165-180).  
The first two failed coup attempts occurred in 1962 and 1963 respectively. They 
were plotted by Colonel Aydemir, who was discontented with the leniency of the new 
regime towards ex-DP representatives. He also complained about the new cabinet’s 
reluctance to apply social reforms. Although his final goal was a parliamentary 
democracy, he regarded a non-parliamentary regime as a necessary transitional phase. It 
would be an exclusionary regime, relentless against counter-revolutionaries and insistent 
in applying radical reforms. However, Colonel Aydemir was unable to obtain the support 
of the generals and was hanged after his second abortive attempt (D. Çakmak, 2008, pp. 
43-58; Y. Demir, 2006, pp. 167-168). 
The Failed March 9 Coup and the Successful March 12 Memorandum 
The next (failed) coup attempt eight years later was different from that of Colonel 
Aydemir in two senses. First, those who plotted the coup this time were not only soldiers 
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but also included intellectuals, journalists and bureaucrats. Second, high- ranked officers 
including generals were more actively involved in the coup plot this time. 
Despite these differences, the motivation for the coup was the same. The soldiers 
and intellectuals were dissatisfied with a JP government which they considered to be a 
recycled version of the DP. From their point of view, electoral results would not change 
without structural changes like agrarian reforms and a national industrialization move. 
Hence the coup had to do away with the electoral masquerade and establish a 
revolutionary government capable of implementing radical reforms. In short, the 
envisioned coup would move the regime towards the exclusionary bureaucratic zone 
(Akyaz, 2002, pp. 272-294, 301-218). 
Not all members of the army adopted this radical line. Despite the politicization of 
generals, the chief commander and other high-ranked generals chose not to change the 
status quo. However, their authority over the army was not strong enough to expose and 
arrest the coup plotters. Instead they chose an alternative tactic and stole the role of the 
coup plotters by a preemptive coup. On March 12, three commanders of the army issued 
a memorandum, in which they underlined the need for structural reforms and a 
determined government. This memorandum was meant to be a call for the resignation of 
the already weak government. While the government was dismissed, the parliament was 
not dissolved, and a new technocratic cabinet was formed without any member from the 
JP. The civilians who were associated with the March 9 junta were arrested, and 
conspirators in the army were expelled through early retirements (Akyaz, 2002, pp. 319-
326; Karavelioğlu, 2007). 
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Hence, in March 1971, the Turkish regime again experienced two coup attempts. 
One radical and transformative, and another balancing. The army’s top generals put the 
kibosh on the radical junta’s transformative coup. The March 12 coup was not a 
transformative coup and did not change the position of the regime even temporarily.  
Nevertheless, the constitutional changes of the interim regime between 1971 and 
1973 strengthened the army’s position within the state apparatus: the number of generals 
in the NSC increased. Also, whereas the NSC’s previous function was defined as 
“expressing opinions,” it was now in a position to “recommend” policies to the cabinet. 
The reserved domains of the military courts grew at the expense of civilian courts. State 
Security Courts, initially designed to operate only under martial law to control social 
unrest, acquired a regular character. With the constitutional amendments, some of the full 
and associate members of these courts would be appointed among the soldier judges. 
Similarly, military expenditures would not be controlled by the Chamber of Accounts 
anymore (Tanör, 2004, pp. 412-418; Yazıcı, 1995, pp. 96-109).  
All in all, in the same way that the protective coup of 1913 helped the CUP rise to 
an unchallenged political status, the 1971 coup initiated the rise of the generals. Before 
the coup, the generals were one of the candidates for control of the state apparatus, the 
civil bureaucracy and low-level officers being the others. After the coup, there was no 
other candidate. 
What makes the March 9 movement more interesting is the coup plotters’ 
intention and hopes of making use of the youth movement. On the eve of May 27, despite 
the absence of any organic links between university students and conspirators in the 
army, the colonels had made use of the political crisis caused by the spontaneous 
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movement of the youth. In 1970-71, the coup plotters actively tried to establish links with 
-- and thereby manipulate - the youth movement. Given the Kemalist inclinations of the 
youth and its uncompromising opposition to the government, this seemed to be a feasible 
plan. After all, “Army-Youth Hand-in-Hand” has been a popular slogan since 1960 
(Atılgan, 2007, pp. 643-645; Aydınoğlu, 2007, pp. 141-161, 169-187; Belli, 1970, pp. 59-
65, 69-72; Cemal, 1999). 
Nevertheless, what the prospective junta leaders had not calculated was the rapid 
radicalization and politicization of the youth towards revolutionary socialism, which was 
at least in practice incompatible with the support of putschist movements. The coup 
government attempted to silence the growing social and political discontent through 
extensive political repression. During the coup period, the leading cadres of the three 
revolutionary organizations were annihilated, and hundreds of people were arrested. Yet 
after the 1973 elections, which marked the end of the coup period, all these cadres were 
released with an official pardon and most of them resumed their political activity by 
founding both legal and illegal organizations (STM, pp. 2172-2175, 2182-2178, 2193-
2177 ). 
Phase 4: The Bureaucratic Tutelary Post-1980 Regime 
Similar to the one in 1971, the 1980 coup was the initiative of the very top 
echelon of the army. This time, however, there was no split within the army. More 
importantly, whereas the coup in 1971 protected the existing regime by solidifying the 
soldiers’ position in it, the leaders of the 1980 coup dismantled the old regime altogether 
and engineered a new political system wherein the army could exert maximum control. 
The 1980 one is the only coup in Turkish history that simultaneously dissolved the 
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parliament and banned all political parties. With this bold move the regime changed its 
position to C1- a no-party and no-parliament regime. 
As far as we can glean from the autobiographies of the conspirators, the coup was 
the result of two years of planning and the commanders waited up to the point where the 
leaders of political parties would have no hope of restoring their credibility. Keeping this 
concern in mind, the commanders twice postponed the execution of their planned coup. 
When the day eventually came, the army arrested all the major cadres of legal political 
parties and shut the parliament down. A few months later, the parties were also banned. 
Once the actors of parliamentarian politics were silenced, the regime turned on non-
parliamentary revolutionary movements (Aydınoğlu, 2007, pp. 404-405; Evren, 1990, pp. 
276-283; İba, 1998, pp. 232-233). 
As officially declared by the junta, the major goal of the 1980 coup was to smash 
all revolutionary and socialist organizations. With 650,000 detentions, 210,000 trials, 517 
capital punishment decisions, more than 500 suspicious deaths, and 14,000 revocations of 
citizenship, the army managed to change the regime from tutelary parliamentarian to 
bureaucratic autocratic. In terms of the position of the regime, this was the most drastic 
regime change of the 1908-2012 period  (Cumhuriyet,  "Barışalım Yaşayalım," December  
10, 1995; Zürcher, 2004, p. 279).  
After a two-year-long repression period, the coup regime started the process of 
constitution-making and established a consultative assembly by appointments. The new 
constitution was ratified by 92% of votes and the junta leader was elected as president 
(Cumhuriyet,  "Yeni Anayasa ile Yeni Dönem: Evren Cumhurbaşkanı," November 8, 
1995). Simultaneously, military oppression gradually lessened and competitive elections 
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were held in 1983. So the regime moved back to democracy, but it was in an exclusionary 
mode. 
The Exclusionary Version of the 1960 Regime 
The difference between the post-1960 regime and the one after 1980 lay not in the 
relationship of the elected with the nonelected. In terms of favorably tilting the power 
balance towards the latter, there is continuity between the modifications in 1971 and the 
transformation in 1980. Since 1971, the cabinet can bypass parliamentary legislative 
procedures with statutory decrees, but with the post-1980 constitutional changes, these 
decrees can also regulate basic freedoms and rights. The president has no responsibility- 
as in the 1960 Constitution - but his position is no longer symbolic. On the contrary, with 
its prerogatives, the presidency is the strongest part of the executive office. The president 
not only appoints bureaucrats to key posts, but also has stronger delaying veto powers. As 
regards constitutional amendments, the president has the right to call for a referendum 
any time. Finally, the 1980 constitution increased the army’s control in the executive 
office33 (Parla, 2007; Tanör, 1994, pp. 115-125). 
As a result of this process, the already visible segments of the non-elected upper 
echelons of the bureaucracy became even more visible. If we think of newspapers as the 
barometer of political life, we can measure the centrality of any given institution or 
bureaucratic position by comparing the number of news it elicits with the number of news 
about any other institution. Figure 2-7 shows the ratio of the news items covering the 
non-elected (National Security Council, Constitutional Court and the Chief Commander) 
to those about the parliament. With the 1960 coup there occurs a dramatic jump, mainly 
33 Cf (Harris, 1988, pp. 194-196). Harris considers these changes to be merely procedural and goes as far as 
claiming that in some domains such as voting, the new constitution curtailed the political rights of soldiers. 
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because of the introduction of the new institutions like the National Security Council and 
the Constitutional Court. It is after 1980 however, that bureaucratic institutions start to 
play an even more prominent role in political life despite the fact that no new institutions 
were founded during this period. 
The move from elected to non-elected personnel/institutions represented 
continuity from 1971. What had changed was the inclusionary character of the regime. 
The new regime narrowed the sphere of political competition and brought it to pre-1960 
levels (Table 2-5). The first step in this direction was banning eighteen parties in one go 
in 1981. 
The second step was the extensive screening or veto process before the 1983 
elections. None of the parties considered as the continuation of the pre-1980 parties were 
permitted to contest the elections (Demirel, 2014; Soysal, pp. 2132, 2136-2140). A 
complementary step was extensive repression, and keeping socialists, one of the 
politically most active segments of the society, in prison. As Figure 2-5 shows, the 
number of political prisoners after the 1980 coup increased dramatically34. 
Approximately 70,000 in number, political prisoners were also disenfranchised even after 
they completed their sentence (Top, 2004).  
Another important and innovative strategy to remove socialists and especially 
Kurds from electoral politics was the 10 percent electoral threshold (Ağırdır, 2013; 
Gürsel, 2013). Before the coup Turkey did not have an electoral threshold. Afterwards 
she had the highest threshold in the world followed by Liechtenstein (8%) and Russia 
34 Actually, Figure 2-5 does not completely reflect the repressive character of the post-1980 period because 
the data do not include those who were sentenced because of the special anti-terror law (Article 3713 of the 
Penal Law), replacing the notorious 141st and 142nd articles.  
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(7%) respectively. Finally, from 1983 onwards, party banning became a frequently used 
tool of the new regime (Güney & Başkan, 2008, p. 266). Hence after the 1983 elections, 
the new position of the regime was B2.  
 
Figure 2-8 Government Programs and Expressions of Intentions for Constitutional Change 
Author’s Calculation  
Source: (Hükümetler ve Programları)  
 
The Failed Democratization Attempt between 1989-1995 
Since 1980, the Turkish regime has experienced two democratization attempts 
with the aim to change its bureaucratic and exclusionary character. A comparison of the 
relative weight in government programs of the post-1983 cabinets enables one to discern 
these two waves. The first corresponds to the period of the 49th and 50th (TPP) and the 
Social Democrat People’s Party (SDPP), the heirs of the Justice Party and the Republican 
People’s Party of the pre-1980 period. From 1984 onwards these two parties had started 
to oppose the domination of the army with modest demands for democratization and 


















































eruption of “Spring Actions” - the trade union mobilization in 1989. Democratization and 
a new constitution were slogans of the electoral campaigns of both TPP and SDPP (DYP, 
1991, pp. 82-85; Kömürcü, 2009, pp. 7,11,14; 2010, pp. 263-264; Sakallıoğlu, 1996, pp. 
149-115; SHP, 1991, pp. 15-17) (DYP, 1991, pp. 82-85). 
Despite the electoral victory of these parties, who governed Turkey up to 1995 as 
a coalition, none of their promises were fulfilled. Indeed, from 1993 onwards, the 
demand for a new or amended constitution dropped from the agenda of mainstream 
political parties altogether and became limited to discussions within a small but 
influential intellectual circle named İkinci Cumhuriyetçiler35 (Second Republicanists). 
The story of Cem Boyner, the former chair of the strongest business organization in 
Turkey, illustrates this phase well. In late 1994, with İkinci Cumhuriyetçiler’s backing, 
Boyner founded a political party with the name New Democracy Movement (NDM). 
Thanks to Boyner’s monetary and social capital, the party attracted enormous attention in 
the mainstream media. However, in the 1995 elections the NDM could not even receive 
0.5% of the votes. Four months later, a frustrated Boyner claimed that the NDM had 
accomplished its mission and quit all political activities (Kömürcü, 2009, pp. 23-24; 
Köroğlu, 2012, pp. 127-129; Sakallıoğlu, 1996, pp. 153-156).  
The Protective Coup in 1997 
Two years later, in 1997, another coup took place. The gradual decline of the 
parties in the center created opportunities for the Welfare Party (WP), generally labeled 
as the “Islamist Party” or representative of “political Islam” by scholars writing about the 
35 Here the discussion is limited to the major actors in mainstream politics. Socialist parties, and parties that 
affiliate themselves with the PKK are beyond the scope of this discussion. Since the begining of the 1980 
regime, these currents opposed it and tried to mobilize masses for a new regime. These movements and 
their demands will be discussed in the fourth and fifth chapters. 
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Turkish party system. The reasons for the rise of the Welfare Party will be discussed in 
the following section. For now, suffice it to say that the WP’s electoral victory first in the 
Istanbul municipal elections of 1994 and later in the general elections of 1995 alarmed 
the military. The sequence of events leading to the 1997 coup started with a press 
declaration after the monthly National Security Council meeting in 1997. The press 
briefing was notable for its harsh tone and its criticism of the Welfare Party government. 
According to the declaration, ‘Sharia’ [Islamic law] was the biggest threat against 
national security- even bigger than the Kurdish threat. In the following days, this rising 
threat of Sharia was used as a political weapon against the Welfare Party. The military 
started to give briefings about the Sharia threat and the companies and organizations 
supporting fundamentalist movements. Businessmen, professors, journalists and 
bureaucrats were invited as separate groups for such briefings. Eventually the Welfare 
Party resigned and despite being the party with the largest share of votes, was excluded 
from all coalitions. Simultaneously, the public prosecutor of the Republic Party initiated 
the legal process for outlawing the Welfare Party. Eleven months later, the WP was 
banned by the Constitutional Court. The Virtue Party founded by the members of the 
Welfare Party was banned three years later (Jenkins, 2007, pp. 345-346). 
In April 1999, new elections were held, and according to the criteria of this study, 
the coup process had ended. The 1997 coup did not have an impact on the constitution, so 
it was a protective coup like the one in 1971. Similarly, although social movements were 





Figure 2-9 Reported Detentions as Violation of Human Rights 
Source: (İHD, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013) 
 
The end of the 1997 coup corresponded to a turning point in Turkey’s relationship 
with the European Union. Up until the late 1990’s, European countries justified their 
reluctance to invite Turkey to the European Union by referring to her lack of democracy. 
One of the decisions of the EU’s Luxemburg Summit in 1997 was to freeze the 
discussions concerning Turkey’s candidacy. To address this concern, or better said to 
overcome this obstacle, Turkish governments between 1999 and 2004 amended the 
constitution no less than ten times. The Helsinki Summit’s acceptance of Turkey’s 
candidacy for EU membership in December 1999 thanks to extensive US pressure in 
Turkey’s favor speeded up and extended the scope of the reform process36 37. The 
36 Keyder (2004), Hale (2003), and Müftüler Baç (2005) trace the start of the reform process with the 
constitutional change in 2001 and therefore consider EU membership as the primary initiator if not the 
cause of the reform process. What they overlook however is the fact the reform process had already started 
with the constitutional change in June 1999, six months before the EU summit (Özbudun, 2006, p. 46). 
Although not as dramatic as the 2001 change, the 1999 change civilianized the State Security Courts and 
solved an important problem in the EU-Turkey relations. The program of the 51th government, voted in 
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reforms included the abolition of the death penalty and state security courts, weakening 
the constitutional role of the NSC as well as increasing the number of its civilian 
members, expanding press freedom, and permission for broadcasting in other languages 
(Ç. Keyder, 2004, pp. 79-81; Müftüler Baç, 2005, pp. 22-26; Özbudun & Gençkaya, 
2009, pp. 43-72). 
However, none of these reforms changed the exclusionary practices of the regime. 
The banning of parties continued to be widespread. As late as 2008, the Turkish 
Constitutional Court tried the Justice and Development Party (JDP), the party that has 
been governing Turkey since 2002. Although the majority of the court members voted for 
its liquidation, the JDP survived the trial because the majority was not a qualitative one. 
Still, the court decided to halve the state support for JDP38 (Shambayati & Sütçü, 2012, p. 
119). 
The JDP’s trial should be interpreted as part of another failed coup attempt. The 
JDP entered the political arena with the 2002 elections. Thanks to the weakening of the 
centrist parties during the 1990’s and to the electoral threshold, the 2002 elections 
functioned like a ‘tsunami’ sweeping all existing parties but one- the RPP, out of the 
parliament. As a result, the JDP, presenting itself as the dovish and moderate wing of the 
Welfare-Virtue party tradition, obtained 65% of the seats with 36% of votes. The United 
States, big businesses, and liberal intellectuals in Turkey celebrated the JDP in its early 
years as a staunch promoter of democratization, but the generals were not amongst the 
sympathizers. However, given the domestic and international support that the JDP 
37 For American pressure about Turkey’s EU membership see Sayarı (2003), Barkey (2008). 
38 Parties that can get more then 7 % of the votes in the general elections are eligible for the financial 
support of the Treasury. 
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enjoyed, the generals did not launch an immediate assault but waited until the presidential 
elections in 2007. Given the critical position of the president, the soldiers were especially 
anxious to prevent the presidency of Abdullah Gül, one of the founders of the JDP and 
the minister of foreign affairs. To accomplish this task, the generals used a plan similar to 
the one against the Welfare Party. During the presidential elections for the parliament, 
huge demonstrations against the JDP were organized in all the big cities in Turkey. Then, 
to increase pressure over the Constitutional Court, the soldiers issued a memorandum 
reminding everybody of the army’s determination to fulfill its responsibilities to the 
Republic. However, right after the memorandum, the JDP went for an early election and 
increased its votes by more than 10 percent. It was consequently not only able to elect 
Gül as president but also pass a constitutional amendment regarding the election of the 
president. Henceforth, the president would be elected not by the parliament but by 
popular elections. The closure trial, filed one year after the JDP’s electoral victory, was 
another component of the military’s strategy to oust the JDP. At the time, the trial was 
interpreted as the army’s ace in the hole. As is obvious today, it was rather the swan song. 
The decision of the Constitutional Court marked the decisive failure of the coup project 
(Özel, 2003, pp. 80-83; Shambayati & Sütçü, 2012, pp. 111, 117-118; Yavuz & Özcan, 
2007, pp. 120-124) 
Since 2010, amending the constitution has been at the center of politics yet again. 
In a political maneuver in 2010, Tayyip Erdoğan of the JDP held a national referendum 
on several constitutional amendments, wherein he obtained another sweeping victory39. 
During his electoral campaign, Erdoğan conceded that the changes were modest and 
39 ("Turkey's constitutional referendum: Erdogan pulls it off," 2010) 
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promised to prepare a new constitution after being elected40. After winning the 2011 
elections, one of the first initiatives of the JDP was to establish a commission for a new 
constitution. Although all of the four parties in the parliament agreed on the need for a 
‘democratic’ constitution and participated in the commission, they have so far been 
unable to produce a draft. Today, there is consensus among party leaders and those who 
observe Turkish politics that the commission will be unable to prepare a new constitution 
(Işık, 2013).  
Where is the Regime Now? 
After so many constitutional changes and democratization packages, can one still 
claim that the Turkish regime is at the same location where the 1980 coup had brought it? 
If the president can be elected by the people, why should one consider the present regime 
as being dominated by the non-elected? If the army’s attempt to liquidate the JDP failed, 
and if no political party has been banned for the last five years, can one still categorize 
today’s regime as exclusionary? If one remembers that several socialists who are JDP’s 
arch-opponents today used to hail the constitutional reforms as the “completion of the 
bourgeois democratic revolution”, these questions deserve special attention (Laçiner, 
2007; Pekdemir, 2004). 
To begin with, the centrality of constitutional debates in the Turkish political 
arena indicates that the regime has not changed yet. As regards to its position along the 
elected-non-elected axis, the activism of bureaucratic institutions has not lost its 
momentum in the last decade. Despite the weakened or weakening position of the army, 
judicial instruments still control parliamentary activity. According to Shambayati (2009), 
40 ("Erdoğan: Yeni anayasa için seçim sonrası gelin," 2010) 
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the Constitutional Court is as active as before (p. 776). We can witness its hyperactivity 
in 2014 as well, when the court obstructed three crucial maneuvers of the JDP41 in rapid 
succession between March and July. 
If the election of the president by popular vote becomes a resilient practice, it 
would certainly have an impact on the position of the regime and tilt the balance towards 
the elected. As I write these lines, the president has not been elected yet. However, very 
few people believe that Turkey’s system after the presidential elections would be viable- 
combining a powerful, elected, but irresponsible presidency with an elected but relatively 
weak and responsible prime minister (T24, 2014; Yayla, 2014; "Zombie democracy," 
2013).  
As regards the exclusionary character of the regime, the last party that was banned 
was the Democratic Society Party in 2009 with 21 deputies in the parliament (BBC, 
2009). However, in the previous exclusionary phase - phase 2 between 1954 and 1958 - 
no party had been liquidated. The prosecutions related to the corruption of Prime Minister 
Erdoğan and his relatives in December 2013 revived the possibility of another trial 
against the JDP (Selvi, 2014; Türköne, 2014). Thus it might be too soon to conclude that 
the times of party dissolutions are over. Especially if one remembers that the state also 
relies on other methods to decrease political competition. In 2012, around 2000 BDP 
members, activists and sympathizers including 3 deputies and 31 mayors were in prison 
(sendika.org, 2012; Yağmur, 2012). Despite much advertised releases in the spring of 
2014, 250 of them have not been released as of July (Türkiye Gazetesi, 2014). 
41 In two of these the court lifted the ban on YouTube and Twitter (Cumhuriyet, 2014) (Cumhuriyet, 2014). 
The third obstruction was the annulment of the law that would increase the government’s control over the 
judiciary –so crucial for rescuing Erdoğan from all the corruption allegations (Uludağ, 2014). 
140 
 
                                                          
In other words, thirty four years after the 1980 coup, the Turkish regime still 
resides in the exclusionary-tutelary zone. The dismantling of the pillars of the system 
with which the army regulated political life is not sufficient for the establishment of a 
new regime, and is actually responsible for the current political crisis. It would therefore 
not be an exaggeration to say that until the formation of a new constitution, Turkey will 
be in a permanent state of crisis. 
Reprise 
Because of the way we define modes of democracy, each phase starts with the 
formulation of a constitution and ends with a transformative coup. But the way the 
regimes change reveals a pattern: 
1908 Inclusionary- 1920 Exclusionary- 1960 Inclusionary- 1980 Exclusionary. 
The other dimension has the following pattern: 1908 Elected-1920 Elected- 1960 
Nonelected- 1980 Nonelected. The agents of the transformative coups also alternate in a 
patterned way: 1908 low-ranked – 1919 high-ranked -1960 low-ranked – 1980 high-
ranked. The coups of low-ranked officers were the result of politicization of the army. 
The coups of high-ranked officers were the result of de-politicization in the army. 
Instead of analyzing the four phases separately, dividing them into two categories 
will help us understand the big picture better. The first era is the age of the assembly 
between 1908 and 1960; and the second era is the age of the bureaucracy from 1960 until 
today. Each era starts with the transformative coup of politicized low-ranked officers and 
then initiates a de-politicization of the army, which results in the high-ranked officers’ 
coups. Each era starts with an inclusionary phase and transforms into an exclusionary 
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one. Once started, each era has the following coup pattern: balancing-transformative-
balancing coup. 
In these two eras, political power has been in different hands: Between 1908 and 
1960, we observe the rise and fall of Kemal’s party RPP. Between 1960 and today, we 
observe the rise and fall of the military as an institution actively involved in politics. The 
first era started with the 1908 Coup (Revolution) and the second with the coup in 1960. 
Both coups changed the configuration of the state in a radical way. The first introduced 
electoral politics, the second usurped power from elected institutions and transferred it to 
bureaucratic ones. 
Each phase actually consists of four different stages: First, the power struggle and 
de-politicization (de-radicalization) stage. At this stage, the transformative agents of the 
coup struggle against representatives of the old regime, and establish themselves as the 
unchallenged political power-holders by its end. They do not change the constitution, but 
modify and amend it to secure their position. And that is the reason why this stage ends 
with a balancing coup. It is balancing in the sense of demonstrating to the ancien-regime 
representatives that they cannot change the balance of power. This stage also corresponds 
to a process in which the transformative coup leaders try to de-politicize the army and 
liquidate the radical elements.  
The second stage is that of consolidation, when the new power-holders eliminate 
all challengers eventually. This stage includes coups of all three types: Balancing-
Transformative-Balancing again. With the first balancing coup, the consolidation starts; 
the subsequent transformative coup (re)designs the regime in line with the interests of the 
new power-holders. Finally, the second balancing coup eliminates all challengers. 
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Following this coup, which represents the apex of political power for the incumbents, the 
process of retreat sets in. And sooner or later, those who control political power have to 
make room for political competitors. This stage thus ends with the opening of the system. 
The third stage corresponds to the dismantling period. At this stage, with the entry 
of new political forces into the system, the institutional securities and privileges of the 
previous power-holders are gradually dismantled. None of these changes alter the 
position of the regime, but they weaken and de-legitimize the old pillars, simultaneously 
creating a new wave of politicization in the society.  
To present this narrative in more concrete terms, let us start with the first era 
(1908-1960): The first stage corresponds to the 1908-1913 period, when the CUP 
struggled against monarchist forces but simultaneously negotiated with high-ranked 
generals and the depoliticized army. After the 1913 coup, the CUP started to consolidate 





Figure 2-10 Rise and Fall of the RPP 1908-1960 
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The second stage corresponds to the 1913-1945 period. In this stage, the CUP 
collapsed unexpectedly due to the defeat in WWI. And from its ashes rose Mustafa 
Kemal’s RPP. Like the CUP, Kemalists continued to de-politicize the army. Although 
they did not object to the Sultan, who only had symbolic power, they replaced the 
Sultanate with a presidential system that did not touch the elected-versus-non-elected 
relationship. 
De-politicization at the same time meant increasing pressure for an exclusionary 
regime. That is why the Kemalist regime, which was established by a coup of high-
ranked generals, moved the regime to an exclusionary position. Although CUP and RPP 
shared the same ideological and support bases, they were not the same. Indeed, there was 
cut-throat competition between them. However, after the 1925 coup which corresponds to 
the second transformative coup, Kemalists eliminated the CUP and became a political 
force without any challengers. Their very consolidation initiated the Kemalists’ political 
decline. 
In 1945, after WWII, the Kemalists opened up space for new political parties as 
safety valves for the rising discontent. The new political force- the Democrat Party- did 
not change the regime but dismantled all Kemalist institutions one by one. Consequently, 
political life became unstable again and frequent political crises politicized the society. 
The result was re-politicization within the army, and a transformative coup in 1960. 








We can trace a similar pattern for the second era from 1960 until the present: the 
first stage corresponds to the 1960-1971 period. An active fight against representatives of 
the old regime was the defining theme of this stage. It was an active opposition against 
the Justice Party, which was the successor of the Democrat Party. But this was 
simultaneously a stage of de-politicization, when radical elements of the army made 
unsuccessful coup attempts or were neutralized before any attempt. This period ended 
with the balancing coup in 1971. The 1971 memorandum and the resignation of the 
Justice Party cabinet was the sign that political power was in the hands of the military. 
The new power holders were different from those of the previous era. In the first 
era prestigious soldiers formed a political party -- first the CUP then the RPP -- and kept 
the army under their political control because of their unchallenged prestige amongst the 
ranks of the depoliticized army. In the second era, soldiers and bureaucrats governed the 
country by creating reserved domains and institutional mechanisms through which to 
manipulate the elected. Hence the first era corresponded to the ‘control-via–party’ 
regime, while the second era corresponds to the ‘control-via-institutions’ regime. 
The second stage of the second era started with the 1971 balancing coup and 
ended with the EU- oriented reform packages in 1999 which also corresponds to the end 
of the second transformative coup in 1997 against the Islamic Welfare party. In the midst 
of this period in 1980, the army mounted a transformative coup with which the de-




The 1997 coup, on the other hand, confirmed the untouchable character of the 
reserved domains of the army and the bureaucracy. It also eliminated any political 
challenge with an Islamist discourse. However this complete victory was at the same time 
the beginning of the decline of the army’s prestige.  
 But in contrast to the first era, opening up more space for political opposition 
occurred before the drastic decline of the army’s political prestige as a result of pressure 
exerted by the European Union.  
The third stage started in 1999 with the EU reforms. Eventually the new force 
rising rapidly in the political sphere (the JDP) undermined the unquestionable credibility 
of the bureaucratic institutions one by one, and especially the army. This increased the 
level of politicization in Turkish society.  
How will the current regime crisis be resolved? I try to answer this question in the 
concluding chapter. But before giving this answer, it is necessary to look at social forces 
and movements which determine the content and direction of political struggles for 






Chapter 3  
The Competition within the Power Bloc 
This idea and aim are exactly the same as the idea 
and the aim which underlay the economic teaching of 
Karl Marx. In fact, what distinguished him from the 
economists of his own time and those who preceded 
him, was precisely a vision of economic evolution as 
a distinct process generated by the economic system 
itself. 
(Preface to the Japanese Edition of A Theory of 
Economic Development) 
 
This primitive accumulation plays in Political 
Economy about the same part as original sin in 
theology. Adam bit the apple, and thereupon sin fell 
on the human race…. In actual history it is notorious 
that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, briefly 
force, play the great part. In the tender annals of 
Political Economy, the idyllic reigns from time 
immemorial. Right and “labor” were from all time 
the sole means of enrichment, the present year of 
course always excepted. As a matter of fact, the 
methods of primitive accumulation are anything but 
idyllic. 
(The Secret of Primitive Accumulation) 
Introduction: Power Bloc and Waves of Competition 
As argued in the introduction, the dominant perspective on Turkey in the social 
sciences literature is based on the assumption of a ‘strong’ state and a ‘weak’ civil 
society. Accordingly, social and political change is explained as being driven by inter-
elite struggles that arise because of differences in beliefs and value systems, not because 
of conflicting material interests. Class interests come into picture only to account for the 
anti-bourgeois sentiments allegedly harbored by the Turkish bureaucracy. 
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Complementing the strong-state approach is the conceptualization of capitalist 
development in Turkey, which is never presented as a process based on creative 
destruction. According to the dominant perspective, Turkish capitalists, because of their 
dependence on the state, constitute an economically non-innovative and politically non-
assertive social group. Hence capitalists, as part of the civil society, and their struggles 
within the power bloc, never deserve any special mention. 
This seemingly tranquil picture of accumulation, however, is in stark contrast to 
the violent history of capitalist accumulation in Turkey. There have been two important 
instances of ‘destruction’. The first occurred in the period 1913-1945 with the 
dispossession of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie. The second has been underway since 1997 
as a politically-motivated struggle for dispossession and its outcome is not yet clear.  
Additionally, the history of capital accumulation in Turkey has experienced not 
only destruction but also innovations. One can talk of at least three innovative processes 
which were responsible for the rise of: a) the traditional Turkish bourgeoisie in the 1940’s 
b) the emergence of the Turkish army as a capitalist enterprise from 1960’s onwards, and 
c) the rise of the Islamic (Anatolian) bourgeoisie from late 1980’s onwards. 
What is important to note is that both the creative and destructive aspects of 
capitalist development did not have purely economic dimensions. In fact, all of them 
were state-related and involved political transformations of state power. The political 
actors who changed the regime either had vested interests tied with certain capitalist 
factions, or had to make use of their interests in order to obtain a material base. Contrary 
to the dominant approach then, this study considers competition amongst the capitalists 
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of immense importance in determining the fate of political struggles and the shaping of 
the political system in Turkey. 
In this analysis I draw upon the concepts of the power bloc and the ruling 
coalition. The concepts are based on Marx’ works, although the former was never 
explicitly used by him. It was Poulantzas, who defined the concept of power bloc in an 
articulate way:  
[power bloc] indicates the particular contradictory unity of the politically 
dominant classes or fractions of classes as related to a particular form of the 
capitalist state…..The concept of power bloc covers both the concrete 
configuration of the unity of these classes or fractions in stages characterized by a 
specific mode of articulation and also a specific rhythm of the ensemble of 
instances. (Poulantzas, 1978, p. 234 emphasis in the original) 
According to Poulantzas, a power bloc is distinct from an alliance in two senses. 
First, the contradictions within the power bloc are qualitatively different from the 
contradictions between the members of the power bloc and other classes and fractions. 
Second, there is ‘relative unity’ among members of the power bloc, whereas alliances are 
formed at a specific level of the class struggle (political, economic or ideological). As a 
result, a change in the configuration of the power bloc (the emergence of a new 
hegemonic class/fraction, the entering and exiting of classes, a redefinition of the 
principal aspect of class contradiction) would lead to a new state form (military 
dictatorship, liberal state) whereas a change in an alliance would only result in a regime 
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change (multiparty regime, two party regime, presidentialism among others.) (Poulantzas, 
1978, p. 241)  
Poulantzas’s work is focused not on regimes but on the comparison of different 
forms of the state. This study does not attempt to analyze transitions from one state type 
to the other, but focuses on regime changes under a specific state type: a bourgeois 
democracy. Poulantzas’s conception of regimes is also different from the one used in this 
study, and his unsystematic examples for regimes are closer to the typologies developed 
by Maurice Duverger (1959). With some departures, I still adopt Poulantzas’s definition 
of a power bloc in drawing the border lines of the domain, the contradictions of which is 
the subject of this chapter.  
I depart from Poulantzas first by conceding more divergence and conflicts to the 
fractions within the power bloc. In fact, the very competition within the power bloc, 
arising from the contradictory character of capital accumulation, is one of the three 
driving forces of regime change in Turkey42. Second, internal re-configuration of the 
power bloc does not necessarily lead to a new state form, but definitely to a new regime. 
Due to the dynamic nature of the capitalist accumulation process, the balance of 
power within the coalition is subject to change. Additionally, due to the unevenness of 
capitalist development, some latecomers demand to join the power bloc and also struggle 
for it. Given the dynamic nature of the power bloc, one can divide the history of Turkish 
capitalism into two periods: i) a hegemonic period, when a class or fraction can form a 
coalition and represent its own interests as the general interest of all partners of the 
coalition, and ii) a competitive period when competition between different partners of the 
42 Social movements constitute the second driving force, as discussed in the next chapter. An analysis of the 
third one, inter-imperialist competition, is beyond the scope of this study. 
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coalition exceeds the containable threshold and the coalition partners confront one 
another on multiple fronts. As a result of this destructive competition, a new coalition 
with a new hegemonic fraction emerges. 
In this chapter we analyze three competitive periods: early 1900’s-1924; 1945-
1971; and 1971-today. In terms of the world-historical context, the first competitive 
period started and ended before the terminal crisis of British hegemony, and the second 
one ended before the signal crisis of American hegemony. The third period started before 
the terminal crisis of American hegemony and has not yet ended43.  
All three competitive cycles share the same eight-step pattern: 
a) An initial contradiction leading to political pressure or struggle 
b) Emergence of a new political actor 
c) Defeat of the old hegemon in the ruling coalition 
d) Emergence of a post-transitional contradiction 
e) A split within the capitalist class 
f) Resolution of the conflict 
g) A struggle for hegemony 
h) Defeat of all rivals and the emergence of a new ruling coalition with a new 
hegemon. 
In the following parts of this section I outline the story of three competitive 




43 For signal crisis and terminal crisis see Arrighi (1994, p. 215) 
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Abdülhamid’s pan-Islamist policy44 did not restrict the economic activities of the 
non-Muslim bourgeoisie, but it meant further exclusion of an economically strengthening 
social class45. Hence the desire for political freedom was actually the bourgeoisie’s 
demand for participation in the political system46. The combined development of non-
Muslim capital with Abdülhamid’s emphasis on Islam aggravated the contradictions 
between the power bloc and the non-Muslim bourgeoisie chafing under limited political 
rights. 
In a departure from his royal predecessors in the 19th century, Abdülhamid was 
not a promoter of a western schooling system, nor did he encourage the empowerment of 
a meritocratic bureaucracy47. In contrast, his educational reforms tended to incorporate 
the previously neglected Muslim population into the schooling system. The same 
44 For the un-anachronistic character of this pan-Islamism see Deringil (1991). 
45 There is no specific study but see Kasaba (1988a, 1988b) for an analysis of the growth of the non-
Muslim bourgeoisie in the 19th century with a commentary on the Abdulhamid era. 
46 In discussing the problem of the bourgeois revolution, Keyder (1988) considers theories about a 
bourgeois revolution empirically unfounded. According to him, first of all, the Ottoman bourgeoisie was 
too fragmented to act as a collective class and second, there is no evidence of bourgeois mobilization or 
politicization prior to the Constitutional Revolution. For Keyder, the functions of the bourgeois revolution 
had been fulfilled by the bureaucracy to pre-empt the ascendancy of the bourgeoisie (pp. 158,163). Since 
then, several studies have empirically shown not only the bourgeois mass mobilizations prior to the 
revolution (Kansu, 1997; Sohrabi, 2011) but also the link between the non-Muslim and Muslim 
revolutionary organizations (Moumdjian, 2012). Still, independent of the empirical evidence, Keyder’s 
argument has two short-comings. First is his sociologization of the notion of bourgeois revolution which is 
a political concept. If the necessary condition of a bourgeois revolution “from below” –here I leave aside 
the dubious versions like ‘revolution from above’ or ‘passive revolution’- is defined as bourgeois 
mobilization and participation then one would not be able to find a single bourgeois revolution. Neither 
Cromwell nor Robespierre, nor Noske was any closer to British, French or German “bourgeoisie” than the 
CUP members were to the Ottoman bourgeoisie. Keyder accuses the proponents of bourgeois revolution 
thesis of trying to read Ottoman developments from European blueprint. However, the findings of 
empirical studies about the French Revolution from Tocqueville (2011) to Guerin (1977) show that even 
the French Revolution does not fit the blueprint. Hence one is confronted with a choice: either drop the 
notion of the bourgeois revolution altogether, say like Francois Furet, or read Marx’s account of the 
revolution from a political perspective. Keyder’s second shortcoming is related to his transhistorical 
conceptualization of the Ottoman bureaucracy in the 20th century as representative of a Wittfogelian 
Asiatic despotic state. Seeing an unchanging Ottoman bureaucratic class over 600 years of the Empire, 
through several cycles of political, economic and social change and attributing to this class a transformative 
role is not a theoretically superior position than the one of vulgar Marxists he criticizes. 
47 For the contradictory outcomes of bureaucracy and Abdulhamid’s despotism see Shaw (1977, pp. 211-




                                                          
segment, the social pillar of Abdülhamid’s clientalistic despotism, was also recruited 
heavily to bureaucratic posts. Yet, as in the case of capital accumulation, Abdülhamid did 
not abolish the western schooling system, nor did he take any measures to reduce the 
turnout of westernized civil and military bureaucrats from those schools. This very group 
of bureaucrats then became the second contender for membership of the power bloc. 
Abdülhamid’s turn to clientalism deepened the contradictions between the Porte and the 
young bureaucrats. 
The New Political Actor and the Defeat of the Old Hegemon 
The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) emerged as a result of the second 
contradiction between the meritocratic system and patronage networks, which was 
nowhere as pronounced as in the army. Thessaloniki and İzmir were two port cities where 
the CUP had its greatest political influence, partly because of the contradictions between 
the bourgeoisie and the monarchy. 
Although it is difficult to pin down a starting point, the CUP’s revival after its 
second congress in 1902 can be considered as the onset of the competitive period. The 
CUP’s demands were the common denominator of the bureaucracy and the non-Muslim 
bourgeoisie: a parliamentary monarchy that would open the doors of the power bloc to 
both the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy. Yet emphasizing the contradictions between 
the Porte and the aspirants for power bloc membership should not obscure the deep 
contradictions between the centralism of the CUP and the centrifugal tendencies of the 
Christian – especially the Greek - bourgeoisie. This dormant contradiction, because of the 
unhappy alliance of the oppositional forces, would determine the fate of the regime and 
Ottoman subjects in the subsequent decade(s). 
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The 1908 revolution shook Abdülhamid’s regime but could not topple it 
completely. Between the July 1908 Revolution and the April 1909 Counter-Revolution, 
the monarchy fought a life-and-death battle for survival that it ultimately lost. The failed 
Counter-Revolution was the end not only for Abdülhamid’s monarchy but for all future 
hopes for a strong monarch. 
With the 1909 constitutional changes, the Ottoman Empire entered the realm of 
bourgeois democracy. The bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie joined the power bloc and the 
Sultan had to accept a junior, if not symbolic, role within this coalition. 
The Post-transitional Contradiction 
Soon after this transition however, the interests of the bureaucracy and the 
bourgeoisie started to contradict. What was responsible for the growing contradiction was 
not necessarily the planned initiatives of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie, but rather its links 
with Britain and its functioning within the cosmopolitan financial networks under British 
hegemony. Within British geopolitical calculation, there was no room for the Turkish 
bureaucracy’s developmentalist aspirations partly because Britain’s trade privileges were 
incompatible with the CUP’s developmentalist policies, and partly because the Ottoman 
Empire itself was the target of Britain’s imperialist aspirations48. 
At the beginning of the 1908 Revolution, the leading cadre of the CUP was a 
combination of free trade adherents and national developmentalists. However, Britain’s 
distancing from the CUP and her active collaboration with the monarchy gave the 
nationalist elements in the CUP the upper hand and pushed the bureaucracy into an 
alliance with Germany, which had been propagating a Lisztian protectionism. 
48 For Britain’s distancing from the Ottomans, see Ahmad (1966). 
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 Split within the Capitalist Class  
The adoption of a pro-German nationalist developmentalism intensified the 
distrust between the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie, as the latter had been benefiting 
from the cosmopolitan finance and trade networks and was not too disturbed by the 
geopolitical challenges. And so the non-Muslim bourgeoisie became unreliable in the 
eyes of the bureaucracy. To counter the former’s economic power, the CUP engaged in 
an ambitious project of creating a loyal Muslim bourgeoisie. This project was the first of 
the three creative destruction processes in the history of Turkish capitalism. 
One aspect of this process was the creation of monopolies to which Muslim 
merchants were offered privileged access. The other aspect was creating barriers for non-
Muslims in their commercial activities. Boycotts and mandatory use of Turkish language 
in commercial activities were examples of these practices (Ç. Keyder, 1987b, pp. 61-65; 
Toprak, 1982).  
Resolution of the Conflict 
The biggest blow to the non-Muslim bourgeoisie was the dispossession move 
which occurred during WWI with the Armenian massacre. Due to geo-strategic 
calculations during the war, the Ottoman Empire displaced approximately 1 million 
Armenians, who together with the Greeks had been at the heart of Ottoman commercial 
life. This displacement meant the acquisition of Armenian assets and properties by 
Muslim merchants at very low prices or at no cost at all (Üngör & Polatel, 2011). 
The Ottoman Empire’s defeat in WWI and its occupation by the Allied Powers 
gave the non-Muslim bourgeoisie a second chance at claiming economic and political 
hegemony. However, the change of priorities in British foreign policy in response to the 
158 
 
growing Bolshevik threat, and the resulting Turkish-British agreement changed the 
course of the peace agreement and the bureaucracy gained the upper hand again. 
The last straw for the non-Muslim bourgeoisie was the population exchange 
between Greece and Turkey. As a result of this exchange, 1.5 million Greeks left 
Anatolia, which meant a radical dispossession of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie (A. Aktar, 
2003; Ç. Keyder, 2003). 
 Struggle for Political Leadership 
After the defeat and expulsion of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie, a new struggle 
within the ranks of the power bloc started. One section of the bureaucracy was defending 
an alliance with the nascent Muslim bourgeoisie whereas the other segment led by 
Mustafa Kemal had no intention of sharing political power. The split of the bureaucracy 
into two parties, RPP and PRP, mentioned in the previous chapter, actually referred to 
this split. 
Given Kemal’s political prestige as the savior of the nation and the almost 
complete disappearance of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie, the Kemalist fraction won the 
struggle. The party of the opposition was banned from political life and rival factions 
were liquidated. Hence from 1925 onwards, the Kemalist bureaucracy declared its 
supremacy and started a new period which would last until the end of WWII. 
The Second Competitive Period 
The initial contradiction that sparked off a competitive process within the power 
bloc this time differed from the first period. The contradictions during the hegemonic 
period were caused by the accumulation process and its impact on the state apparatus as 
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both its beneficiaries - the non-Muslim bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy- demanded 
inclusion. The period between 1925 and 1945, however, cannot be considered a proper 
accumulation regime. It was rather a transitory period and the priorities of the hegemon 
in the power bloc were first dispossession and later with the collapse of the world market, 
promotion of economic growth via state enterprises49. As a result, these twenty-five years 
did not see the emergence of a new fraction within the power bloc. 
In the latter period, it was the distribution of power within the top tier of the 
power bloc rather than its composition that had changed. And this was related more to the 
decline of the bureaucrats’ sources of power than to the strengthening of the bourgeoisie. 
With the subordination and dispossession of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie and 
establishment of an industrial base for capital accumulation, the role of the bureaucracy 
within the power bloc had become more marginal50. 
Moreover, the measures necessary to fulfill the functions of both dispossession 
and accumulation alienated not only the population in general but also the bourgeoisie 
from the bureaucracy. Eventually, both of these dynamics weakened the bureaucracy’s 
position within the power bloc and initiated a new competitive process (Ç. Keyder, 
1987b, pp. 112-115). 
To protect its position, the bureaucracy adopted a strategy different from that of 
Abdülhamid. Its two-pronged approach consisted first of replacing extensive repression 
of the monarchy with limited liberalization of the political system to encourage the 
49 For the various Turkification processes as mechanisms for dispossessions see Koraltürk (2011, pp. 95-
202). For the wealth tax as the final shot of dispossession see Bali (1999, pp. 424-495; 2005) and Aktar 
(2000). Concerning statism see Tezel (2002, pp. 237-257), Buğra (1994, pp. 101-119). 
50 As Tezel (2002) shows, even in 1950, five years after the wealth tax, non-Muslims constituted 22% of 
Turkish manufacturing employment. Given the division of labor in Turkish society, this indicates an even 
bigger share in ownership. 
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bourgeoisie to compete with itself in the political arena. Second, it attempted to restore its 
legitimacy through land reforms at the expense of landowning capitalists51. 
A New Political Power and the Defeat of the Old Hegemon 
The bureaucracy’s insistence on land reforms and electoral competition with the 
bourgeoisie led to the formation of the Democratic Party (DP), a party supported by the 
land-owning capitalists. However, rather than narrowly defending the interests of the land 
owning classes, the DP tried to establish a counter- hegemonic alliance against the 
bureaucracy. Its demands summarized the pillars of the coalition: general political and 
more importantly religious freedom; the transfer of state enterprises to the capitalists; and 
freedom for the markets. 
In response to the DP’s challenge, the bureaucracy could neither implement land 
reforms nor win the peasantry’s support due to its incapacity to function as a political 
party, its vested interest with the capitalists, and more importantly, its 20-year long 
legacy of repression52. And so the bureaucracy’s attempts to marginalize the bourgeoisie 
backfired and resulted in its own marginalization within the ruling coalition. 
In the elections of 1950, the RPP, as the bureaucracy’s political wing, suffered a 
humiliating defeat. Since the political system had been designed with the assumption that 
the RPP would be the majority party forever, the 1950 elections unexpectedly transferred 
an immense amount of power to the new party of the bourgeoisie. 
Since it was impossible for the DP to purge all existing cadres of the bureaucracy 
and fill their posts with its own loyalists, the bureaucracy survived as part of the ruling 
51 Karaömerlioğlu underlines the Kemalist conservative fear from proletarianization as an additional factor. 
52 Keyder (1987b, pp. 125-127) lists the close relationship between the bureaucracy and bourgeoisie and the 
absence of a landed oligarchy as the primary reasons for the failure of this reform. 
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coalition, as did the RPP, although the latter was now in a marginalized position. Hence 
the electoral defeat of the RPP did not establish the bourgeoisie’s hegemony, but simply 
intensified competition within the power bloc.  
Post-revolutionary Struggle and the Split 
The displacement of the bureaucracy from its previously unshakable position 
within the power bloc was soon followed by another struggle therein. This struggle 
centered on the choice of an accumulation strategy and the development path that Turkey 
was to pursue: should development be based on agricultural exports or import-
substituting industrialization (ISI)? The former implied that the agrarian sector would be 
the motor of capital accumulation and thus the main recipient of state credits. The latter, 
on the other hand, required the transfer of foreign exchange from agricultural exporters to 
the nascent industrial bourgeoisie. Also, as the latter strategy entailed more elaborate 
planning, it required the presence of autonomous bureaucratic institutions. The former 
strategy appealed to the commercial capitalists with agricultural links whereas the latter 
was preferred by the industrial capitalists (Ç. Keyder, 1987b, pp. 142-144). 
In this market versus planning debate, the Democrat Party sided with the 
agricultural exports advocates from the beginning. Being a populist party whose survival 
depended on votes of the small peasantry producing for the world market, it did not have 
any choice. In the early years, the DP’s leaders went as far as associating planning with 
communism. Yet, from 1954 onwards, the shift to a new international climate less 
conducive to export-based growth forced the party to change this attitude. The DP’s 
reluctance to adopt a new line further alienated the industrial bourgeoisie, and led to a 
split and the formation of the Freedom Party (FP) that articulated the interests of the 
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industrial bourgeoisie in its program. The FP’s share of 4% votes in the 1957 elections 
two years after the split, and its subsequent decision to join the RPP should not mislead 
anyone concerning its important role as the voice of the industrial bourgeoisie and urban 
populism. With the publication of its magazine titled Forum, the party shaped the 
contours of the incoming post-coup regime. Indeed, more than 30 articles of the 1961 
constitution were taken from the program of the FP (Albayrak, 2008; Buğra, 1994, pp. 
187-190; D. Çakmak, 2008). After joining the FP, the RPP exploited the split between 
agrarian and the industrial capitalists in its struggle within the power bloc. Over the years, 
the industrial capitalists distanced themselves from the agrarian capital and cultivated ties 
with the bureaucracy. 
The initial struggle between the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy had other 
repercussions as well. The bourgeoisie’s biggest supporter in its struggle against the 
bureaucracy was the United States. This support was not limited to financial aid but also 
included military training and modernization of the Turkish army under NATO’s 
guidance. Tellingly, although all the founding fathers of the Republic had been soldiers, 
not a single significant military modernization project was undertaken between 1925 and 
1945. The army was a remnant of the crumbling Ottoman Army in the 1920’s, and 
American support for military modernization sparked the opposition between the young 
military officers and the older generation (Akyaz, 2002). As described in the previous 
chapter, the discontent of young officers combined with the crumbling structure of the 
army, and resentment for the DP’s revanchist policies against the RPP and the 




Resolution of the Competition 
After 1954, the contradictions between the agrarian capitalists and the industrial 
bourgeoisie increased the competition incrementally. Eventually, the contradictions were 
resolved by the military take-over in 1960, which settled the conflict in favor of the 
industrialist bloc and its accumulation strategy of import-substitution industrialization. 
While the coup signaled the defeat of agricultural capital, it still could not determine the 
dominant element within the power bloc. What it did establish (and portend) was a 
change in the army’s status. The coup had been an outcome of the army’s politicization 
and it politicized the army further.  
The army was confronted with two choices after 1960. The first was to use the 
power acquired through the coup to go back to the 1920’s set-up and not share power 
with any member of the power bloc. This would mean reversing the division of labor 
between the civil and the military bureaucracy. Between 1925 and 1945, the civilian 
bureaucracy had controlled the system with power and legitimacy derived from the army. 
The army as an institution had not attempted to intervene in the political process, and the 
civilian bureaucrats played a direct role in the system as much as they had been utilized 
by the military. In contrast to this precedent, in 1960, the first alternative implied direct 
control of the system by the army. The Zeitgeist in the 1960s was indeed suitable for such 
a path. In fact, during 1950s and 1960’s, most of the Middle Eastern countries were ruled 
by “progressive juntas” (Haddad, 1965, pp. 20-32; Khadduri, 1953, pp. 523-524). 
The second alternative was an alliance with the industrial bourgeoisie. The army 
would preserve the parliamentarian system and not dismantle the mechanisms with which 
the industrial bourgeoisie influenced the system in exchange for powerful and 
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autonomous posts in the political system. The alliance with the industrial bourgeoisie 
meant not only political but also economic privileges for the army. This alternative 
opened the door of possibilities for the army to accumulate capital as a private company 
with various tax exemptions and protected markets. Additionally the army could increase 
its capital by deducting forced savings from the officers’ salaries- an option not available 
to private capitalist companies at the time (Fırat Demir, 2005, pp. 675-685; Parla, 1998). 
The period between 1960 and 1971 was a period of intense competition within the 
army between the respective defenders of the two options. The high-ranked generals’ 
preference for the second option marginalized the defenders of the first option, but did 
not hinder them from plotting coups. The latter group was eliminated from the army as a 
consequence of the three failed coups in 1962, 1963 and 1971. That is why 1971 - the 
year of the last failed coup- also marks the end of the competitive phase and the 
beginning of a new hegemonic period (Akyaz, 2002). 
If the years from 1960 to 1971 marked the army’s gradual homogenization, they 
were also a period of the industrial bourgeoisie’s consolidation. At the end of 1950’s, 
members of the industrial bourgeoisie were scattered individual capitalists. In the 
following years industrial capitalists were able to organize themselves and defend their 
interests in a strong and articulate manner. Another fact that makes 1971 a turning point 
was the foundation of TÜSİAD, the association of Turkish Businessman and 
Industrialists (Buğra, 1994, pp. 336-337; Yavuz & Özcan, 2007, p. 113). 
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The Third Period of Competition: 1997- 
The Initial Contradiction 
The industrialist-military alliance lived its heydays during the 1970s and 1980s. In 
a protected domestic market, the industrial bourgeoisie profited without any innovation. 
The switch in 1980 from ISI to export-oriented industrialization (EOI) did not increase 
the competitive capacity of the industrial bourgeoisie either. The immediate consequence 
of this switch was to decrease wages and increase profit rates (Yeldan, 2001, pp. 44-48). 
Similarly, the army made extensive gains. It got involved in several sectors from biscuits 
to car manufacturing and became one of the biggest corporations of the country (Akça, 
2006). 
Still, the switch from ISI to EOI meant at the same time the emergence of a new 
industrial bourgeoisie in Anatolia. This group specialized in low-cost labor-intensive 
manufacturing like textiles which are the main source of Turkey’s exports revenues. Most 
of the owners of these middle-to-small scale enterprises had a pronounced Islamic 
identity which explains the label ‘Green Capital’ attached to them. In harmony with the 
American ‘green belt strategy’, the Turkish state’s post-1980 strategy to combat 
communism with a form of Islamism blended with nationalism solidified this identity of 
Anatolian capitalists (Adas, 2003, pp. 74-82; Bulut, 1999; Ö. Demir, Acar, & Toprak, 
2004, pp. 168-172). 
The financialization of the economy starting from the late 1980’s made the 
division of labor between the hegemonic bloc and the newly emerging Islamic 
bourgeoisie more visible. The TÜSİAD-Army alliance was involved in financial 
investments and high-profit (mostly import related) commercial and industrial activities 
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(Yeldan, 2001, pp. 127-157). The Islamic bourgeoisie on the other hand specialized in 
export-related activities with low profit margins. The credit mechanisms were controlled 
by the hegemonic bloc, but the Islamic bourgeoisie found innovative ways to form 
alternative credit mechanisms by exploiting the political atmosphere. Making use of the 
state’s dependence on Islam to combat revolutionary and separatist movements, the 
Islamic bourgeoisie relied on the network of religious sects to finance its investments. 
Together with export revenues, the money collected through sectarian channels enabled 
the ‘green capitalists’ to make ambitious investment plans. 
A second consequence of the rapid growth of TÜSİAD and the army as capitalist 
powers and of the subsequent financialization was the need to integrate with European 
markets. The more urgently this need was felt, the more important the issue of European 
Union membership (or at least candidacy for membership) became (Öniş & Türem, 2002, 
p. 452). However, the Turkish army’s privileged position in the economy and the way it 
dominated the political system was incompatible with EU membership (Güney & 
Karatekelioğlu, 2005). This incompatibility, combined with the need for integration with 
western markets, was the main source of contradictions within the power bloc throughout 
the 1990’s and the early years of the new millennium. 
As a result, the subsequent financialization and integration with western markets 
gave rise to two sets of contradictions: 
a) The contradiction between the growth of the Islamic bourgeoisie as the motor of 
Turkish industry and its deprivation of official credit mechanisms. 
b) The contradiction between the increasing financial and commercial integration 
with western markets and a political system incompatible with this integration. 
These contradictions gave rise to two different struggles within the power bloc: 
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1. The Islamic bourgeoisie’s struggle for joining the ruling coalition. 
2. A growing number of TÜSİAD members’ demands for democratization and 
reforms in the state structure. 
The initial contradictions before the third competitive period contained elements 
of both the first and the second periods. Like the first period, there was a new member of 
the power bloc demanding to join the hegemonic coalition, if not to become the 
hegemonic fraction. And analogous to the second period, an older fraction of the ruling 
coalition wanted to change the balance of power therein. 
Members of green capital supported the Welfare Party, which defended the 
nascent national bourgeoisie with an Islamist and anti-imperialist discourse. As described 
in the previous chapter, members of TÜSİAD did not participate in this struggle as an 
independent political force but preferred to be a silent accomplice of the army. 
The TÜSİAD-Army alliance responded in two different ways to the two different 
forms of contradictions. The inclusion demand was rejected harshly and both segments of 
the ruling coalition attacked the Islamic bourgeoisie as defenders of Sharia. Their 
campaign escalated and eventually resulted in the coup of 1997. The ruling coalition’s 
approach to the second contradiction however was similar to the bureaucracy’s response 
on the eve of the second competitive period. Instead of completely ignoring the demands 
for reform, they attempted incremental reform. 
The Formation of a New Political Actor 
The initial attacks on the Islamic bourgeoisie and its political voice, the Welfare 
Party, resulted at first in the bankruptcy of several Islamic companies. Politically, the 
Welfare Party split into two wings and later two parties along the moderate-orthodox 
division. Hence two years after the 1997 coup, the political scene seemed as if a short but 
168 
 
intense competitive period had ended with the victory of the ruling coalition. It was 
probably this impression that gave the generals the confidence to make bold statements 
like: “If necessary February 28 process will continue for 1000 years”.  
However, since nothing had changed in terms of the division of labor among 
Turkish capitalists, preventing the growth of the new Islamic bourgeoisie by political 
campaigns proved to be impossible. 
Moreover, the JDP - the moderate wing of the Welfare Party - had suddenly 
become a staunch defender of the reforms for the European Union, i.e., privatization and 
financial liberalization. In this way, it was able to soften the opposition of the TÜSİAD if 
not to create an alliance (Uğur & Yankaya, 2008, pp. 588-594). Additionally, the existing 
political parties could not cope with the double contradiction and rapidly lost their 
political prestige. The result was the emergence of a power vacuum. 
The End of the Ruling Coalition  
In the 2002 elections, the three factors discussed above enabled the JDP to obtain 
a sweeping electoral victory. With the exception of the RPP, none of the parties from the 
coup period could obtain any seats in the parliament. Hence, like the historic elections in 
1950, there emerged a two-party parliament with an overwhelming majority of the JDP. 
With the rise of the JDP, it became obvious that the 1997 coup had signaled not 
the end but the beginning of competition within the power bloc. Like the post-1950 
period, the competition was between the army and the JDP backed by Islamic capital. 
The army aimed to create conditions for an anti-JDP alliance as had happened in 1997. 
However, this time TÜSİAD did not side with the army and gave silent approval to JDP 
and its pro-reform, pro-European rhetoric. 
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The failed coup attempt in 2007 and the JDP’s subsequent electoral success was 
the turning point in the Turkish balance of power. From that point onwards, the army-
TÜSİAD alliance has no longer been the ruling coalition. Nothing could illustrate the 
decline of this coalition better than the Ergenekon and Balyoz process between 2009 and 
2013, after which one-third of all generals were jailed on allegations of coup-plotting. 
However, the fall of the Army-TÜSİAD alliance and pacification of the army did 
not end but only intensified the competition between the Islamic bourgeoisie and 
TÜSİAD. Like the first competitive period, the rift between TÜSİAD and the Islamic 
national capital cannot be reduced to different economic interests. True, the former 
group’s monopoly over credit mechanisms and insistence on import-driven growth was in 
opposition to the latter’s insistence on the priority of exports and deprivation of cheap 
state credit. However, the economic strength of the Islamic bourgeoisie was not sufficient 
to challenge the economic dominance of TÜSİAD. 
What fueled the competition were international dynamics. The JDP’s inability to 
implement democratic reform plans as envisioned by the United States led the US to look 
for political alternatives to counterbalance, in not to replace, the JDP.  
Like the CUP, the JDP is a heterogeneous bloc, wherein one segment favors an 
agreement with the US, while the other harbors more nationalistic aspirations. With the 
American search for a stronger civilian opposition to the army, the nationalist segment 
gradually gained the upper hand. Like the CUP’s nationalist rhetoric with emphasis on 
the monopolistic rents of non-Muslim merchants, the JDP, with its increasing distance 
from the US, started to center its political propaganda on the monopolistic rents of 
TÜSİAD, accusing them of being an interest lobby. 
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Chapter 4  
Historical Overview of Popular Struggles in Turkey 
 Denn die einen sind im Dunkeln 
 Und die andern sind im Licht 
 Und man siehet die im Lichte 
 Die im Dunkeln sieht man nicht 
 (Dreigroschen Oper)53 
 
Ben senin yalanlarınla ve hilelerinle baş edemedim, 
bu bana dert oldu. ben de senin önünde diz 
çökmedim, bu da sana dert olsun54. 
(Seyid Rıza) 
Introduction 
This chapter presents a narrative of social movements in Turkey, to provide the 
necessary background for an analysis of the relationship between revolutionary 
movements and regime change in the following chapter. Although the dataset utilized in 
this chapter contains information about movements since the 1870’s, the starting point of 
our narrative is the eve of the 1908 Revolution. Information about earlier years is not 
used for explanatory purposes, but employed to demonstrate the contrast between the 
contentious 1870’s and the subsequent two decades. 
 
  
53 Therefore some live in darkness/And others in light./We see those who live in the daytime/But not those 
who live at night. (Threepenny Opera translation from (Manvell, 1973, p. 276) 
54 I could not cope with your lies and conniving ways. This has been rankling me. But I didn’t fall down to 
my knees in front of you. So let that rankle you. 
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Figure 4-1 Waves of Social Movements in Ottoman Empire-Turkey  
(smoothened idealized version) 
 
 While a conceptual analysis of social movements and their role in regime change 
is the subject of the next chapter, this chapter clarifies several points through its 
descriptive narrative. To begin with, so far, scholars writing about Turkish political 
change have neglected the existence of social movements in general. To be sure, the last 
three decades have witnessed a rapid increase in the number of historical studies 
concerning this or that social and political movement. As a matter of fact, without these 
valuable studies, establishing the first part of the database informing this chapter and the 
next would have been impossible. However, because of the particularistic focus on 
individual movements, they are not seen as entities that are part of a bigger wave-like 
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process with its own dynamics55. The primary purpose of this chapter therefore is to 
make these waves visible. I demonstrate that Turkey witnessed two major waves of social 
movements in the twentieth century: i) between 1896 and 1930 and ii) between 1968 and 
1999. Our data also hint at the signals of a third wave (Figure 4-1). 
This chapter also compares the two waves of social movements, although this 
comparison is not the central focus of our narrative. Both waves are similar in the sense 
that they were initiated by competition within the power bloc and the resulting 
politicization. However, whereas the first wave was predominantly composed of 
separatist uprisings, the second wave was a combination of labor, student, and separatist 
movements. Furthermore, the instances of the first wave occurred more or less in the 
same time interval, while the second wave itself is comprised of two (sub)waves: a west-
centered wave of labor and student movements followed by the second Kurdish 
awakening. I argue that this unsynchronized unrest in the second wave is partially 
responsible for the different reactions to the 1980 coup. Whereas the coup could easily 
stamp out the (student and labor) movements in the western part of the country, which 
had already lost momentum and were in a process of decline, it could not prevent the rise 
of the Kurdish movement which had just started to rise. I also argue that the lack of 
synchronization is also responsible for the blurring of the borders between the second and 
third waves. 
 
55 In his rightful criticism of economistic theories of nationalism, Adanır (2001) considers the Macedonian 
unrest in the late 19th and early 20th century as the product of political projects of national elites (pp. vi-
vii). Similarly Keyder (1997) sees the rise of Balkan nationalism as an unavoidable reaction to belated 
Ottoman democratization (pp. 33-34, 38-40). 
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None of the waves is smooth and continuous because all of them were interrupted 
by violent state repression. The first wave was interrupted four times: first by the Greco-
Ottoman War in 1897, later by WWI in 1914, third by the National Resistance in 1920, 
and finally by the military campaign against Kurds in 1925. However, with the exception 
of the last, none of these interruptions could prevent the rise, let alone terminate the 
movement. What did terminate the first wave were the military campaigns between 1930 
and 1938. The second wave was interrupted twice by military coups, first in 1971 and 
later in 1980. As with the first wave, the movements regained their momentum a few 
years after the coups. The terminal decline of this wave came with a complex set of 
repressive policies practiced in the 1990’s. The trajectory of the third wave has not 
become clear yet. 
The following three sections present a descriptive summary of these three waves 





TABLE 4-1 SOCIAL MOVEMENTS BEFORE AND AFTER THE JULY REVOLUTION IN 1908 





Unrest in the Army 
Occurrence 18 2 
In Category 90.0% 10.0% 
In Period 50.0%Mo 1.0% 
 
Strikes 
Occurrence 1 110 
In Category 0.9% 99.1% 
In Period 2.8% 53.7% 
 
Celebrations 
Occurrence 0 63 
In Category 0.0% 100.0% 
In Period 0.0% 30.7% 
 
Protests Against the 
Administration 
Occurrence 7 9 
In Category 43.8% 56.3% 
In Period 19.4% 4.4% 
 
Assassinations 
Occurrence 6 1 
In Category 85.7% 14.3% 




Occurrence 4 20 
In Category 16.7% 83.3% 




Occurrence 36 205 
In Category 14.9% 85.1% 
In Period 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Source: Social Movements Database 1876-1945 (SMD 258)  
 
The First Wave: 1896-1930 
1896 - 1913: Constitutional Revolution, the Balkans and the Middle East 
Going by Figure 4-2, 1908 appears to be the most important year of the first 
wave, since it was the year of the Constitutional Revolution, and the intensity of recorded 
58 For SMD 2 see Chapter 1 (page 76) 
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To explain the weakness in the organizational capacity of the labor movement, 
one should emphasize less the level of capitalist development and more its ethnic 
composition. As Table 4-2 shows, 37% of the strikes were in the Balkan zone, where 
non-Muslims constituted the majority of the population. Thessaloniki, a primarily Jewish 
port-city, where a quarter of the population was employed in manufacture, especially 
functioned as the engine of militant labor movement and socialist activity (Dumont, 
1994, pp. 59-72). Here the Jewish workers played a role similar to that of pre-Bund 
Jewish organizations in Russia (Ilıcak, 2002, p. 139). Similarly, approximately half of the 
strikes occurred in Istanbul, İzmir, Adana and Aydın, where Greeks and Armenians 
constituted a significant minority. The politically active labor force in the Ottoman 
Empire was comprised mainly of non-Muslims60. According to the industrial statistics of 
1915, two years after the loss of almost all Balkan territories, 85% of the labor force in 
manufacturing was non-Muslim. In 1919, the ratio for the western Anatolia was the same 
(Koç, 1992, pp. 74-78; Tezel, 2002, p. 98). 
TABLE 4-2 DISTRIBUTION OF 1908 STRIKES OVER CITIES 
 
İstanbul Thessaloniki İzmir 
Other Regions 
in Balkans  
Adana 
Aydın Total 
Occurrence 41 32 14 19 8 137 
Percentage 29.9% 23.4% 10.2% 13.9% 5.8% 100.0% 
Source: SMD 2 
 
The loss of Thessaloniki and other Macedonian regions, the rise of nationalism, 
the loss of industrial districts as a result of wars, literal destruction, and forced migration 
60 Cf (Quataert, 2008, pp. 183-185). Quataert shows that one cannot simply assume an ethnic division of 
labor in the Ottoman Empire. Muslims were also part of the labor force and the majority among the 
unorganized segments.  He also states that non-Muslims constituted a privileged segment of employees. 
Koç agrees with this statement but reminds us of the crucial role played by the labor aristocracy in the first 
stage of class struggle. 
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of the labor force undermined – indeed precluded - the very possibility of class solidarity 
across ethnic divides and the rise of a workers movement in the Ottoman Empire. Hence 
the events in 1908 should not be considered as representing the first wave of social unrest 
in Turkey. 
At the core of the first wave of social unrest was separatism in different parts of 
the Empire: the Balkans, the eastern regions heavily populated by Armenians, the 
Arabian Peninsula, and later Kurdistan. As can be seen from Figure 4-4, the suppression 
of the Bulgarian April Uprising in 1876 and the Russo-Ottoman War resulting in an 
autonomous Bulgaria, were followed by a relatively tranquil period for almost twenty 
years. The year 1896, the beginning of the second round of the Cretan revolt, can be 
considered as the starting point for the next wave. The political stance of the revolt 
leaders was in line with Greek irredentism and eventually this uprising led to the Greco-
Ottoman War. The war resulted in an autonomous Crete and eviction of Ottoman troops 






Figure 4-6 Separatist and Ethnic Unrest in the Ottoman Empire 
Source: SMD 2 
 
The Ottoman retreat in the Balkans had started in the early nineteenth century 
with the Serbian and Greek uprisings. After Bulgarian independence in 1908, Macedonia 
-- a region which covers parts of Greece, Bulgaria, the present-day Macedonian Republic, 
Albania, and Serbia -- was the last stronghold of the Empire in the Balkans. It was also 
the most urbanized and in the capitalist sense most developed region of the Empire. By 
extension, it was also the region with the most developed civil society in the capitalist 
sense. For these reasons, the earliest nationalist movements under Ottoman rule emerged 
in Macedonia; by the same token, the constitutionalist movement was also born in the 
Ottoman Balkans (Tekeli & İlkin, 2003, pp. 4-6). 
The next important point in the wave was the Ilinden Uprising in August 1903 
that surpassed April 1876 in terms of intensity. The insurrection was led by the Internal 
















and Bulgarian nationalist factions (Adanır, 1994, p. 35)61. The popular discontent that the 
IMRO strove to exploit was the inability of the Porte to abate the burden of taxes and 
other oppressive policies for the Christian peasantry, and implement tax reforms. The 
expansion of pastures at the expense of small farmers further added to the discontent 
(Adanır, p. 45, ; Pinson, p. 132). The rebels repelled the Ottoman army and declared a 
republic that was not based on a specific ethnic claim but could only survive for less than 
two weeks (Brown, 2003, pp. 12-18, 103-125)62. In any case, the declaration of the 
republic had limited popular backing and involved even more limited popular 
mobilization. It could not go beyond armed attacks of chetes, the Balkan version of 
guerilla bands, and was smashed by the Ottomans. By the end of the revolt, 200 villages 
had been burnt, 10,000 houses demolished, 5,000 peasants killed and approximately 
30,000 exiled (Khadziev, 1992; Tekeli, 2003, p. 76). 
Overall, it was not only during the Ilinden uprising that the rebels’ actions have 
been recorded as insurrectionary by the secondary sources and were anything but 
peaceful. Only a tiny percent of all recorded events were rallies and demonstrations, and 
even some of these were armed gatherings. The insurgents’ repertoire included road-
blocking, cutting of telegraph lines, ambushing the gendarmerie, and finally, occupying 
certain zones.  
  
61 Before the uprising, the organization had already been competing with the External Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization, which was in favor of Macedonia’s annexation by Bulgaria (Adanır, 2001, pp. 
119-125; Jelavich, 1983, p. 94). 
62 Adanır (2001)documents several attacks against the Muslim population and claims that the insurgents’ 
deeds contradicted their non-ethnic discourse (pp. 199-200).  
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TABLE 4-3 SHARE OF MACEDONIAN UNREST IN THE RECORDED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 
Macedonia 4 4 6 0 3 8 18 21 42 0 
Total 9 10 44 34 240 151 43 41 57 9 
Percentage 44.4% 40.0% 13.6% 0.0% 1.3% 5.3% 41.9% 51.2% 73.7% 0.0% 
Source: SMD 2 
 
         
           
A few years following the suppression of Albanian chetes together with the 
Muslims, the officers constituting the backbone of the CUP went after the IMRO and also 
the Serbian chetes (Adanır, 2001, pp. 263-269)63. However the decline of Christian chete 
activities did not solve the Empire’s problems. The mobilization of the Muslim 
population of Macedonia against the Christians paved the way for the Albanian problem. 
From the defeat of Ilinden onwards, most of the separatist activities were actually 
conducted by Albanian nationalists, who eventually managed to separate from the 
Ottoman Empire. Between 1903 and 1912, Albanian chete activities grew further and 
became the Empire’s most important domestic problem. The intensity of social protests 
in 1912 was one standard deviation above the median (Figure 4-2). And from 1909 to 
1912, the Macedonian nationalist movement increased its share in the total. In 1912, one 
year before the CUP coup, the Macedonian movement had a 70% share in the total unrest 
(Table 4-3).  
63 Cf Upward (2013 (1909), pp. 298-301) who cites Inspector General Hilmi Pasha’s reports documenting 
about 98 and 79 military confrontations between Ottoman troops and Bulgarian and Serbian chetes in 1907 
and 1908 respectively, and writes about the inevitable failure of suppression attempts. Tekeli and İlkin 
(2003) highlight the unintended democratic influence of the chetes as freedom fighters on the officers 
fighting as the guardians of despotism (p. 47). 
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In its initial stages, the Macedonian nationalist movement, especially because of 
the religious affinity of the Albanian one, was not a separatist movement at all. What they 
demanded was more cultural autonomy. Albanian nationalists even supported the CUP in 
the first years of its rule. But the latter’s centralism and nationalism alienated not only the 
Greeks and Armenians but also Albanians and the demand for autonomy gradually made 
way for the demand for independence (Sönmez, 2007, pp. 225-228; Tallon, 2012, p. 198) 
(Tallon, p. 198)64.  
The events in 1910 and 1912 correspond to two big waves of the Albanian 
uprising. The first uprising, which lasted two months, ended with Ottoman suppression 
and Albanian Muslims lost even the cultural rights they had acquired after the 1908 
Revolution (Tallon, 2012, p. 167). Thanks to the war against Italians, the revolt in 
Yemen, and the widespread character of the rebellion, the second wave had the opposite 
outcome. In September 1912, the Ottomans had to accept almost all of the insurgents’ 
demands including a high degree of autonomy (p. 192)65. This concession split the 
leading cadres of the insurgency between the Northerners who were content with the 
acquired rights, and the Southerners who wanted to continue the struggle until complete 
autonomy. Given the military incompetence of the politically paralyzed Ottoman State 
torn by conflicts within the power bloc, the Balkan wars paved the way for a more radical 
third alternative - independence - for the Albanians who feared being attacked by the 
neighboring young Balkan nations (Sönmez, 2007, pp. 201-222).  
64 Cf Bayraktar(2010) who argues that historically Albania was de facto independent under the feudal 
dominance of Ayans and Begs (pp. 2-3). Accordingly, it was this suitable socio-economic formation and 
the feudal resistance against centralization efforts that created a favorable environment for the “national 
awakening” in Albania. 
65 The demands that were not accepted included  the return of the expropriated weaponry and court martial 
of ministers responsible for the suppression of the revolt (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, p. 293) 
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With the exception of the year 1915, the period between 1913 and 1920 
corresponds to a period of relative tranquility caused mainly by WWI. However, 
compared to the periods outside the 1906-1931 wave, it still has high intensity. During 
these years, the events recorded as social movement/uprising have two main components: 
the Arab Uprisings and the Armenian Resistance. WWI opened the doors to freedom for 
the former and a disaster for the latter. In one of the bloodiest massacres of the 20th 
century, 1.16 million Armenians, who constituted approximately 6% of the population, 
were wiped out of Anatolia. In 1927 only 65,000 Armenians resided in Anatolia (Tunçay, 
1994, p. 162).  
So far there has not been a comparative analysis of the trajectories of the 
Bulgarian-Macedonian, Albanian, Arab, and Armenian nationalisms.66 Still, it is possible 
to discern three important factors. One is the presence of a strong landed class, with the 
capacity to mobilize the local population and resist Ottoman attempts at centralization. 
The Albanians and Arabs, although the former not necessarily always against 
centralization, had this advantage and therefore could fight effectively against the 
Ottoman armies in a crisis situation like the eve of the Balkan Wars and during WWI 
(Pula, 2011, p. 113)67. In contrast, neither in Macedonia nor in Ottoman Armenia was 
there a Christian landed nobility that could lead or support such a mobilization. The 
revolutionaries had to rely either on the peasantry or (non-Ottoman) imperialist backing. 
66 Göçek’s (2002) resourceful article is the only exception. However, she does not develop a clear-cut 
comparative framework to explain the success or failure of different movements. Moreover, her conceptual 
confounding  of Turkish nationalism, a  nationalism developed by a state,  with the Greek, Arab and 
Armenian nationalisms, developed without an already existing state apparatus, undermines her explanatory 
framework altogether. 
67 For criticism of the theories explaining Arab nationalism as a reaction to Ottoman centralization attempts 
see Blumi (2003, pp. 57-81) and Kayali (1997, pp. 10-12, 174-176). However in both cases, regardless of 
their divergent concerns which were not necessarily decentralism, the landed notables played a crucial role 
and their capacity to mobilize the population was a central factor in the success of separatist movements. 
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Over time, in Macedonia, the second factor gained the upper hand (Adanır, 1994). The 
Bulgarian-Macedonian and Arab nationalist movements were supported by live and 
aggressive British and Russian imperialisms. In contrast, the Armenians stopped 
appealing for foreign intervention after the Constitutional Revolution. When they 
eventually and belatedly did demand European intervention, it was for the 
implementation of social and political reforms and not a separatist struggle (Kaligian, 
2011). They turned to Russia only after the massacre in 1915. But the hour of destiny for 
Armenian separatism, 1915-1919, coincided with the hour of death for Tsarist Russia. 
Similarly, from 1920 onwards, the British Empire had its own problems and preferred to 
negotiate with the new regime in Turkey (Arslanian, 1978, pp. 524-525). 
All of this brings us to the third factor, which is more important from the 
perspective of this study and will be discussed at length in the next chapter: independence 
from the power bloc of the Empire. Certainly all of the separatist/autonomist movements 
had relations with this or that faction of the Ottoman ruling coalition. However, whereas 
the leading cadre of all other separatist movements allied with the decentralist monarchist 
faction of the power bloc, the Armenian political leaders allied with the CUP68. The 
alliance with the decentralist faction of the power bloc did not inhibit the growth of 
separatism among the ranks of Albanians and Arabs. However, internal wavering 
concerning separatism was highest among the Armenian political leaders (Kerimoğlu, 
2008; Libaridian, 2011; Ter Minassian, 1994).  
The political wavering of the Armenian nationalists and socialists can be read 
from graphs depicting the aggregate movements. Unlike the Arab, Macedonian or 
68 From the 1913 coup onwards, all parties started to negotiate with the CUP, but this political ‘expedience’ 
should not be mistaken for ‘support’. 
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Albanian movements, the Armenian movement did not have a minimally continuous 
course. Since the Armenian parties did not have an independent line of action, their 
‘movement’ occurred in 1896 and then in 1915 as short-lived eruptions following 
Ottoman atrocities (Figure 4-6). And in both cases the insurgencies had a defensive 
character. The primary purpose of both uprisings was to prevent further massacres. 
With the end of WWI and collapse of the Empire, the Ottoman pashas’ attempts 
to defend the Empire’s heritage from Ankara sparked off two different social uprisings. 
The first, which constituted nearly one-fifth of all social actions, was comprised of strikes 
in Istanbul under British occupation. The strikers’ demands were narrowly economic and 
their leaders abstained from confronting British authorities. These strikes gradually 
disappeared from public life partly due to the victory of the National Resistance. The 
Greeks had constituted a significant section of not only the bourgeoisie but also the labor 
force of the Empire, and hence with the de-proletarianization following the population 
exchange, the material basis of the strikes was undermined (Yıldırım, 2013, pp. 293-296). 
Kurdish Uprisings 
As the labor movement declined, behind the surge in social action lay the Kurdish 
uprisings. The share of Kurdish uprisings in the movements between 1876 and 1920 was 
merely 3% , but it increased to 85% between 1920 and 1938. 
The Koçgiri Rebellion started in late 1920 at the weakest position of the 
nationalist movement. At that time, British support for the Greek occupation of Anatolia 
had not ended and Greek armies were militarily advancing. To stop this advance, the 
Ankara government needed peace in the east to move its military forces to the western 
front (R. Olson & Rumbold, 1989, p. 46). 
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After the end of WWI, the Great Powers signed two peace treaties with the 
Turkish state. The first was the Sevres Treaty in August 1920 signed with the Ottoman 
Empire. This treaty entailed a drastic shrinking of the Empire and made an independent 
Kurdistan and Armenia a theoretical possibility. Not surprisingly, it was vehemently 
rejected by the Ankara Government and was used as the basic justification for the 
National Resistance. The Lausanne Treaty, according to which Turkey’s current borders 
were drawn, was signed by the Ankara government in 1924, and left no room for an 
independent Kurdistan. 
The Koçgiri Rebellion took place three months after the Sevres Treaty, and 
pressed for an independent Kurdistan (Öz, 1999, pp. 43-50). The leaders of Koçgiri 
Rebellion were members of Kurdish Progressive Association, an organization enjoying a 
close relationship with Britain. Not all Kurds but only Alevi Kurdish Tribes in the 
Dersim region were mobilized. The insurgents put together a military force of 6,000 
people, occupied the administrative offices of the government, and declared sovereignty. 
Moreover, even with a modest number of soldiers, they were strong enough to arrest, try 
and execute the commander of Turkish forces trying to suppress the insurgency. 
Of all the Kurdish uprisings in that period, the Koçgiri Rebellion is the only 
instance when the Ankara government tried to negotiate with the insurgents. The 
government succeeded in suppressing the rebellion after five months and capturing 500 
insurgents including their leader, Alişan Bey. However, given the critical situation in the 
National Resistance and Kemalist dependence on Kurdish support, almost all of the 
insurgents were pardoned (Dersimi, 1952, pp. 120-174; Lazarev, Mgoi, & Kale, 2001, pp. 
115-117; Öz, 1999, pp. 123-161). 
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In the late 19th century and early 20th century, Kurdish uprisings like Emir 
Bedirhan’s in 1847, Sheikh Ubeydullah’s in 1880, and Bitlis and Barzan uprisings in 
1914 were an integral part of social movements, but they were mostly the resistance of 
local notables and tribes to the Porte’s centralization efforts (Bozarslan, 2005, pp. 92-93). 
The Koçgiri rebellion in 1920, which took place in Dersim in northeastern Kurdistan 
close to the Russian border, contained the same anti-centralist elements. Several studies 
underline the local character of the uprising and claim that its demands did not go beyond 
autonomy (Bozarslan, 2005, p. 101; Van Bruinessen, 1992, pp. 278-279). However, what 
set Koçgiri apart from other uprisings was the formation of the first Kurdish government, 
openly articulating the intention for independence (Dersimi, 1952, p. 130; Öz, pp. 259-
260, 274-255). Although never researched so far, given the proximity of Dersim to 
Russian-occupied zones of Anatolia, and the cooperation between Russia and tribes from 
Dersim during WWI, Koçgiri seems to be a byproduct of the anti-colonial and nationalist 
wave following the October Revolution in Russia. After Koçgiri’s raising of the bar, all 
subsequent Kurdish uprisings would contain a nationalist element, pressing for a nation-
state. 
As the insurgency was not completely destroyed, Dersim continued to be a region 
not ruled and dominated by the Turkish state. Thus the upheaval in Dersim lasted until 
1938, the year of the final attack and massacre by the Turkish state. 
Sheikh Said and Ağrı Rebellions 
The real peak of the first wave of social movements was the Sheikh Said 
Rebellion in 1925. Compared to the movements in 1912, the intensity of this rebellion 
was 2.5 times higher. The rebellion started on February 8, 1925 and lasted for 
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approximately six weeks. It spread to the four cities of Diyarbakir, Bingöl, Muş and 
Elazığ, which cover approximately 5% of Turkey’s area. The estimated number of people 
killed in this insurgency is 5,000 (R. W. Olson, 1989, p. 160). 
If Koçgiri was an outcome of the hopes aroused by the Sevres Treaty, Sheikh Said 
was fuelled by resentment of the Lausanne Treaty dictating a Turkish nation state.  
The demands of the uprising were a combination of Kurdish nationalism and Islam. 
Studies close to the Turkish state’s official narrative underline the religious title of the 
insurgents’ leader- ‘Sheikh’- as proof of the traditional and backward character of the 
rebellion (Mumcu, 1991; Toker, 1968). However, since the mid-1970’s, a rapidly 
growing historiography has provided evidence for the modern character of the 
insurrection. As was the case during the Albanian unrest, a clandestine organization 
called Azadi was behind the Sheikh Said insurrection. The organization consisted of 
Kurdish officers –colonels and majors - who had served in the Ottoman Army during the 
First World War and were part of the Turkish army during the National Resistance. 
Sheikh Said was not supposed to lead the insurrection but had to assume leadership 
because the Turkish state captured the leading cadre before the insurrection. Secondly, in 
this case too, the separatist demand was not a call for a return to the Ottoman period. 
Since the old empire had already gone, what they demanded was a new state (R. W. 
Olson, 1989, pp. 41-50; Özsoy & Eriş, 2007, pp. 87-94). 
The third peak of Kurdish resistance was the Ararat rebellion in 1927. It was 
actually part of a new wave of Kurdish uprisings which occurred between 1926 and 1932 
in two cities –Ağrı and Van- around Mount Ararat on the Iranian border. After a few 
small-scale uprisings, the Ararat rebellion intensified in 1928 and the Turkish state could 
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only suppress it after four years. Thus, compared with the short-lived Sheikh Said 
rebellion which spread to a wider region, the Ararat rebellion was concentrated within 
two cities but lasted longer. No doubt geographical factors were important: the 
insurgents’ base was at the Ararat Mountain and they could easily trespass through the 
Iranian border. But what really increased the Kurds’ resistance capacity was the 
leadership factor, and the link between the rebellion and effective commanders was 
evident. In 1924, right after the abortive Beytussebap insurrection, İhsan Nuri Bey, a 
captain and conspirator in the Turkish Army, joined Xoybun, the organization which led 
the uprising. In the following years, due to İhsan Nuri Bey’s military experience and 
guerilla tactics, Turkish forces suffered heavy casualties. 
Xoybun (independence in Kurdish) was an organization founded by Kurdish 
nationalist intellectuals who had gone into exile after 1925. They certainly used religion 
as a tool for mobilization, but as the organization’s name suggests, nationalism was a far 
more dominant theme than religion, especially when compared to the Sheikh Said 
insurrection. Moreover, Xoybun’s leaders went far beyond the imagined autonomy-
seeking rebel in the periphery in terms of their agenda. As a result of its republican 
aspirations, Xoybun declared the founding of the Kurdish Republic with Diyarbakir as its 
capital. Its leaders were as modernist as the founders of the Turkish Republic. What they 
demanded was not autonomy, but membership in the international state system. For this 
purpose, they even applied for membership in the League of Nations (Alakom, 1998, pp. 





TABLE 4-4 REPERTOIRE OF KURDISH MOVEMENTS 
 
Koçgiri Sheikh Said Ağrı 
Attack-Raid-Occupation 47 20 14 
Combat-Confrontation 24 50 21 
Plundering 3 
  Sabotage 2 3 1 




 Source: SMD 2 
    
Amongst the three Kurdish insurgencies, Sheikh Said had an offensive 
expansionary tactic whereas the Koçgiri and Ağrı Rebellions were on the defensive side 
in their tactics. Nevertheless all three uprisings shared the same action repertoire: 
attacking forces, occupying and severing communication lines, and plundering (Table 4-
4). Like the Macedonian separatists, they seldom relied on demonstrations and rallies. 
There was only one speech and it was Sheikh Said’s speech which started the 
insurrection. 
After the Ağrı rebellion, the Kurdish insurgency got scattered and lost its 
momentum. From 1930 onwards, Turkish authorities held the initiative and organized 
‘cleansing campaigns’ year after year, until 1939. The only exception was the Dersim 
uprising that had the character of a resistance to a predicted final assault by the Turkish 
state. Indeed, the attacks on Turkish patrols in Dersim only accelerated the official 
military campaigns. 13,000 Kurds according to the official sources, and 70,000 according 
to testimonies of witnesses were massacred and members of the surviving tribes 
associated with the uprisings were exiled to the western parts of Turkey (Aygün, 2008; 
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Bilmez, 2011, pp. 31-37; Genelkurmay belgelerinde Kürt isyanları-II, 1992, pp. 168-
306). After 1938, social actions in Turkey entered a 30 year--long phase of silence. 
The Silent Phase: 1938-1968 
Before the Coup 
During the first eight years of this period, especially because of the atmosphere of 
war, it was impossible to find the slightest evidence of social unrest. However from 1945 
onwards, rallies before the elections became the major form of social action expressing 
social discontent. Rallies constitute more than half of the social action, and are much 
more dominant during the election years of 1950, 1954 and 1957. As can be observed 
from Figure 4-2, 1957 was an exceptionally intense year in terms of social movements, 
mainly because of the cut-throat 1957 elections. Electoral rallies had been part of the 
political process since 1946, but in 1957, with the RPP’s attempt to mobilize the masses, 




TABLE 4-5 FREQUENCY OF SELECTED TYPES OF SOCIAL ACTION 
 
S E Q OD L A Other Total 
1947 2 1 1 
    
4 
1948 2 1 1 
















1951 5 21 3 1 
 
18 1 49 
1952 
 
9 6 4 1 1 3 24 





1954 2 41 4 







1956 3 30 6 
   
1 40 





1958 8 6 15 13 
  
14 56 
1959 11 3 24 2 1 
 
20 61 
Total 38 282 73 45 5 19 66 528 
         
S: Student Demonstrations and protests    E: Electoral Rallies    Q: Armed Attacks and Quarrels  
A: Anti-Atatürk Activities        OD: Other Demonstrations      L: Labor Unrest 
Source: SMD 1 
 
What deserves special attention during the first silent phase are the student 
demonstrations. This was mainly due to the emergence of the conflict between Greece 
and Turkey on the Cyprus issue. As a result of the nationalistic climate caused by this 
diplomatic tension, thanks to the DP’s use of national chauvinism to consolidate its 
position in the government, the Turkish public had become prone to provocations. This 
sensibility was exploited by forces within the Turkish state by spreading the news that 
Mustafa Kemal’s house in Thessaloniki had been bombed by Greeks. This manipulated 
misinformation triggered two days of looting in Istanbul and İzmir, which is generally 
known as September 6-7 events.  This event was a turning point in two senses. First, it 
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opened the final chapter in the de-Christianization process of Turkish port cities, to be 
completed in 1964 with the expulsion of 40,000 Greeks overnight (Kuyucu, 2005, pp. 
376-377). Second, it was the beginning of student movements motivated by nationalism, 
which would end only after the 1971 coup. From 1955 onwards, student demonstrations, 
not only limited to the Cyprus issue, would be an important part of the rising social 
protest (F. Çakmak; Szyliowicz, 1970, pp. 157-160). 
Another important trend during this period was the increase in relatively violent 
events: clashes and armed attacks. In the beginning, most of the events recorded under 
this category were typical land disputes among peasants. However from 1956 onwards, 
the quarrels with the increasing tension in party politics, and the disputes and clashes 
between the respective supporters of DP and RPP became the main source of these 
disputes.  
After the Coup 
The Coming of a New Wave of Labor Unrest 
The coup on May 27, 1960 was preceded by a wave of student demonstrations in 
Istanbul and in Ankara, which created a political atmosphere conducive to a military coup 
(Bali, 2006, pp. 24-25, 34; Çavdar, 2000, pp. 82-84). It is also true that the coup was 
welcomed by an important segment of the population not limited to students, who poured 
into the streets of these two cities. In contrast to the coups in 1925 and 1980, and similar 
to the one in 1908, May 27 was followed by an increase in social mobilization. Between 
May 28 and June 4 there were 46 rallies in 28 cities69. These demonstrations definitely 
69 Compiled from ("Ankara'da Dün Halk Ordu Lehinde Tezahürat Yaptı," 1960; "Bütün Yurtta Hürriyet 
Bayramı Devam Ediyor," 1960; "Gençlik Dün Vakur Bir Yürüyüş Yaparak Âbideye Çelenk Koydu," 1960; 
"Yurtta Bayram Sevinci ve Şenlikler Devam Ediyor," 1960) 
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occurred under the guidance of the officers affiliated with the junta, yet they were by no 
means planned performances.  
The 1961 Constitution was both politically and socially inclusive. In addition to 
defining the state as a “social law” state, it explicitly recognized the right to organize and 
protest, and made provisions for the right to strike. Moreover, as a reaction to the 
Democrat Party’s attempts to establish complete control over all bureaucratic institutions, 
the new regime guaranteed an autonomous domain for the ideological centers of the state 
such as the institute of planning, radio, television, and the universities. Autonomy for 
universities not only increased the legitimacy of protest by elevating these institutions to 
an almost untouchable position, but also decreased the risk of protest by removing the 
police from campuses. Hence the 1961 constitution paved the way for a wave of strikes 
and student protests (Table 4-6). 
TABLE 4-6  RECORDED STRIKES AND OBSERVED LABOR UNREST BETWEEN 1949-68 
 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 
Strike 
Dataa  3 1 8 4 3 5 5 2 1 
Newspaper 
Datab 1 6  2 2 1  2 2  
           
 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
Strike Data 2    8 83 46 42 101 54 
Newspaper 
Data 3 5 4 18 9 9 45 45 27 23 
           
a(Çalışma Bakanlığı; Makal, 2002, pp. 333-334) 
b Author’s own calculation See: SMD 1 
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The Saraçhane meeting on 31 December 1961 can be taken as the harbinger of the 
coming wave of unrest70. Despite the Constitution’s emphasis on the social character of 
the state, the first elected government of the post-coup period did not implement any 
regulation concerning the problems of labor. The contradiction between constitutional 
promises and governmental neglect aroused immense discontent and led to the first 
workers’ demonstration under the new regime. The demands of the one hundred thousand 
workers from all over Turkey, an unprecedented number for a workers’ demonstration, 
were far from political and only articulated problems related to collective bargaining and 
low wages. Nonetheless, even such modest demands backed by the Constitution aroused 
fears in Ankara ("Saraçhane Mitingi," 1996).  
 The initial reaction of Türk-İş, the confederation founded under close supervision 
of the Democrat Party according to the principles of American trade-unionism, was 
diametrically opposed to its discontented member unions. This became clear a year later 
when Türk-İş organized an equally massive demonstration “condemning communism”, 
sponsored by the businessmen (Koç, 2012b)71. The consequence of both demonstrations 
was the radicalization and polarization of the labor movement, which eventually led the 
militant part to form a new organization called DİSK (Progressive Workers Union 
Confederation) - the protagonist of militant labor movements between 1967 and 1980. 
Another forerunner of the coming strike wave was the Kavel resistance. Although 
strikes were not legalized at the time, workers of the Kavel cable factory – frustrated 
because of unpaid bonuses and lay-offs - locked themselves into the factory and 
70 Koçak (2008) shows that workers were neither completely unorganized nor obedient during the 1950’s 
and emphasizes the continuity between 1950s and 1960s. Accordingly, the Saraçhane meeting was the fruit 
of the hard work of labor organizers throughout the 1950’s. 
71 ("Ankara'daki İşçi Mitinginde Zaman Zaman Hadiseler Oldu," 1962) 
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sabotaged production. The factory occupation created a hitherto unseen network of 
solidarity among workers across sectors. Workers from various factories blocked the 
roads, organized marches, and collected money for the strikers. After two months of 
strike, Vehbi Koç, one of the wealthiest capitalists like his family members today, gave in 
and workers returned to their job. Four months after this movement, the government 
accepted the labor law and a new constitutional article – known as the Kavel Article since 
then - legalized strikes and obliged the employers to re-employ the workers laid off 
during a strike ("Kavel Direnişi," 1996)72. 
Student Movements 
Despite the efforts of the junta and subsequent governments to calm down the 
streets, student demonstrations were still frequent. In contrast to the workers’ movements 
which focused narrowly on their economic demands, the students were uninterested in 
their problems as students, and their demands were solely political. They were urging the 
government to take harsher measures against the toppled Democrat Party and protested 
whenever they noticed signs of leniency and concession. What triggered the biggest 
demonstration of the early sixties - the March Demonstration - was the release of Celal 
Bayar, the eighty-year old president of the Democrat Party era, from Kayseri prison 
because of his health problems. After the news spread in İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir, 
students occupied the streets in tens of thousands, and surrounded and attacked the 
headquarters of the Justice Party, which was seen as the heir of the Democrat Party. In 
72 ("170 Fabrika İşçisi Dün Oturma Grevi Yaptı," 1963; "Grev Yapan Kavel Fabrikası İşçileri Polisle 
Kavga Ettiler," 1963; "Kavel İşçilerinin Eşleri ve Polis Arasında Arbade Oldu," 1963) 
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the following years, anti-Justice Party feelings continued to be the motor of student 
demonstrations (Birand, Dündar, & Çaplı, 1994, pp. 94-101)73. 
The politicization of students was not limited to universities but also occurred in 
Turkey’s only military academy. The cadets showed their disgruntlement with the 
government’s tolerant attitude towards the “fallen politicians” through symbolic marches. 
In these marches, the cadets articulated their unshakable belief in, and active support for, 
Colonel Talat Aydemir, the leader of both the failed coups in 1962 and 1963 (Y. Demir, 
2006, p. 163). 
 
Figure 4-7 Comparison of the Intensity of Labor, Socialist and Student Movements 
Source: SMD 1 
73 ("20 Bin Üniversiteli İle 4 Bin AP'li Arasında Kanlı Bir Çatışma Oldu," 1963; "Gençler Bayar'ı Protesto 
Ettiler ve AP Genel Merkezi Taşlandı," 1963; "Gençlik Bayar'ın Tahliyesine ve Taşkınlıklarına Tepki 
Gösterdi," 1963; "İzmir'de Gençler Orduya Şükranlar Diye Bağırdılar," 1963; "Tahrik Olunan Gençler AP 




























































                                                          
Despite their historical significance as the beginning of a wave of labor and 
student unrest however, these actions were too weak to influence the regime. As Figure 
4-7 about the distribution of student and labor unrest between 1961 and 2004 illustrates, 
the intensity of both actions was lower than the subsequent period. They were signaling 
the beginning of the wave but should not be confused with the wave itself. 
 The Second Wave 1968-1998 
From Workers’ and Students’ Movements to the Anti-Fascist Struggle  
At the beginning, the second wave of social action had two components: workers’ 
movement and student demonstrations. As mentioned above, both of them had their roots 
in the post-1960 political climate. From 1968 onwards, one can observe a constant surge 
in the labor movement (with dramatic interruptions during the coup interregnums in 
1971-73 and 1980-84). But the real explosion after 1968 was in the students’ movement, 
which rose dramatically over the next thirty years.  
Unless one builds very abstract categories, it is not possible to conceptualize the 
Turkish student movement under the general heading of the 1968 movement, from which 
it was different in both its ideological and practical content. In the ideological sense, it 
was not a libertarian and anti-statist movement. On the contrary, being the outcome of a 
politicization process leading to a coup, political problems revolving around the issue of 
state power constituted the central concern of the Turkish student movement. Until 1970, 
students considered the Turkish Army as an integral part of the revolutionary forces. To 
give another example, whereas most of the youth mobilized in the 1968 movement in the 
West supported Dubcek and his socialism with a human face, the dominant trend 
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amongst the Turkish student movement was to support the Soviet invasion (Önderoğlu, 
2008; "Sosyalizm mi? Reformizm mi?," 1968; Vardar, 2008a, 2008b). 
 At the practical level, the Turkish student movement had closer ties with the 
workers movement. The rift elsewhere between the workers’ and students’ movements, 
which could be openly observed in May 1968 in Paris, did not happen in Turkey74. On 
the contrary, the allegedly student organization Dev-Genç (Revolutionary Youth) 
participated in the labor uprising in June 1970 (Koç, 2012a; Öztürk, 2001, pp. 430-435). 
Behind this lay not only the students’ rural or working-class backgrounds, but also their 
political motivation for building an alliance with the working class. 
What triggered the uprising in 1970 was the government’s decision to annul the 
collective bargaining rights of DİSK and force the workers and their unions to surrender 
to Türk-İş. In protest against the government’s decision, workers from all factories of 
Istanbul blocked the highways and started to march to the city center. On the Anatolian 
side, approximately a hundred thousand workers gathered and managed to overcome the 
military barricades. Workers could only be stopped by Kemal Türkler’s (the secretary 
general of DİSK) radio announcement asking the workers “to stay within the limits of the 
Constitution and not to attack the members of the honorable Turkish army”. The balance 
sheet of the uprising was 4 dead and approximately 200 injured. Martial law was declared 
in Istanbul for three months and within a week, 260 demonstrators were arrested although 
all of them were released two months later ("70 bin işçi direnişe geçti," 1970; "Gece 
sokağa çıkma yasağı kondu, T.B.M.M Sıkı Yönetim kararını onayladı," 1970; "İstanbul 
ve İzmit'te sıkıyönetim," 1970; 2001, pp. 80-88) 
74 The tension between the French Communist Party and the radical student movements as depicted by 
Mendel  (1969, pp. 3-10) reveals at the same time the distance between the students and workers. 
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Being a socialist mass organization with more than 10,000 members and a much 
bigger capacity to mobilize the youth, Dev-Genç itself was the product of the student 
demonstration wave in 1968. From 1970 onwards, Dev-Genç - as the name suggests – 
was never an organization confined to students’ problems, and became the womb of 
revolutionary political organizations like THKO (People’s Liberation Army of Turkey) 
and THKP-C (People’s Liberation Party-Front of Turkey). Similarly, despite not being 
directly formed under the umbrella of Dev-Genç, members of TKP-ML learnt their 
political ropes in FKF (Confederation of Idea Clubs), which was the political predecessor 
of the Dev-Genç. These were all guerilla organizations, which, after the failure of June 
15-16 events, were disillusioned with the political capacity of the working class to lead a 
revolution, and adopted foco, urban-guerilla and people’s war strategies respectively. The 
rapture of the youth, who at the beginning still spoke the Kemalist language, was 
practical rather than ideological. Instead of supporting a military coup, the youth decided 
to arm and to build their own army and fight against the regime (Çayan, pp. 325-334, 
339-341; Kaypakkaya, pp. 333-340; Kürkçü, pp. 498-507).  
The change in the youth’s orientation can also observed from a comparison of 
Figures 4-3 and 4-8. Although there is an increase in the general intensity of the 
movement from 1969 to 1970, we observe a dramatic fall in the intensity of the students’ 




Figure 4-8 Standardized Intensity of Student Movements 1947-2004 
Standard Deviation from the Median 
Source: SMD 1 
Despite these groups’ attempts to build various forms of guerilla organizations, 
the 1971 coup regime was able either to annihilate or jail the leading cadres of all these 
organizations. It could also suppress the workers’ movement with the help of Martial 
Law provisions. In this sense, 12 March was a defeat for the left, although the material 
bases for these movements survived: rapid industrialization based on the import 
substituting strategy, the 1961 Constitution, a politicized society and finally, tens of 
thousands of socialist youth who were committed to socialism and motivated by the 
heroic deaths of the young guerilla leaders. And so a new surge in the workers’ and 
students’ movements began rapidly and immediately after the tight grip of the coup 
regime was relaxed in 1974. This second round, however, would not be a mere repetition 























































As we can see from Figure 4-3, from 1974 onwards there is a rapid rise in the 
intensity of social unrest, and 1978 is the second peak after the 1925 revolt. Moreover, in 
the 1977-1980 period, the unrest intensity was permanently 1 standard deviation above 
the median. Such a long and sustained period of intensity is unique in the history of 
Turkish social movements. Besides, as can be seen from Table 4-7, this was not only a 
period with the highest incidence of political violence, but also with the highest rate of 
strikes, university boycotts and meetings. Finally, compared to the 1910-1913 or 1920-
1930 periods, the protests were effective throughout the whole country.  
The unrest before 1980 can be grouped into two categories: socialist and fascist, 
the latter generally euphemized as the ‘right’ or ‘far right’. The leftist movement was a 
combination of workers’ and student movements in addition to the political 
demonstrations organized by leftist parties or associations. The fascist movement’s action 
repertoire however, consisted mainly of attacks on leftists. These attacks were certainly 
not one-sided and were responded to by the leftists. Indeed, after a while, attacks became 
the main component of the leftist action repertoire as well75. 
Studies on the 1970-80 period conceptualize the leftist movement either as radical 
sects isolated from the masses (Ç. Keyder, 1987b, pp. 210-222; Lipovsky, 1991, pp. 109-
110) or under the heading of political violence without referring to its class character 
(Zürcher, 2004, pp. 263-264)76. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Only a few 
organizations focused their activities on killing, kidnapping, and robbery. Moreover, most 
75 Due to the socialist bias of Cumhuriyet, the left’s responses to these attacks are under-reported. 
76 Curiously, several socialist organizations, who were actually part of the struggle, resort to the same 
explanation when trying to give an account of their past ("İşçi Sınıfının Komünist Programı İçin Temel 
İlkeler," 2001, pp. 153-154; Yakın Geçmişe Genel Bir Bakış ve Platform Taslağı, 1990, pp. 44-54) 
(Konferans Belgeleri, 1990, pp. 55-58). For a Leninist criticism see ("Tasfiyecilik Rüzgarları Eserken Kim 
Hangi Yolda Yürüyor (2)," 2008). 
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of these violent activities were not undertaken by marginal groups but by the major leftist 
organizations whose main activities were organizing meetings, demonstrations, and 
unionization struggles among others. To give an example, after 1980, seventeen members 
of leftist organizations were hanged after being indicted for terror and anarchy, and four 
of these militants belonged to Dev-Yol, (Revolutionary Path). Before 1980, Dev-Yol had 
either controlled or was the main opposition group in many important trade unions like 
Genel-İş, Maden-İş, and Dev. Maden-Sen (Pekdemir, 2007, p. 778; STM, 1988b, pp. 
2258, 2261). Democrat, a daily newspaper read mainly by Dev-Yol supporters, is said to 
have a circulation between 50,000 and 70,000 ("Müftüoğlu’ndan Özkök’e ‘Şarlatanlığı 
bırak, kendi işine bak’," 2008). Similarly during the Dev-Yol trials, 40% of the 4400 
defendants were either workers or peasants. And this was true not only for Dev-Yol but 
also for other major socialist organizations like Halkın Kurtuluşu and Kurtuluş (Çubukçu, 
2007, p. 733). Hence the unrest of 1977-1980 cannot be simply labeled as the struggle of 
isolated leftist and rightist organizations. During these years, violence was deeply 
connected to the laboring segments of the society and therefore violent actions should be 
considered not the whole of, but a part of, the leftist movements.  
The unrest between 1976 and 1980 is in another sense also a counter-example to 
the liberal approach, which explains the absence of democracy with the weakness of the 
civil society in Turkey, because it corresponds to a period in which the level of social 
organization was the same as the present, although the content was different. If we use 
the number of associations per ten thousand people as an indicator of the development of 
civil society, it is evident that the level of this development during the 1970’s is close to 
today’s level (Table 4-7).  
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1938 205 17000 0.01 
1946 733 19000 0.04 
1950 2011 21238 0.09 
1955 7086 24 585 0.29 
1960 18958 28 161 0.67 
1966 31281 32 556 0.96 
1970 42170 35 464 1.19 
1973 18958 37 885 0.50 
1979 49365 43 133 1.14 
1981 53657 45 130 1.19 
1994 61000 58 222 1.05 
1998 72636 62 048 1.17 
2001 77259 64 862 1.19 
2010 85102 73 357 1.16 
 
Source: (Yaşama Dair Vakıf, 2008) (Yücekök, 1972) 
 
The military was also aware of the power of these associations and banned 
approximately 20,000 of them, which corresponds to 50%. Second, the type and demands 
of these associations changed over time. Together with unions, associations in the 1970’s 
were based on more universalistic values compared to the post-1980 years – a period of 
the rise of identity politics. Needless to say, a rapid decline in trade union membership 
accompanied this process. So liberals who do not hesitate to label the present flourishing 
of identity-based associations as the rise of civil society, should actually make the same 
statement for the period between 1974 and 1980. 
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To return to the differences between the political terrains before and after 1971, 
four factors were responsible for these differences: The first was the end of competition 
within the power bloc as discussed in the previous chapter. The second was the crisis of 
the import substitution industrialization strategy (Ç. Keyder, 1987b, pp. 187-196). The 
crisis not only inhibited the process of capital accumulation but also decreased the 
regime’s capacity that further undermined the competition within the power bloc. And so 
in contrast to the pre-1971 period, this strengthened the state’s capacity to smash the 
revolutionary movements. 
Third, the 1971 coup happened at the beginning of the global détente but the 
second rise of the social movements went hand-in-hand with its decline. The coup 
terminated all types of social action right after the end of the détente with the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, a period when the US became more concerned about communist 
expansion and devoted more resources to crush revolutionary movements worldwide (W. 
Hale, 2012, p. 163; McCormick, 1995, pp. 203-212). 
Finally, the rise of the fascist movement between 1971 and 1980 had a 
devastating impact on the Turkish socialist and workers’ movements. The fascist 
movement in Turkey did not start with the 1971 coup. Its origins date back to the WWII 
period, when Turkey had a close relationship with Nazi-Germany and pro-German 
politicians had important posts in the cabinet. It is also a well-known fact today that 
fascist militants were trained in the commando camps after 1960. But fascist violence 
escalated to a scale incomparable with the previous period only after 1974. Two 
developments gave an impetus to the fascist movement.  
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The first development was the social instability caused by capitalist accumulation 
and dispossession accompanied by the fear of the rise of socialist and revolutionary 
movements. The combined impact of both factors prepared a fertile ground for the fascist 
movement to recruit militants at an unprecedented scale (Ç. Keyder, 1987b, pp. 217-232). 
Second, the fascist party took its place in the federal cabinet as the junior coalition 
partner after 1975. This enabled the fascist party to open up space in the state for its 
cadres, which eventually meant state support and protection for fascist aggression 
(Yanardağ, 2002, pp. 70-73). 
Fascist violence assumed two different forms: (i) in big industrial centers, where 
fascists were politically weaker than socialists, their methods included kidnapping, 
bombing and killing, (ii) in cities where fascist had a mass base but socialists also 
enjoyed considerable mass support, provocations and mass mobilization for massacres 
were the main method. 
After 1978, some factions of the left did counter the fascist attacks in two ways: 
(1) they started to respond in kind by retaliations and (2) in some cases by building 
resistance committees to repel the attackers. However the first method outweighed the 
second one which resulted in de-politicization of masses and their retreat from the 
political sphere. Despite the increase in the intensity of social action then, the number of 
mobilized people shrunk to a numerically small but determined segment of the 
population.  
Whereas the coup in 1971 confronted a rising level of social action accompanied by 
politicizing masses, the coup in 1980 had to deal with high-intensity social action with 
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declining mass support. Therefore it could easily smash all kinds of organizations related 
to labor movement or socialism and atomize the opposition (Table 4-8 and Figure 4-9).  
TABLE 4-8 AVERAGE MONTHLY INTENSITIES OF PROTESTS ACCORDING TO MASS 
CHARACTER OF PROTESTS AND VIOLENCE INVOLVED* 
Year MV Mv mV All mV/(MV+Mv) 
1962 0.33 7.83 3.00 18.00 0.37 
1963 1.33 4.67 2.17 11.33 0.36 
1964 0.83 3.17 1.67 8.33 0.42 
1965 3.33 15.67 3.33 27.67 0.18 
1966 1.17 14.67 2.17 25.33 0.14 
1967 4.33 6.50 3.33 16.17 0.31 
1968 5.00 26.17 3.17 41.67 0.10 
1969 2.40 28.80 8.00 56.20 0.26 
1970 0.17 34.17 5.67 57.67 0.17 
1971 0.33 19.67 8.00 43.17 0.40 
1972 0.67 6.00 2.83 12.33 0.43 
1973 5.17 2.33 1.67 12.67 0.22 
1974 7.83 9.00 2.83 23.50 0.17 
1975 8.33 21.33 6.00 67.50 0.20 
1976 15.17 33.50 10.67 93.50 0.22 
1977 16.00 28.50 20.00 130.83 0.45 
1978 3.67 44.83 58.50 268.50 1.21 
1979 0.00 29.88 53.13 169.13 1.78 
1980 0.00 59.00 93.50 251.00 1.58 
 
M: Movements with Mass Character 
m: Movements without a Mass Character 
 
V: Movements involving violence 
v: Movements without violence 
Source: See Chapter 5 
* Except the total protest column all averages show the intensity of independent movements. (For the 




The outcome was 650,000 detentions, 210,000 trials, 517 capital punishment 
decisions, more than 500 suspicious deaths, and 14,000 revocations of citizenship. 
The loss of political and associational freedoms of course had economic consequences as 
well. Between 1979 and 1985, the real wages of workers dropped by approximately 40 
percent (Figure 4-10). 
 
 
Figure 4-9 Ratio of Group Action over Mass Protests between 1962 and 1980 
Source: Table 5-8    mV/(MV+Mv) Column 
 
The Second Rise: Workers without Socialists 
Two days after the 1980 coup, the junta banned all trade union activities until the 
end of 1983- when a new Labor Law full of restrictions was promulgated77. Since strikes 
were considered threats to internal peace, no strike happened until 1984. And even then, 
the strikes stopped far short of mobilizing a significant mass of workers, and it was not 
possible to speak of a workers’ movement until 1987. Yet, as was the case in 1971, the 
coup regime could not bring the labor movement to an end and freeze all kind of social 















                                                          
protest. With the relaxation of repressive policies from 1987 onwards, workers started to 
mobilize to regain what they had lost after the 1980 coup.  
What (re)started the movement was the Netaş – a Canadian telecommunication 
company- strike in Istanbul. In November 1986, the workers demanded an increase in 
wages, a bonus on the New Year and a voice in the disciplinary committee. After the 92-
day-long resistance of 2600 workers, the company accepted all the demands of the 
strikers ("Netaş Grevi ", 1996, p. 438). The Netaş strike became a prototype for strikes in 
the following two years. Compared to the political strikes before the coup, almost all 
these strikes had demands related to wage increase or workplace authority. And be it in 
the private or the public sector, most of the strikes ended with workers’ gains. In 1990, 
workers’ wages in manufacturing were as high as in 1977 and one year later, they were 
approximately 17 percent higher (Figure 4-10). Yet due to high inflation, the workers 
could not retain these economic gains. 
 
 
Figure 4-10 Real Wages between 1962-1994 (1976=100) 
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Strikes were not the only activity the workers engaged in. Sit-ins, demonstrations, 
work slow-downs and other forms of passive resistance were also part of their repertoire 
of mobilization (Voyvoda, 2011, pp. 90-109). The highest point in workers’ activity was 
the one-day long general strike – a solidarity strike in support of the miners in Zonguldak 
- in the first week of 1991. Approximately 48,000 workers had been on strike for over a 
month. And right after the general strike they decided to take the protest to Ankara. Since 
the buses could not enter the city due to the police blockade, the workers decided to walk 
to Ankara which meant walking a distance of 268 kilometers. So, with the decision of the 
trade union, approximately one hundred thousand people started to walk to Ankara. The 
army stopped the workers after the hundredth kilometer and the head trade-union leader 
sent the workers back home and went alone to Ankara. From that day onwards, workers 
were fed with empty promises as if the negotiations were continuing. Actually, what the 
government was trying to do was to gain time and to come to an agreement with 250,000 
metal workers. After the collective agreement with metal workers was signed, the 
government used the Gulf War as an excuse –Turkey was not a belligerent country- to 
postpone all strikes for sixty days. This meant the end not just of the Zonguldak strike, 
but also the first part of the workers movement (Özen, 1998). After this episode, the 
workers’ movement entered a phase of decline, and real wages eroded again to approach 
the 1987 levels. Only after the 1994 economic crisis was there a new but temporary surge 
in workers movement and from 1997 onwards it disappeared from the scene for almost a 
decade. 
In contrast to the pre-1980 period, the governments had the upper hand in their 
negotiations with various representatives and leaders of the labor movement. The first 
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reason was the position of the left in the post-coup situation. Whereas the left had 
survived the 1971 coup with increased political prestige and audience, the opposite was 
true after the 1980 coup partly because of leftist mistakes in responding to fascist attacks 
and partly because of high degree of state repression. Hence the bonds between leftist 
groups and unionized workers were incomparably weak.  
Comparing the strike data of the pre-and post-1980 periods reveals that the post-
1980 strikes included workers from all segments rather than being led by a movement of 
the politicized and ideologically committed segment of the workers. The maximum 
number of strikers in pre-1980 period was 82,000 in 1980, and the number of strikers in 
1990 and 1991 were 166,000 and 164,000 respectively (Çalışma Bakanlığı). But at the 
same time, unlike the former, the latter were neither led nor influenced by any kind of a 
leftist movement. This phenomenon can also be read from Figure 4-7. Whereas the 
socialist movement went hand-in-hand with the workers’ movement between 1974 and 
1980, after 1980 due to the weakness of the left and its isolation from the trade unions, 
there is a big gap between the intensity of both movements, which explains the lack of 
any political content in the strikes. 
Another factor responsible for the weakening of the trade unions was the shift in 
Turkish capitalists’ industrialization strategy which meant deindustrialization of Istanbul, 
moving the capital to Anatolian districts (Doğruel & Doğruel, 2010, pp. 7-17; Kaya, 
2013, pp. 176-180), and switching to informal labor (Eren, 2003).  
Because of these two factors, despite the rise after 1987, the labor movement was 
on the defensive, and was unable to make substantial gains. And eventually after the 1989 
peak, the labor movement started to fade from the political scene. 
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The Rise of the Kurdish Movement 
In the third rise of the social wave during the 1980s, the Kurdish movement was 
more influential than the workers’ movement. Compared to the socialist movement, it 
entered the political scene pretty late. It also experienced the impact of the coup 
differently, which weakened and eventually liquidated most of the leftist movements and 
organizations. The Kurdish movement was already on the rise before the 1980’s.The 
coup just postponed this rise for a few years and after 1984, the Kurds intensified their 
struggle against the regime. Since it has been active for thirty years and is as intense as its 
previous peak in 1994, the Kurdish movement is the movement with the longest survival 
period within the Turkish borders. 
 
 
Figure 4-11 Mentioned Kurdish Protests per Month 









































































TABLE 4-9 KURDISH, WORKERS' AND STUDENTS' MOVEMENTS’ YEARLY SHARE IN 
AGGREGATE MOVEMENT 1987-1997 
Year Kurdish Worker Student 
1987 25.0% 30.6% 11.1% 
1988 18.9% 24.7% 6.1% 
1989 13.9% 47.4% 0.1% 
1990 23.5% 26.9% 0.2% 
1991 26.7% 33.9% 0.5% 
1992 39.9% 16.5% 0.2% 
1993 37.8% 17.0% 0.3% 
1994 36.2% 6.1% 0.5% 
1995 16.1% 21.9% 0.5% 
1996 24.9% 5.8% 0.5% 
1997 16.3% 7.3% 7.6% 
Source: SM D 1 
 
After 1984, the Kurdish movement was led by the PKK (Kurdistan Workers 
Party), an ex-Marxist-Leninist organization originating from Turkish revolutionary 
groups and claiming to fight for a unified and independent Kurdistan. The PKK was 
founded in 1978, and at that time was not amongst the strongest Kurdish organizations in 
Kurdistan. But its capacity to resist and apply flexible tactics helped its rapid growth after 
1980. The PKK initially chose Syria as its base and launched guerilla attacks into Turkish 
Kurdistan78 from there. From 1987 onwards, it was able to build a mass base and not only 
attacked Turkish state officers and collaborator villages but also started to mobilize the 
Kurdish masses in urban areas. Demonstrations and shutter-down strikes became routine 
in urban areas as a result. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the PKK abandoned the 
78 Kurdistan is a politically loaded and contested label. In this study the term Turkish Kurdistan, or simply 
Kurdistan when it is clear that the protest takes place within the borders of Turkey, denotes the cities with 




                                                          
official Marxist-Leninist line as an ideology and also its demand for an independent 
Kurdistan. 
Despite its general image, the PKK79 has never been a movement with its roots in 
the peasantry, but recruited mainly the urban population (Esentur, 2007, pp. 112-114). 
Similarly it is very modern, in the sense of having a bureaucratic party apparatus, and a 
structure encompassing all local organizations in the four parts of Kurdistan. Although 
adopting a people’s war strategy, the PKK never adopted a movement strategy like the 
Maoist guerilla groups in India or Nepal. It trained the militants coming from big cities 
outside of Turkey, and attacked Turkish forces. The Turkish state burned almost half of 
the villages in Kurdistan in the hope of weakening the PKK, and enforced rapid 
urbanization. But this urbanization actually strengthened the PKK further. The election 
results since 1999 of parties and candidates indirectly affiliated with the PKK is one sign 
of this increasing strength (Erdem, 2014). 
Despite its current distance from Marxism, the PKK has always been a socialist 
movement with a universalist and emancipatory discourse. Likewise, the position of 
women in the Kurdish movement, affiliated with the PKK, is incomparably superior to 
any other organization in Turkey, including all political parties (Diner & Toktaş, 2010, 
pp. 48-50). Given its radical egalitarianism and democratism, the demands and principles 
of the Kurdish Movement do not lag behind any Western-style civil society movement. In 
Turkey it is the Kurdish movement that supports the strengthening of local governments. 
79  Partly due to the strengthening of the Kurdish movement, and partly due to its flexibility and creativity 
in terms of organization and politics, it is no longer possible to talk about the PKK as a guerilla 
organization with clearly defined organizational borderlines. Today, even if one excludes legal political 
parties indirectly affiliated with it, PKK refers to a cluster of sister parties, assemblies, congresses and 
associations(Joost & Akkaya, 2013, pp. 165-166). In this section when referring to the PKK, I do not 
denote the organizational nucleus but this entire cluster. 
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is a staunch defender of LGBT rights, mounts the most active struggle for ecological 
rights, and defends not only its own cultural rights but the cultural rights of all ethnic 
minorities (Akkaya & Jongerden, 2012; Joost & Akkaya, 2013). The difference of the 
Kurdish Movement from the western post-68 social movements lies not in its demands 
but its methods: its refusal to condemn the use of violence as a political method to 
strengthen its position.  
Another important feature of the Kurdish movement is its level of social 
organization in Kurdish areas. If there are some civil society organizations in Kurdistan, 
most of them are founded by supporters of the Kurdish movement. In most of the urban 
regions of Kurdistan, the movement has attempted to organize people in cooperatives and 
associations. They also receive funds from the European Union, that are blocked by the 
state. These organizations have been repeatedly targeted by the Turkish state, and 
hindering, threatening, and eventually shutting them down is one of the state’s priorities 
in its fight against the PKK. Hence civil society organizations play a crucial role in 
Kurdish unrest. However, contrary to the liberals’ expectations, they are not against but 
in favor of the PKK and its organizational methods (Watts, 2006). 
Given its demands and political values, the PKK is definitely not a remnant of the 
past but propagates an organization very similar to western-style social movements. And 
this similarity should pose at least some difficult questions for liberals. The first difficulty 
is to explain the absence of the correlation between capitalist development and 
flourishing of civil society organizations. Kurdistan is the region where capitalism is least 
developed in Turkey, but we find the most active and politicized civil society 
organizations there. Second, the civil society organizations are not against Kurdish 
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radicalism but mainly support it. Third, the PKK is condemned as a terrorist organization 
and within the conceptual schema of liberalism it is diametrically opposed to western-
style social movements, which are considered to be products of a developed civil society. 
But the demands and values propagated are very similar. How can an “archaic”, and 
“totalitarian” organization defend most actively the values associated with liberalism and 
post-modernism? A center-periphery approach does not have an answer to any of these 
questions. 
The End of the Second Wave 
Despite the dramatic interruptions caused by both coups, the 1971 coup could not 
prevent the rise of social movements, and the 1980 one could not end them completely. 
However, a dramatic decline did occur after 1996 in three steps. The first one was related 
to the movements of workers outside the domain of trade unions. From the 1980 coup 
onwards, thanks to neo-liberal restructuring, the working class assumed a new form. The 
typical unionized industrial worker, employed in a big factory with a certain degree of 
job security, gave way to informal workers without unions and job security. The latter 
type of workers, who are generally not even recognized as part of the working class, are 
usually described by their residential location: people form varoş- a derogatory name for 
the outskirts of the city of Istanbul. Workers of varoşs together with their families gave a 
lease of life to the weakening revolutionary organizations in Turkey, which consequently 
experienced a revival (Eren, 2003). Figure 4-12 compares movement intensity for 
workers who are under the control or within the orbit of unions, with the intensity of 
movements in varoşs. Although this comparison is only for Istanbul, it is obvious that 
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from early 1990’s onwards, the intensity of social unrest cumulated- and eventually 
culminated - in varoşs with a reloaded radicalism. 
 
Figure 4-12 Average Monthly Intensity of Protests according to Type and Location 
Source: SMD 1 
 
Two events in 1995 and 1996 represented the zenith of the varoş movement. The 
Gazi uprising - Gazi being the name of the varoş - was provoked by a gunned attack on 
three Alevi (an oppressed religious sect that constitutes approximately one fifth of 
Turkey’s population) cafés, killing one religious leader and injuring 25 Alevis. Right 
after the attack, residents of Gazi, many of whom are Alevis, marched to the police 
station instead of attacking the cafés of Sunnis (the dominant Muslim sect in Turkey). 
Surrounded by approximately ten thousand people, the police started to target and shoot 

















intimidate the Alevis and the next day the uprising spread to other Alevi districts like 1 
Mayıs Mahallesi, and Gülsuyu. As a result of the three-day long uprising, 23 people were 
killed and over 400 injured. Despite the high death toll, Gazi was the event when workers 
were on the offensive side in their confrontation with the police rather than being on the 
defensive ("Alevilere Saldırı," 1995; "Halka Ateş Açıldı," 1995; "Sağduyuya Çağrı," 
1995). 
The second high point of the varoş movement happened the following year again 
after a provocation. Thanks to the radical winds blowing, 1996 witnessed the most 
crowded May 1 demonstration after 1977, which had ended with a provocation of snipers 
shooting randomly from a hotel roof at hundreds of thousands of people filling Taksim 
Square in Istanbul. In 1996, right before the beginning of the gathering for the 
demonstration, the police shot at the demonstrators and killed three people. In contrast to 
May 1 1977, when people had died not because of the sniper shots but of the stampede 
resulting from panic, in 1996 the demonstrators started chasing police forces, attacking 
banks, and burning cars instead of escaping ("1 Mayıs Coşkusu Kana Bulandı," 1995; 
Soner, 1996). After this incident, workers of varoş and their hostility towards the system 
became an object of curiosity even for the mainstream media which reflected the fears of 
the Turkish bourgeoisie: “One day from the districts they live in and will cut our throats.”  
Nevertheless, like all peaks, May 1 1996 was simultaneously the beginning of a 
retreat. Following the Gazi and May 1 incidents, as Figure 2-9 in the second chapter 
indicates, police repression of revolutionary organizations intensified. The state also 
started to systematically separate varoş workers from unionized workers and their 
demonstrations by terrorizing and criminalizing all kinds of political activities. The 
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success of the government’s endeavors became evident in the May 1 demonstrations in 
the following two years, where the unions continued to celebrate May Day, while 
revolutionary organizations, which constituted more than one third of the total crowd, 
were left outside and subjected to violent police attacks. As a result, radical organizations 
in varoşs who could not fashion a flexible response to this move lost their support basis 
and became politically paralyzed ("Emekçilerden Birlik Çağrısı," 1997; "Göstericiler 
Polisle Çatıştı," 1998; Soner, 1997). 
 
 
Figure 4-13 Intensity of Mentioned Hunger Strikes 
 
The last nail in the coffin of varoş-based revolutionary organizations was the 
state’s attack on the prisons. From the mid-1980’s onwards, Kurdish political prisoners, 
who constituted 15% of all prisoners in Turkey, had transformed the prisons into an 
organizational base and a training and recruitment institute. Hence state repression and 
arrest of sympathizers of political organizations lost the desired deterrence and 
rehabilitation effect. On the contrary, collective life in prisons consolidated the political 
identity of the younger members. As a result, after the mid-1990s, ‘rehabilitating’ the 












and one prison massacre, when 30 prisoners died and 230 were injured, the state was able 
to put all prisoners in isolated cells and break further the political power of these 
organizations. 
Ironically, all these incidents of selective terror went hand-in-hand with 
democratic reforms like improving detention conditions, and extending the scope of 
freedom of speech. Turkey’s reforms were even applauded by the European Union, 
which used to justify the postponement of membership talks with Turkey with the latter’s 
notorious human rights record. In other words, the more successful the state was in 
repressing the movements, the more courage it showed in applying various democratic 
reforms80. 
 
Figure 4-14 Ratio of Mentioned Events (Turkish Metropolis / Kurdish Cities) 
Source: SMD 2 
Another important development on the Kurdish front was also responsible for the 
decline of protests in general in the Turkey of 1990s. In 1998, with US diplomatic 
support, Turkey was able to force the PKK’s leader Öcalan to leave Syria. Four months 
later, Öcalan was captured by US forces and handed over to the Turkish state. In his post-
80 For the EU’s attitude towards the prison problem in Turkey see ("Avrupalılar F Tipini Beğendi," 2001) 











                                                          
trial public messages, Öcalan asked the PKK to declare a ceasefire and withdraw its 
forces from Turkey. The PKK’s acquiescence caused a dramatic decrease in its activities. 
Since the PKK’s actions had constituted a significant proportion of recorded social 
actions, a fall in the Kurdish share in the aggregate (from 35% in 1993 to 13% in 2002-
SMD 2) also led to a significant decline in the overall intensity of social movements from 
a peak of 2.63σ above the median in July 1996 to a minimum in June 2002 with an 
intensity 0.38 σ below the median. All of these developments have changed the relative 
importance of the Turkish metropolis for social movements (see Figure 4-14). Another 
indicator is the ratio of social actions in the biggest five Turkish cities to those in Kurdish 
cities. Despite the well-known metropolitan bias of national newspapers, the ratio was 
close to 1 in 1993, while in 2003, at the height of the PKK’s retreat, the weight of 
Turkish cities increased six times (Figure 4-14). 
However, while referring to the PKK’s retreat, two important points concerning 
its beginning and end should not be forgotten. Ever since the Turkish state started to 
negotiate with the PKK, many scholarly and non-scholarly articles have been written, 
hailing the negotiation process as an historic event, a beginning with new possibilities, 
and a convergence, whereby both the government and the PKK moved away from their 
old positions and dogmas and created a basis for dialogue and peaceful solution. 
Certainly, even the acknowledgment of PKK as an organization to be negotiated with is a 
radical change in the state’s attitude towards the Kurdish population. Yet from the PKK’s 
perspective, it was hardly a new step for two reasons. First, the PKK had been founded as 
an organization aiming at the independence of Kurdistan by means of people’s war, and 
its first retreat was in 1993 for reasons related to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
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first Gulf War. At that time, at the peak of its intensity, the PKK had declared a ceasefire 
and offered to start negotiations with the state on terms comparable to the terms of today. 
The PKK then offered a unilateral ceasefire with several months’ extension in 1995 and 
then again in 1997. Parallel to the change in its party line and tactics, the PKK decreased 
the intensity of its activities with each ceasefire, and the level of social action reached its 
nadir in 2003. Second, the PKK’s retreat did not last forever. Indeed, starting from 2004, 
the trend again turned upwards. However, this newly rising movement was anything but a 
replica of the guerilla action backed by occasional urban uprisings of the previous period. 
While the movement had previously started in Kurdish rural regions and later spread to 
urban areas, the new movement emerged first and foremost in the cities of Kurdistan and 
later sparked the guerilla movement. This time, it was an urban mobilization for the 
democratic rights of Kurds backed by guerilla action (Figure 4-15 and 4-16). 
 
Figure 4-15 Monthly Average of Mentioned Non-Guerilla Actions in Kurdistan. 














Figure 4-16 Share of Mentioned Non-Guerilla Protest in Total Protest in Kurdistan. 
Source: SMD 1 
By 2002, social movements in Turkey were not only at their lowest level of 
intensity, but had also started to assume a new form. Concentrated more in the centers of 
big cities, symbolic actions and peaceful press declarations took the place of radical and 
violent actions in varoşs and guerilla warfare in Kurdistan. The masses were in retreat, 
and various organizations - from liberal to socialist - were trying to fill this void with 
their symbolic and fragmented demonstrations. 
 
Figure 4-17 Share of Press Declarations in Aggregate Movement. 





























































































































A New Surge? Gezi’s Differences and Context 
The second silent phase has not been as quiet as it was between 1938 and 1962. 
As Figures 4-3 and 4-4 demonstrate, with the exception of 2001 the average protest 
intensity has generally been above the median. Then again, with the exception of a couple 
of months in 2004, the monthly intensity could not pass the .5 σ cut-off point that was 
considered necessary for being the starting point of a new phase. 
Nevertheless, the same figure also hints at the coming of a new wave. It might be 
too soon to predict and the data might be considered insufficient to give an explanation or 
accurate picture of the years since 2004. Keeping all these caveats in mind, it is not 
possible to overlook the fact that the monthly mentions of protests since 2010 have been 
above the cut-off point.  
Certainly, the Gezi uprising in June 2013 makes the new upward trend even more 
dramatic. Like most uprisings Gezi had not been predicted by any observer of Turkish 
politics and “struck them like a thunderbolt from a clear sky”. At that time, sitting at the 
negotiating table with the Kurds made Erdoğan believe that he had finally managed to 
bring the Kurdish resistance under control if not to silence it, and bolstered his self-
confidence. It was probably this self-confidence that led him to open Taksim Square to 
the May Day demonstrations81. Again, the same self-confidence was probably 
responsible for his insults towards women, Alevis, and all segments of the opposition. In 
81 After the massacre on May Day in 1977, Taksim Square acquired a symbolic meaning for the left. From 
1978 onwards, the Square had been closed to socialists and workers for 32 years. As a result of this 
restriction, between 1987-91 and 2007-2009, conquering the Square and confronting the police comprised a 
significant portion of the recorded events in May. Partly out of a desire to market himself as a democrat a 
few months before the 2010 referendum, and partly out of the fear of increasing Kurdish involvement in the 
struggle to free the Taksim Square, Erdoğan opened the square to the demonstrators. 
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this sense, police violence against the youth at the park in Taksim was in line with 
Erdoğan’s preceding performance. 
The demonstrators at the park were mainly university students with a bourgeois 
background. They tried to resist Erdoğan’s plans to replace the park with a shopping mall 
with a repertoire reminiscent of the 1968 occupations in the European and North 
American movements. The expected result was another easy victory for Erdoğan. 
However, things turned out differently this time and on May 31st the resistance at the park 
transformed into an uprising. 
What distinguished Gezi from the social protests preceding it can be summarized 
in two points. The first difference is quantitative. The average intensity of protests during 
Gezi was 6 σ above the median, a record for the 1945-2014 period. It was also the most 
widespread protest in Turkish history. At no other point in Turkish history had so many 
demonstrations occurred on the same issue at the same time. 
The second difference is related to Gezi’s being an uprising. Most of the protests 
in the previous months were protests of militants under the discipline of several 
organizations. Gezi was a mass uprising involving more than three and a half million 
participants as per police reports, and only 22% of the detained people were affiliated 
with a political party or organization (Şardan, 2013). Moreover, in contrast to the popular 
portrayal of Gezi as a peaceful resistance, it was a violent and offensive movement. 
Participants of the uprising did not hesitate to attack the police and occupy the roads, 
buildings and parks. Before Gezi, the pattern of a typical confrontational protest with 
mass participation was: police warning, wavering and hesitating masses, limited 
aggression of several militant groups, police attack and escaping masses. This pattern was 
228 
 
reversed during Gezi which saw determined and aggressive masses, hesitating police, and 
political organizations watching the masses. 
This particular pattern of uprisings had been observed at two other times in 
Turkish history: the 15-16 June uprising in 1970, and the Gazi uprising in 1995. 
However, a third characteristic of Gezi distinguished it from these two uprisings as well. 
Gezi was an explicitly political uprising with a single agenda: forcing Erdoğan to resign. 
In this sense it was similar to the anti-Menderes, anti-DP student demonstrations on the 
eve of May 27. Ironically, this third characteristic of Gezi not only separates it from 
previous uprisings, but also underlines its similarities with the post- 2010 protests. An 
important determinant of Gezi was the competition within the power bloc and bourgeois 
politicization of the society as a result of hatred against Erdoğan, propagated by the 
media channels and universities still under the control of “old capital”. 
In spite of its social democratic credo, historically the RPP had been reluctant to 
mobilize the masses. Its recent hyperactivity was in contrast with this historical passivity 
and alarmed supporters of Erdoğan. However, the RPP’s interest in popular mobilization 
did not emerge out of the blue but developed together with the increasing politicization of 
the bourgeois society (Figure 4-18). In this sense, the resilience of the post-2010 
movements above the 0.5 σ cut-off line makes it plausible to consider 2010 as the 





Figure 4-18 Intensity of Movements with the RPP (SDPP) as a participant/organizer  
 
Conclusion: Comparison of the Two Waves 
This chapter conceptualized social movements in Turkey as cycles and traced the 
rise and fall of these movements in two cycles. The first cycle started in 1896 at the time 
of Cretan uprising and lasted until the suppression of the Ağrı Rebellion in 1930. The 
following silent phase continued for more than thirty years. However, especially during 
the last ten years of this phase, the politicization within the power bloc not only sowed 
the seeds of a new wave but also shaped its initial political line. The new wave started in 
1968 and phased out in 1998. At present, the lasting intensity of protest events since 
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TABLE 4-10 COMPARISON OF THE TWO WAVES 
Period First Wave Second Wave 
 1896-1930 1968-1999 
Starting Eruptions 
1896 Cretan Uprising 
1903 Ilinden Uprising 
 
1968 June Boycotts 
1970 Labor Uprising 




Ending Coup 1925 1997 
Ending Massacre 1937-38 Dersim 2000 Prision Massacre 
Violence Incomparably High 
High 
But relatively low 
Location Periphery Center and Periphery 
Composition Separatist Movements 
Labor, Student, Antifascist, 
Separatist 
Movements’ ability to 





   
Table 4-10 summarizes the similarities and differences between the two waves. 
First, none of the waves rose smoothly but started with several eruptions. In the first 
wave it was the Cretan uprising followed by the Ilinden uprising. In case of the second 
wave, it was first the student boycotts in June 1968 and later the 15-16 June uprising of 
workers in Istanbul. Second, both waves were interrupted several times by coups: 1913 
and 1920 for the first, and 1971 and 1980 for the second one. Third, the final assault on 
both waves also came with protective coups in 1925 and 1997 respectively. Finally, in the 
early periods of both phases, it is possible to observe a final and hopeless attempt to resist 
the coup regime, that ended with a massacre: the 1937-38 Dersim uprising and massacre 
in the first silent phase, the 2000 prison resistance and massacre in the second one. 
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As regards the differences between the two waves, violence is one of the key 
factors. It is not possible to ignore the number of casualties in the second phase, 
especially during the post-1980 period, but the violence applied by the movements and 
also against them is incomparably higher. Another difference is related to the location of 
movements, with the second wave being more urban centered. With the exception of the 
March 31 uprising in 1909, the story of the movements in the first phase can be narrated 
without referring to protests in Istanbul. For the second phase that is not possible. The 
third difference concerns the politics and social composition of movements. Although the 
previous wave was composed mainly of separatist movements, the second phase was a 
combination of labor, student, anti-fascist and later Kurdish movements. Fourth, the 
silent phase of the first phase lasted for a much longer time. Finally and related to 
previous difference, whereas all failed movements of the first phase had been annihilated 
by the state, especially the Kurdish movement managed to survive the second silent 
phase. It is especially this final difference that will be important in the fate and success of 
the movements in the coming phase. 
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Chapter 5  
Revolutionary and Reformist Movements’ Impact on the 
Regime 
To pit this single assertion, that “in the Absolute all 
is one.” against the organized whole of determinate 
and complete knowledge, or of knowledge which at 
least aims at and demands complete development – to 
give out its Absolute as the night in which, as we say, 
all cows are black – that is the very naïveté of 
emptiness of knowledge. 
(The Phenomenology of Spirit) 
 
But to live outside the law, you must be honest.  
(Absolutely Sweet Marie) 
The Three Dimensions of a Movement 
The second chapter depicted the trajectory of the Turkish political regime, which 
is the dependent variable of this study. The third and fourth chapters introduced the 
historical development of competition within the power bloc and social movements 
respectively as the independent variables. In this chapter, I establish the first link between 
the dependent variable- regime change- and one of the independent variables- social 
movements. 
As argued in the first chapter, the common denominator of the literature on 
Turkey is the absence of social movements as an explanatory factor, I contested this 
argument in the previous chapter by showing that Turkey has experienced two major 
waves of social unrest in the twentieth century. The aim of this chapter is to show that the 
success of attempts to change the regime’s position is dependent on the absence or 
presence of social movements. However, the label ‘social movement’ covers a variety of 
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movements which affect regimes in different directions at different levels of significance. 
To disentangle the heterogeneous category of ‘movements’, this study will draw upon 
Marx’s discussion of revolutions and revolutionary movements and develop three criteria 
to classify different types of social movements. Marx did not develop a sociological 
theory of revolution and revolutionary movements, but criticized the movements he 
witnessed and participated in according to three criteria: mass mobilization, violence, and 
independence. 
Independence 
For Marx, independence is the primary condition for a truly revolutionary 
movement. Without independence from the dominant ideology, any attempt to change the 
system would result in the status quo reproducing itself. This ideological independence 
can only be secured by organizational independence and a movement needs to be led by 
an independent party to be able to act in a revolutionary way. But organization in itself is 
not sufficient. In his critical analysis of the defeat of French workers in the 1848 
Revolution, Marx’s diagnosis was the lack of ideological independence. Except for the 
Blanquists, all self-proclaimed and formally independent workers’ parties were actually 
under the influence of bourgeois ideology. And it was this ideology which pushed the 
workers’ parties to bourgeois parties over the course of the struggle.82 
82 “Such a union would turn out solely to their advantage and altogether to the disadvantage of the 
proletariat. The proletariat would lose its whole independent, laboriously achieved position and once more 
be reduced to an appendage of official bourgeois democracy. This union must therefore, be most decisively 
rejected. Instead of once again stooping to serve as the applauding chorus of the bourgeois democrats, the 
workers, and above all the League, must exert themselves to establish an independent secret and public 
organization of the workers' party alongside the official democrats and make each community the central 
point and nucleus of workers' associations in which the attitude and interests of the proletariat will be 
discussed independently of bourgeois influences” (Marx, 1975a, pp. 281-282). 
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 Independence is therefore the first dimension of my analysis of social 
movements. Accordingly, a movement’s opposition to the status quo increases with its 
ideological independence. By the same token, a movement’s increasing dependence 
would increase its preference for the status quo (See Figure 5-1). However, a caveat is 
necessary: the intention to change the regime, by itself, neither implies a course of action 
attempting regime change, nor does it guarantee a power to change the regime. Indeed, 




Our conceptualization of violence is not very different from its usage in ordinary 
language, namely damage to life and property. Charles Tilly (2010) defines collective 
violence as  
… episodic social interaction that immediately inflicts physical damage on 
persons or objects ("damage" includes forcible seizure of persons or objects over 
restraint or resistance), involves at least two perpetrators of damage, and results at 
least in part from coordination among persons who perform the damaging acts (p. 
118).  







Independence and violence are the two necessary conditions for revolutionary 
movements for Marx. However, not every revolutionary movement is capable of 
accomplishing the envisioned social and political change. For a revolutionary attempt to 
be successful, a third condition is necessary: mass participation. For Marx, what makes 
the proletarian movement a truly revolutionary movement is its ever-growing mass base. 
As the proletariat becomes the immense majority in contrast to the decaying social 
classes, its increasing ability to unite and communicate increases its capacity to 




Without the participation and mobilization of the “immense majority”, all 
revolutionary movements are doomed to fail. Their offensive action – unless backed by 
84 “But with the development of industry the proletariat not only increases in number; it becomes 
concentrated in greater masses, its strength grows, and it feels that strength more… Now and then the 
workers are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit of their battles lies, not in the immediate result, 
but in the ever-expanding union of the workers. This union is helped on by the improved means of 
communication that are created by modern industry and that place the workers of different localities in 
contact with one another”, “Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the 
proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of 
Modern Industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product”, “All previous historical movements 
were movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-
conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority” 
(Marx, 1975l, pp. 492-495).  
Figure 5-3 Impact of Mass Participation 
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mass participation - can pressure the regime but its only outcome would be an 
authoritarian backlash (Figure 5-3). 
In fact, this emphasis on mass participation was the criterion that distinguished 
Marx from Blanqui, whom Marx respected a lot and considered a revolutionary leader, a 
phrase he never used for the leaders of other working class movements. Marx and Engels 
criticized Blanqui’s and his followers’ distrust of the masses and their attempts to 
establish a dictatorship of the enlightened minority, not because of their belief in 
democratic ideals but because of their belief in the capacity of the masses. Any type of 
revolutionary action in the absence of mass participation would not be different from 
suicide.85 Hence mass participation is not a criterion distinguishing revolutionary 
85 “Since Blanqui regards every revolution as a coup made by a small revolutionary minority, it 
automatically follows that its victory must inevitably be succeeded by the establishment of a dictatorship—
not, it should be well noted, of the entire revolutionary class, the proletariat, but of the small number of 
those who accomplished the coup and who themselves are, at first, organized under the dictatorship of one 
or several individuals”, “If one thing is certain it is that, after the exhausting war, after the hunger in Paris 
and, notably, after the awful blood-letting of the May days in 1871, the Paris proletariat needs a long rest to 
recuperate, and that every premature attempt at an insurrection can only end in a new, perhaps still more 
horrible defeat” (The Program of the Blanquist Fugitives from the Paris Commune Engels, 1975b, pp. 14-
15)  
Engels is even more explicit on this issue in his notoriously misunderstood introduction to the Class 
Struggles in France 1848-1850: “Does that mean that in the future street fighting will no longer play any 
role? Certainly not. It only means that the conditions since 1848 have become far more unfavorable for 
civilian fighters and far more favorable for the military. In future, street fighting can, therefore, be 
victorious only if this disadvantageous situation is compensated by other factors. Accordingly, it will occur 
more seldom at the beginning of a great revolution than at its later stages, and will have to be undertaken 
with greater forces. These, however, may then well prefer, as in the whole great French Revolution or on 
September 4 and October 31, 1870, in Paris, the open attack to passive barricade tactics. 
Does the reader now understand why the powers-that-be positively want to get us to go where the guns 
shoot and the sabres slash? Why they accuse us today of cowardice, because we do not take without more 
ado to the streets, where we are certain of defeat in advance? Why they so earnestly implore us to play for 
once the part of cannon fodder? 
The gentlemen pour out their petitions and their challenges for nothing, for absolutely nothing. We are not 
that stupid. They might just as well demand from their enemy in the next war that he should accept battle in 
the line formation of old Fritz, or in the columns of whole divisions a la Wagram and Waterloo and with 
the flint-lock in his hands at that. If conditions have changed in the case of war between nations, this is no 
less true in the case of the class struggle. The time of surprise attacks, of revolutions carried through by 
small conscious minorities at the head of masses lacking consciousness is past. Where it is a question of a 
complete transformation of the social organization, the masses themselves must also be in on it, must 
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movements from non-revolutionary movements, but one providing a distinction between 
two types of revolutionary offensive strategy. 
Accordingly, one can create a third dimension to the analysis of social 
movements: mass participation, which brings the capacity to change the system. 
However, it is important to note that not having the capacity to change the regime does 
not necessarily mean having no impact on the regime. As Marx’s discussion with Blanqui 
suggests, a revolutionary movement without capacity to change might still incite a 
repressive governmental reaction. 
After having determined the three dimensions, it is possible to define eight 
different types of movements depending on the fulfillment of each criterion: mass 
participation (M), violence (V), and independence (I). Below, I briefly discuss each type 
of movement and its expected impact on the regime. 
Eight Types of Movements and in-between Cases 
The Eight Types 
Uprisings and Civil Wars (MVI)  
When all three criteria are fulfilled, there emerges at least a glimpse of a 
revolutionary situation. The February Revolution in 1917 Russia and the November 
Revolution in 1919 Germany are the most obvious examples of MVI. However, to 
classify a protest or an episode as belonging to this category, one does not necessarily 
need such widespread and long lasting events. Several protests in the first and second 
wave of social movements in Turkey can be classified as MVI. 
themselves already have grasped what is at stake, what they are fighting for, body and soul” (Introduction 
to Karl Marx’s Class Struggles in France Engels, 1975a). 
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The most typical examples would be the General Albanian Uprising in 1912 and 
the Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925. Both of them have been discussed in the previous 
chapter. They satisfy the criterion of violence not only because of their armed character 
but also because their demands and activities were incompatible with the Ottoman-
Turkish political system at the time of the uprising. The Albanian rebels’ demands ranged 
from a high degree of autonomy to independence, whereas Sheikh Said openly defied 
Turkish sovereignty in Kurdistan. Compared to the Sheikh Said rebellion, the Albanian 
uprising was relatively incoherent and not coordinated by one center. However, even in 
the case of Sheikh Rebellion that was planned by the conspiratorial organization called 
Azadi, the majority of the rebel army was not directly linked with Azadi. 
As regards independence, it is true that both Albanians and Kurds had more 
trouble with one faction of the ruling bloc than the other –the former being anti-CUP, the 
latter being anti-Kemalist. However, none of them had any direct or indirect affiliation 
with the other faction(s) of the ruling bloc. In fact, during the last phase of the Albanian 
Uprising, a cabinet supported by the Liberty and Entente Bloc was in power and the 
cabinet did continue to fight for a while. Similarly, the PRP supported the RPP’s 
campaign against the Kurds.  
Warfare of the Vanguard (mVI)  
Under this category, we have persistent violent attacks of political groups who are 
determined to change the regime or to separate from the existing state. The difference 
from the first category is the absence of popular mobilization. The attack on Monacada 




In Turkey, the THKP-C’s actions, right after the 1971 coup, would be typical 
examples from the second phase of social movements. For instance on May 17, members 
of THKP-C stormed the house of Ephraim Elrom, Israel’s consul general in Istanbul, and 
took him hostage. They demanded the release of all arrested revolutionaries in exchange 
for Elrom, and killed him after the state refused to negotiate. 
Another typical example can be given from the first phase. On August 26 1896, 
25 fighters of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation raided the Ottoman Bank’s center 
in Istanbul. The purpose of the occupation was to draw the attention of European states to 
Abdülhamid’s massacres, as a result of which 300.000 Armenians were killed. 
Reformist Anti-systemic Movements (MvI)  
Here we observe mobilization of the masses by organizations that are independent 
of the power bloc, but do not challenge the state’s monopoly of violence or laws 
protecting private property. Most of the organized strikes and peaceful rallies fall under 
this category. The worldwide anti-war rallies in March 2003 can be considered a typical 
example of this category of movements. 
In Turkey, an example from the first phase would be the May Day demonstrations 
in 1909 in Thessaloniki and Skopje, when Muslim. Christian and Jewish workers 
celebrated the first May Day in the Empire with their march and rally. A similar example 
from the second phase would be the ‘clean society’ rallies protesting the mafia-state 
connections. On April 14, one-and-a -- half month after the protective 1997 warning by 
the National Security Council, socialist parties organized two rallies in Istanbul and 
Ankara respectively. The Ankara rally was the bigger one with 50.000 participants, and 
slogans like “Ankara, don’t hide the chetes”, and “Solidarity of the People will beat the 
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chetes” had a central place. The demonstrators urged the parliament to discuss the mafia 
scandal and impeach the deputies involved. The organizers of these rallies were the 
Freedom and Solidarity Party in Ankara and the Party of Labor in Istanbul- neither of 
which had any involvement with any institution of the state. 
Civil War within the Power Bloc (MVi) 
This category refers to a rare escalation of conflict within the power bloc, when a 
section of the bloc mobilizes masses to either directly attack some part of the state’s 
coercive apparatus, or to violate the legal structure of its administration. Political parties 
affiliated with the power bloc play an important role here. Sometimes, as in the recent 
Egyptian uprising, the military, and not necessarily a party, can support these movements. 
An example from Turkey would be the 1906 tax revolts in Anatolia on the eve of the 
Constitutional Revolution. The monarchist mobilization against the Ankara government 
between 1919 and 1921 would be another example. 
Although these movements involve conflict within the power bloc, their direct 
targets are not always members of the other faction of the power bloc. For instance, in the 
case of September 6-7 riots in 1954, discussed in the previous chapter, the primary 
purpose was to consolidate popular support for the DP’s policies. The victim of the mass 
mobilization, however, was the Greek Population in İstanbul. 
Counter Guerilla Activity (mVi) 
What distinguishes this category from the previous ones is the agent of violence. 
Here controlled and disciplined groups follow the violent directives emanating from 
segments of the power bloc instead of the masses. The object of violence is also different. 
Whereas MVi frequently involves violence against another segment of the power bloc, 
mVi is usually directed at independent organizations and the masses they mobilize. 
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Fascist violence under the Weimar Republic is the most graphic example of mVi 
(Schumann, 2009, pp. 145-186, 251-305)86. A similar form of violence was widespread 
in Turkey in the late 1970’s. Another version of this type of movement was revived in the 
1990s in the form of unidentified bombings and murders. 
As in the case of MVi, another less frequent mode of mVi is also possible. For 
example, assassination of prominent officers loyal to the Porte was one of the tactics 
employed by the CUP before coming to power. Between July 6 and 19 in 1908, CUP 
members killed 8 officers, including 3 Pashas and 2 Beys.  
Electoral Mobilization (Mvi)  
When parties affiliated with the power bloc organize rallies and marches without 
violating any of the rules of the regime, we observe instances of Mvi. Most of the events 
in this category are rallies on the eve of elections. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
the 1957 election campaign provides the best examples of Mvi. However, there are also 
other forms of Mvi, like the 1908 celebrations following the Revolution, unrelated to 
elections. If one remembers Abdülhamid’s claims that he decided on his own to convene 
the parliament, then the CUP’s motivation for these celebrations becomes clear as well –
to exploit the political climate and corner Abdülhamid, thereby demonstrating the real 
agent of constitutional change. 
Attitude Declaration (mvI)  
This type of movement gains wide currency when formally independent forces 
are weak and scattered, or when the price of direct action (violent repression) is high. It 
includes press declarations and/or brief marches, which do not go beyond a symbolic 
declaration of various groups’ position on social and political issues. However, some 
86 For the Communist response, see Rosenhaft (1983) 
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groups or movements in this category represent extreme forms of passive resistance: 
hunger strikes and death fasts, which in the Turkish case comprise the main body of this 
type of action. 
Extensions of lobbying activities (mvi) 
Like mvI, mvi also comprises of mainly symbolic and sometimes spectacular 
actions. The primary purpose is to articulate the demands of the movement by attracting 
attention. Generally under this category, we observe movements closely related to 
lobbying politics. Petitions and placing wreaths at monuments erected by the established 
parties of the regime are the most frequent instances.  
Apparently in-between Cases 
None of the dimensions of movements discussed above have a dichotomous 
character, but each category represents a different degree and combination of mass 
participation, violence and independence. Therefore drawing the border lines to transform 
the continuity to a duality requires more elaboration. In this section I discuss possible 
intermediary cases for each dimension and justify my classification. 
m or M? 
Assessing the mass character of a movement presents a problem especially in two 
cases. The first one is related to categorizing persistent guerilla activities. On the one 
hand, guerilla activity occurs under a strict military-like discipline, and by its very nature 
cannot be considered mass protest. On the other hand, a persistent guerilla war that 
survives and thrives for decades indicates not only a successful recruitment strategy but 
also mass politicization and participation. 
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To solve this puzzle it is necessary to discuss the issue more concretely and 
compare the chetes in the Balkans during the first phase of Turkish social movements 
with the PKK’s activities during the second phase. As a matter of fact, compared to the 
amateur chetes in the Balkans, PKK had been far more successful in sustaining guerilla 
warfare and building links with the local population. The distinction between chete 
members and recruits from the local population had never been clear cut. Actually, far 
from being professionals, chete members continued their daily life as farmers. Yet, this 
very amateurishness of the chete’s, in other words the absence of clear-cut bureaucratic 
borderlines between the party and the masses, give the chete movements a mass character 
whereas the armed attacks of modern PKK should be classified not under mass but under 
organizational actions.  
The same problem occurs when we compare various massacres initiated and 
backed by political parties. Here we can contrast the Armenian massacre in Adana in 
1909 with the one in 1915. In both cases the role of the ’Parties of Order’ is obvious, 
Liberty and Entente in the former and the CUP in the latter. Simonyan’s (2012) account 
of the Adana massacre demonstrates mass participation on the pretext of “self-defense of 
Muslims”. In contrast, studies focusing on the deportation in 1915 hint at a more state-
administered process without much mass mobilization. The number of Muslim casualties 
also strengthens this interpretation: in the first case the Muslims suffered more than 1000 
casualties, whereas during Anatolia-wide deportation, there were only a few instances- of 
clashes between the local population and the Armenians as in Musa Dağ, Zeitun, Shebin 
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Karahisar87 and Urfa. Hence the former falls under MVi whereas the latter is classified as 
mVi. 
v or V? 
Can one consider strikes, disrupting the capitalist accumulation process as violent 
or not? Are demonstrations that start peacefully, but assume later after several police 
provocation a violent character violent or peaceful? Given the capitalist sensitivity for 
labor productivity, and widespread coupling of the word strike with weapon, it is 
tempting to consider every strike as a confrontational activity. However, to be really a 
weapon, a strike should be decided by the workers alone, not by a third party negotiation 
committee. But, especially since the 1980 labor laws, organizing a strike in a factory has 
become a very institutionalized and controlled process. The state can regularly intervene 
and postpone the strike by citing national security concerns. In other words, a strike is 
only permitted if it is considered harmless (A. Çelik, 2008). More importantly, the 
disruption caused by the strike is an economic one, and its political consequences cannot 
be measured by the losses to the capitalists. The context and impact of a strike can be 
understood only by looking at political factors, and its most important indicator is the 
concrete relationship between strikers and the coercive apparatus of the status. 
To speak more concretely, in spite of its poetic appearance, the march of a 
hundred thousand people, mine workers and their families, the Zonguldak workers, to 
Ankara in 1991 (see chapter 4), did not have any disruptive political consequences. The 
gendarmerie stopped them in Mengen after 97 kilometers and without any confrontation 
with the state. The fact that this march had started one day after the one-day-long general 




                                                          
strike underlines the political dwarfism of these movements and the absence of any 
confrontational attempts. 
Second, as regards to the provocations to “peaceful demonstrations”, unless there 
is a public prosecution concerning misuse of police force afterwards, police warnings and 
interventions should be considered as an indicator of what is permitted by the regime or 
not. Hence regardless of the intentions of the demonstrators, a clash with the police, 
whether the demonstrators are on the active side of the violence or not, is considered 
sufficient for the event being categorized as violent. We can now interpret the events in 
June 15-16 (Chapter 4) thus: although the intentions of the marching workers were not 
violent at all, the interaction between the police and workers (not to forget Dev-Genç 
members marching together with the workers) transformed the whole event into a 
milestone in the rise of revolutionary movements in Turkey. 
Impacts on the Regime 
Figure 5-4 summarizes the basic features of all movement types. Since MVI 
fulfills all the criteria for a revolutionary movement, it definitely has an impact on 
political regimes according to the theoretical framework employed in this study. 
Similarly, since mvi does not fulfill any of these criteria, no further justification for its 
exclusion from the group of influential movements is necessary. The impact of the 





Let’s start with mVI. Given the lack of mass involvement, its capacity to change 
the regime is limited. However, an intensive mVI would mean a persistent effort to push 
the regime to its limits, since the combined presence of I and V can be considered as the 
necessary condition for a revolutionary movement. Hence the combined presence of I and 
V in both MVI and mVI means constant revolutionary pressure on the regime. The 
regime’s response to both movements is not limited to repressive measures. Agents for 
the reproduction of the regime additionally try to depoliticize the already politicized 
masses in the case of MVI or try to prevent politicization of masses in the case of mVI. 
Narrowing the channels of participation, in other words moving the regime towards the 
Figure 5-4  8 Types of Movements 
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EX pole, is necessary for de-politicization. Hence, both types of revolutionary 
movements would incite an exclusionary backlash. 
Since MVI not only applies pressure on the system, but also creates situations 
where complete system change is a likely outcome, the stakes for the power bloc are 
higher. Hence in the case of MVI, one would expect longer and bloodier non-
parliamentary transitions because of stronger exclusionary pressures. In contrast, the state 
can live with a resilient guerilla insurgency (mVI) and fight against it under an 
exclusionary democracy.  
In contrast to both MVI and mVI, mvI does not have a significant impact on the 
regime. Although organizations leading the movements of this type have the intention to 
change the regime (I), they do not have the necessary capacity to accomplish the change 
(m). Similarly they cannot sustain a significant level of action straining the limits of the 
regime (v). In other words, the presence of (I) is not sufficient for political significance 
unless it is combined with a capacity (M) or permanent attempts (V) to change the 
regime. 
MVi is another type of politically significant movement. In this case, the leaders 
of the movement are directly linked to the power bloc (i). As a result of this connection, 
none of them has an agenda of change. What they aspire for is either a change of 
government or preservation of the status quo. Since a violent mobilization of the masses 
(MV) indicates an action repertoire incompatible with the existing regime and with a 
capacity to change it, this rare type of movement has a visibly destabilizing impact on the 
regime. Not surprisingly, coups with an intention to change the regime along the EL-NEL 
axis either follow such movements as in the case of April 28-29 demonstrations and May 
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27 coup in 1960; or are followed by them as in the case of 1908 Revolution and March 31 
Uprising. In other words, although unintended by parties leading the MVi, these 
movements unleash massive social and political energy which makes regime change an 
actual possibility. Since members of the power bloc are disturbed by this process, they 
generally try to end this process via military coups. 
Since those who support and fight against MVi belong to the power bloc, despite 
bloody episodes, this movement does not trigger an exclusionary response, and certainly 
not a non-parliamentary one. First of all, the violent mobilization shakes the pillars of the 
regime and adopting an exclusionary practice would mean further alienating the 
competing elements in the power bloc, which would lead to higher levels of mobilization 
and increase the risk of a shift from MVi to MVI. Second, excluding an established 
member of the power bloc from political life is a more difficult task than closing the 
doors of parliamentary politics to the masses. Therefore MVi does not involve long-term, 
non-parliamentary transitions. 
In contrast to MVi, mVi has no significant impact on regime change. When 
discussing mVI. I argued that despite the absence of mass participation, resilient attempts 
to confront the limits of the regime apply revolutionary pressure on the regime. In the 
case of mVi, however, the movements are led by defenders of the status quo. Moreover, 
in most cases, violent action is directed against other movements with the intention of 
paralyzing or at least hindering them. The revolutionary energy arising out of the 
combination of M and V is also lacking. Hence, the violence employed by this type of 
movement does not push the limits of the regime but lessens the pressure for change. 
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MvI is the last type of movement that has an impact on regime changes and 
coups. The coupling of the demand for systemic change with the capacity for the same 
make MvI particularly significant, although regime change is not a real possibility given 
the absence of the destructive combination of mass mobilization with violence. What one 
observes instead is pressure for change, and although the actors have a discourse of 
change they do not really challenge the regime. So the demand for change cannot go 
beyond pressure for the extension of democratic rights without changing the regime. 
Additionally, the absence of the attempts at regime change despite the mobilized capacity 
enables competing members of the power bloc to make use of these movements in 
toppling governments without destabilizing the regime. 
Like MvI, Mvi also applies pressure within the limits of the regime. However, as 
the combination of v and i denote, the mobilization taking place under this type reflects 
the preservation of the status quo or at best the demand for a new government. Mvi 
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Figure 5-5 Revolutionary and Reformist Movements and their Impact on Regimes 
 
 
In conclusion, it is possible to categorize four different types of movements with 
four different impacts on regimes (See Figure 5-5). Because of the VI combination (the 
desire and attempt to change the regime), both MVI and mVI belong to the domain of 
revolutionary movements and both movements evoke an exclusionary reaction from the 
regime. However, since MVI makes revolution a much more likely outcome, in case of 
its failure, the regime stays in the non-parliamentary zone for a longer time period. In 
contrast, reformist movements do not cause an exclusionary backlash. However, due to 
the explosive potential of MV, regime change becomes a likely outcome in the case of 
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MVi. In contrast, the reformist MvI results in democratic reforms within the same regime 
or a coup that changes the government but not the regime. 
TABLE 5-1 REGIME CHANGE ATTEMPTS AND MOVEMENTS 
Direction Successful Failed 
↑ EX High MVI or 
high mVI 
Low MVI and 
 low mVI 
↓ INC Low MVI and  
low mVI 
High MVI or 
 high mVI 
→ NEL 





Coup without regime 
change  
High MvI Low MvI 
   
Hypotheses 
Table 5-1 summarizes the expected relationship between social movements and 
successful and failed regime change attempts. Note that whereas revolutionary 
movements directly determine the failure and success of the regime change attempts 
along the INC-EX axis, their impact on changes along the EL-NEL axis is less clear. The 
absence of intense revolutionary movements is a necessary condition for successful 
regime change along the EL-NEL axis, and for toppling the government without a regime 
change. However, for change along the horizontal axis, another necessary condition 
should be fulfilled: the MVi should be brought under control after a coup attempt. So, the 
presence of intense level of post-coup MVi decreases the chances of success of horizontal 





These expected outcomes can be formulated as hypotheses: 
1. In the presence of intense revolutionary movements, attempts to move the regime 
to the EX pole would be successful. 
2. In the presence of intense revolutionary movements attempts to move the regime 
to the INC pole would fail. 
3. In the absence of intense revolutionary movements, attempts to move the regime 
to the INC pole would be successful. 
4. In the absence of intense revolutionary movements, attempts to move the regime 
to the EX pole would fail. 
5. In the presence of intense revolutionary movements, attempts to move the regime 
along the EL-NEL axis would fail. 
6. If the attempt to change the regime along the EL-NEL axis cannot decrease the 
intensity of MVi, then the attempt would fail. 
7. In the absence of intense MiV, any memorandum to change the government 
would fail. 
8. The duration of non-parliamentary transitions incited by movements can be 
ranked as follows: MVI, mVI and MVi. 
Table 5-2 locates all failed and successful regime change attempts between 1908 
and 2013 in Turkey. Each attempt is a test case for one or more hypotheses listed above. 
Appendix C summarizes the intensity of four types of movements in terms of standard 
deviations from the median. This table provides the necessary data for testing the 
hypotheses. The fifth and sixth columns give the intensity of all revolutionary movements 
and of all movements (aggregate intensity) respectively. The cut-off point for classifying 
a movement as intense is 1 standard deviation above the median. Median is a better 
measure than the mean because explosive years bring the mean to such a high level that 
70 % of years for the first phase remain below the mean and we need the intensity of a 
year in comparison to the year in the middle. Similarly the 1 σ cut off point enables us to 
identify 20 % of years for the first phase and 15.7% of the years in the second phase, 
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which I consider to be a good indicator. It is important however, to distinguish this cut-
off point from the .5 σ in the previous chapter. In the previous chapter we wanted to mark 
the beginning of a wave whereas here we want to determine an intense period that 
requires a higher cut- off point.  
TABLE 5-2 REGIME CHANGE ATTEMPTS BETWEEN 1908 AND 2014 
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Successful Exclusionary Attempts     
1913 coup Revolutionary 1.04 1.04 1.4 
 
All 1.08 0.86 1.25 
1921 coup Revolutionary 0.02 0.44 2.88 
 
All 0.78 1.45 1.58 
1925 coup Revolutionary -0.12 -0.07 3.98 
 
All 0.01 -0.09 2.22 
1980 coup Revolutionary 2.94 2.61 4.7 
 
All 3.46 1.90 2.87 
Failed Inclusionary Attempts     
1930 Revolutionary -0.12 0.21 3.71 
 
All -0.01 0.04 2.67 
1995 Revolutionary 1.6 1.32 1.35 
 
All 1.23 1.05 1.22 
Movements and Regime Change Attempts in Turkey 
Table 5-3 compares the general intensity of all mentioned events with the 
intensity of revolutionary movements in the three years preceding all regime change 
attempts. In all of the successful attempts, the intensity of revolutionary movements is 
above the 1 σ cut-off point, which corroborates H1. In three of the four cases, the 
aggregate intensity is also above the cut-off point, but the revolutionary intensity is 
always higher than the aggregate intensity. In the 192188 and 1925 coups, the 
revolutionary intensity is more than 60% higher than the aggregate intensity, meaning the 
exclusionary pressures are higher than the aggregate intensity reveals. The same table 
88 Actually pinning down this coup is not an easy task. As discussed in Chapter 2, starting with the coup in 
1919, transitions during this period involved a series of coups and the process was completed with the 1921 
Constitution. However, the promulgation of the constitution was simultaneously the turning point to the 
new exclusionary regime, as Kemal’s offensive against the opposition started right afterwards. Hence 
considering 1921 as the date of the coup would be more appropriate for the purposes of this chapter. 
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shows that the years preceding inclusionary attempts have an intense level of 
revolutionary activity and support H2. 
TABLE 5-4 LOW LEVEL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS AND VERTICAL CHANGE 
ATTEMPTS 
Year Type 2 years before 1 year before 
Coup 
 Year 
Successful Inclusionary Attempts 
   1908 Revolutionary 0.35 0.48 0.3 
 
All 0.45 0.35 0.95 
1918 Revolutionary 0.76 0.44 0.94 
 
All 0.31 0.14 0.41 
1945 Revolutionary -0.12 -0.12 -0.07 
 
All -0.16 -0.16 -0.09 
1961 Revolutionary -0.55 -0.51 -0.47 
 
All -0.61 -0.42 -0.52 
1983 Revolutionary -0.07 -0.53 -0.56 
 
All -0.50 -0.70 -0.70 
Failed Exclusionary Attempts    
1909 Revolutionary 0.48 0.3 0.39 
 
All 0.68 5.07 4.73 
1962 Revolutionary -0.5 -0.45 -0.49 
 
All -0.42 -0.52 -0.46 
1963 Revolutionary -0.45 -0.49 -0.51 
 
All -0.52 -0.46 -0.57 
1971 (9 March) Revolutionary 0.07 0.28 0.25 
 
All -0.01 0.23 0.02 
 
Table 5-4 provides the intensity data for three years preceding successful 
inclusionary moves and failed inclusionary attempts. In all cases, the intensity is below 
the cut-off, supporting H3 and H4. In half of the cases (1945, 1961, 1962-3 and 1983) the 
intensity is even below the median. For the remaining four, 1908, 1909 and 1971 are 
lower than or equal to 0.4 σ. Only one case, 1918, is barely under the cutoff. Actually in 
257 
 
this case, the intensity comes from the Pontic movement starting after the inclusive step 
in early October, corresponding to the dissolution Congress of the CUP and to the 
Ottoman armistice negotiations with the Allies (Table 5-5). 
TABLE 5-5 REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN 1918 
Months 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Recorded Instances of 
Revolutionary Movements 2        3 1 15  
 
Actually, 1909 and the other two cases above the median corroborate H1 and H2 
in a different way. The intensity of revolutionary movements in 1918 is not high enough 
to invite an exclusionary coup, but sufficiently high to make the emerging regime fragile. 
That is why one observes several coup attempts (Chapter 2) between 1918 and 1920. In 
the same vein, the failed attempts in 1909 and 1971 could not take the regimes to the EX 
pole. However, in both cases the revolutionary intensity was high enough to invite 
additional exclusionary measures without changing the regime. After 1909, the CUP 
ruled the country under martial law. Similarly, as mentioned in the Chapter 2, from the 
1971 memorandum to the 1980 coup, most Turkish cities including Istanbul were 
governed under martial law for more than 40% of the period. Moreover, following the 
failed coup attempt in the same month, the 1971 Memorandum brought constitutional 
amendments narrowing the political sphere.  
 
 
TABLE 5-6 MVi AND HORIZONTAL REGIME CHANGE 
Successful EL-NEL Change    
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Year Type 1 year before During coup 1 year later 2 years later 
1908 MVi 1.04 1.24 7.70 0 
 
Rev 0.48 0.30 0.39 1.04 
1960 MVi -0.04 0.07 0.22 -0.09 
 
Rev -0.53 -0.49 -0.45 -0.48 
Failed EL-NEL Change Attempts    
Year Type 1 year before During coup 1 year later 2 years later 
1909 MVi 1.24 7.70 0 0 
 
Rev 0.30 0.39 1.04 1.04 
1919 MVi 0 1.83 2.61 0 
 
Rev 0.94 0.023 0.44 2.88 
1920 MVi 1.83 2.61 0 0 
 
Rev 0.02 0.44 2.88 -0.12 
1971 MVi 0.56 0.11 -0.02 0.14 
 
Rev 0.27 0.72 -0.45 -0.50 
 
The relationship between revolutionary movements and attempts to change the 
regime along the horizontal axis can only be tested partially. In all cases (Table 5-6), the 
intensity of revolutionary movements is low, but there is no example of a failed coup 
together with a high level of revolutionary activity. As an explanation, revolutionary 
movements should be at low levels just to attempt a change along the horizontal axis. 
Indeed, two of the failed attempts (in 1909 and 1971) occurred during a somewhat high 
level of revolutionary activity. Arguably, even a modest level of revolutionary activity is 
frightening enough to deter members of the power bloc from attempting a regime change. 
What explains the difference between successful and failed coup attempts is the 
presence or absence of post-coup MVi intensity. In 1908, the leading force behind the 
MVi (CUP) was able to end the violent mobilization wave immediately, which created 
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conditions for the survival of the new regime. Similarly, the almost complete absence of 
MVi in 1960 enabled the coup leaders to effect a smooth regime change. 
TABLE 5-7 MONTHLY DISTRIBUTION OF MVi DURING HORIZONTAL ATTEMPTS 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1908 2  2   4 3 2  1   
1909    102         
1919    2     3 3 3 3 
1920    8 10 10  2 10 6  1 
1960    2         
1961          5   
1971             
 
In contrast to 1908, the regime change attempts in 1909, 1919 and 1920 were 
followed by a dramatic increase in violent mass mobilization. In the case of 1909, the 
attempt started with the eruption of an insurrection in Istanbul. And mass mobilization 
not only persisted after the change of government, but spread to other cities and assumed 
the form of massacres. The pogrom triggered by the monarchist regime change attempt 
explains the record level of MVi intensity in April 1909, like the approximately 30.000 
Armenians killed in Adana in one week (Table 5-7). The dynamics triggered by the 
monarchist coup plotters prepared the conditions for their own failure. In a destabilized 
political regime shaken by mass violence, it was relatively easy for the fallen CUP to 
consolidate support over the army and strike back.  
In case of the series of coups between November 1918 and April 1920, the first 
instance of violent mass mobilization emerged in May 1919, seven months after the first 
coup. The mobilization acquired a new intensity with Kemal’s counter-coup in 
260 
 
September 1919 - higher than the peak of 1909 - and lasted until late 1920 (Table 5-7). 
The destabilization of the regime by monarchist insurrections increased Kemal’s 
legitimacy and hence his control over the military, which secured his success in 
preserving the status quo. 
At first glance, the failure of the 1971 coup seems to falsify H6. There is no 
intense revolutionary movement and no instance of MVi at all, In this sense, the coup 
attempt is not different from the successful one in 1960. So what explains the failure? 
Actually, the March 9 coup attempt would have been successful had it not been coupled 
with an intention to move the regime to the EX pole. An exclusionary coup in an 
environment of low-level revolutionary movements had little chances of success. Hence 
what determined the outcome of March 9 coup project was not the intensity of MVi but 
the low level of revolutionary activities (MVI and MVi), that was only sufficient to 







and TÜSİAD tried to organize mass rallies against the government (however half-
heartedly) with the intention of repeating the performance, and they were quite 
successful: three consecutive rallies in Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir with at least 1 million 
participants each, and several mini-rallies in more than ten cities. However, these 
attempts were not sufficient to increase the general intensity of the movement and faded 







token, MVI’s are followed by longer non-parliamentary regimes compared to mVI. The 
only exception is the coup in 1921. Despite the existence of MVI there is no 
parliamentary interruption. The reason for this “anomaly” is MVi, which lasted from 
mid-1919 to late 1920. With a lurking civil war specter, Kemal would not dare attempt a 
non-parliamentary adventure. 
The Big Picture 
The evidence provided in this chapter contradicts the basic assumptions of studies 
of Turkish politics. First, contrary to general belief, social movements do have a 
determining impact on regime changes in Turkey. Second, the periodic recurrence of 
these movements reveals that their presence or absence cannot be explained with 
reference to the level of development of the civil society in Turkey. On the contrary, after 
1908, the development of Ottoman civil society was high enough to give rise to 
escalating social conflicts and movements. 
The discussion in this chapter provides the conceptual tools necessary to 
disentangle the aggregate social ‘movement’ into its constitutive dimensions: 
independence, violence and mobilization. These criteria enabled us to define two types of 
movements – revolutionary and reformist - with two different subtypes each and with 
four different impacts on the regimes. With this categorization and analysis of impact of 
the different movement types on regimes, we saw how the distinction between reformist 





Figure 5-8 Pendulum of the Turkish Regime and Social Movements 
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The trajectory of the regime illustrated in Chapter 2 (Figure 2-11) resembles the 
movement of a pendulum of exclusion and inclusion. (See Figure 5-8) The poles of the 
pendulum at t0 (t4) and t2 are respectively the most exclusionary and inclusionary 
locations of the regime. Whereas t1 and t3 are the points of regime change, t0 corresponds 
to the beginning of the politicization process which would continue until t2. From t2 to t4, 
we observe a movement in the opposite direction. 
Politicization does not immediately strengthen the revolutionary movements. On 
the contrary, at first it remains within the domain of the power bloc. At t1, when the 
regime enters the inclusive zone as the result of a coup, reformist movements are at the 
peak of their strength. However between t1 and t3, increasing politicization starts to give 
impetus to revolutionary movements. From t4 onwards, these movements start to threaten 
the regime, and its major actors - including its ideological centers - change their discourse 
from democratization to security and attempt to depoliticize and demobilize the society. 
However, before moving the regime back to the exclusionary zone. repression 
only contributes to further politicization and gives fuel to the revolutionary fire. 
Therefore on the eve of t3, when the regime re-enters the exclusive zone, revolutionary 
movements are at their maximum strength and the influence of the reformist movements 
is minimal. 
The phase between t3 and t4 is a period of battles between revolutionary 
movements and the state. In this battle, the state is on its own coercive and exclusionary 
terrain, and has therefore the upper hand and pacifies the revolutionary movements at 






Figure 5-9 illustrates the intensity of revolutionary movements in terms of 
standard deviation from the median. Finally, Table 5-10 compares relative revolutionary 
intensities of different periods. With the help of this figure and tables we can fill the 
abstract time spots t0, t1, t2, and so on. The starting point of our story is the 1908 
Constitutional Revolution, a coup with which the regime entered the inclusive zone t1 in 
our discussion above. The inclusionary phase, the interval between t1 and t2, was pretty 
short. That was partly because of rapid escalation of the revolutionary movements that 
had not been completely wiped out during the Hamidian era which had relied on a 
combination of reform and repression. As a result, the inclusionary period of Ottoman 
democracy provided a climate conducive to the growth of revolutionary movements. The 
de-politicization process started with the 1913 coup. However what we observe between 
t1 and t3 is the growth of revolutionary movements. Only after the 1921 transformative 
coup t3, with which the regime moved to the exclusionary zone, did the revolutionary 
movements start to lose ground and a period of revolutionary insurgencies with heavy 
losses continued until t4-the Dersim insurgency and massacre in 1938. 
The time interval up to 1960 (t5) can be considered a period of politicization 
within the power bloc, which gave life to reformist movements. As it was during the 
post-1908 period, this was the time when reformist currents had maximum influence over 
the social movements. There are however two important differences between reformist 
dominance in the two phases. During the first phase, revolutionary movements had not 
been completely liquidated, whereas after Dersim in 1938, it was not possible to talk of 
revolutionary movements. Second, “the reformism” of the reformist movements was also 
different. Whereas it was more related to the improvement of the conditions of various 
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ethnic and religious groups in the first phase, reformism in the second phase did not 
involve any demands on such “sensitive issues.” Instead the reformists’ demands were 
centered on issues of secularism, and social and economic development.  
 Between 1960 and 1980 (t7), revolutionary movements intensified once again. 
The closure of the regime and the beginning of de-politicization from 1971 (t6) onwards 
did not prevent the rise of revolutionary movements, but intensified the political crisis 
which eventually led to the 1980 coup (t7). after which the exclusionary regime could 
attack the old movement more aggressively. The fight against revolutionary movements 
with the security discourse and all-encompassing attempts continued until 1999, which 
we can consider the peak of the exclusionary period (t8). And from that point onwards, 
the agenda of Turkish regime gradually changed from security to democracy over the 
years. 
In early 2014, the pendulum of the Turkish regime oscillates back to the regime 
change point (t9) that has not been entered yet. So far, none of the regime changes 
occurred without a coup. Will the forthcoming change be an exception to the 
generalization derived from the previous four major regime changes in 1908, 1921, 1960 
and 1980? To discuss such a possibility, which I do in the conclusion of this study, one 
needs to look at the interaction of the competition in the power bloc with revolutionary 
movements. This is the topic of the next chapter. 
The analysis in this chapter can nonetheless highlight important differences 
between the two periods of intense revolutionary movements (Rev1 1912-1938 and Rev2 
1974-1997) that shed light on some parts of the question above. First, although the 
relationship between the transformative coups and movements is the same in both phases, 
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the time spans are different. Whereas the lifespan of Rev1’ stretched beyond the 
restorative coups in 1913 and 1925. Rev2 started after the restorative coup in 1971 and 
lost its significance right after the 1997 coup. This is not simply a chronological 
difference, but as the analysis in this chapter showed, related to the types of the coup. The 
transformative coups in the first period were responses to ascendant revolutionary 
movements, whereas the restorative coups of the second period were results of 
competition within the power bloc. In other words, the closure of the regime started 
before Rev2 and after the transformative coup in 1980, the regime did not need any 
special measures to suppress the movement. 
Asking about the reasons for this difference brings us to another difference. Rev1 
was predominantly an MVI type movement, whereas Rev2 fell under the category of 
mVI. Hence compared to Rev2, Rev1 posed a stronger threat to the regime. Not 
surprisingly. after 1908. all coups within the power bloc were failures in the first period, 
and successful in the second one.89 
The difference between MVI and mVI brings us to the third divergence: the 
regime’s reaction to Rev1 and Rev2. Compared to the first exclusionary period, the 
second exclusionary period (from t7 up to now) was a time of parliamentary rule with the 
exception of three years, and the violence was not concentrated but diffused over the 
years and regions. 
Fourth, while all movements were wiped out during Rev1, the state could not 
completely suppress Rev2. Part of the explanation is the state’s preference to fight against 
mVI within the limits of an exclusionary democracy, as we saw in the previous section. 
89 In 1971 there were two coup attempts: March 9 was a failure whereas March 12 was a success. However 
as we saw, the reasons for the failure of the March 9 coup were its exclusionary intentions.  
271 
 
                                                          
The other equally important part of the explanation, however, is the PKK’s ability to fight 
and retreat effectively, plus its post-1997 timing in switching from guerilla warfare to 
urban-based civil protests without dismantling the guerrilla army.  
As a result, whereas the pendulum of democracy approached the regime’s turning 
point in 1960 on a clean terrain without a single oppositional force, today it approaches 
the same point without having wiped out an important revolutionary force which has 
dramatically extended its mass base since 1997. Actually, the situation in the Balkans 
before the 1908 revolution was analogous. The Ottomans were able to suppress the 
rebellions in the repressive post-1878 period, but the revolutionary organizations were 
not completely eradicated and were even able to organize some serious uprising as in the 
case of Ilinden in 1903, or the “successful” Revolt in Crete in 1896-790. (See Figure 5-9) 
In today’s Turkey, although all post-1974 revolutionary organizations except the PKK are 
de facto liquidated, the PKK’s potential in terms of fighting capacity, organizational 
sophistication, and mass base is far superior to all of the Balkan chetes taken together. 
Hence as democratization and inclusion dominate the Turkish agenda again after sixty 
years, Turkey is on the eve of another 1908, and not another 1960. The 1908 transition to 
democracy rapidly translated into a surge of revolutionary movements and was therefore 
short-lived (4 years). Given today’s higher revolutionary intensity and capacity compared 
to the pre-1908 period, the current phase will probably be shorter. Or perhaps this time 
the leading force of regime change will not be parties affiliated with the power bloc but 
an independent revolutionary organization. The answer to this question cannot be found 
in scientific analysis but in the political praxis. 
90 The peak in 1895 is probably an exaggerated one. The Turkish state extensively supports studies 
demonstrating the tiniest amount of Armenian resistance. The same can be said for the peak in 1915, the 
result of the records concerning Armenian resistance around the city Van. 
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Chapter 6  
Interaction of the two Struggles 
The February revolution was the beautiful revolution, 
the revolution of universal sympathy, because the 
contradictions which erupted in it against the 
monarchy were still undeveloped and peacefully 
dormant, because the social struggle which formed 
their background had only achieved an ephemeral 
existence, an existence in phrases, in words. The June 
revolution is the ugly revolution, the nasty revolution, 
because the phrases have given place to the real 
thing, because the republic has bared the head of the 
monster by knocking off the crown which shielded 
and concealed it. 
  
"Order! was Guizot's war-cry, Order! shouted 
Sebastiani, the Guizotist, when Warsaw became 
Russian. Order! shouts Cavaignac, the brutal echo of 
the French National Assembly and of the republican 
bourgeoisie.  
"Order! thundered his grape-shot as it tore into the 
body of the proletariat.  
"None of the numerous revolutions of the French 
bourgeoisie since 1789 assailed the existing order, 
for they retained the class rule, the slavery of the 
workers, the bourgeois system, even though the 
political form of this rule and this slavery changed 
frequently. The June uprising did assail this system. 
Woe to the June uprising!  
(Class Struggles in France) 
 
Introduction 
So far we have talked about the impact of social movements on regime change. 
However, as stated in the first chapter, this impact is indirect. In other words, in the last 
100 years, Turkish social movements have not been the agents of regime change. The 
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agents of regime change under a democracy have been either various segments of the 
bureaucracy or ‘Parties of Order’. 
 According to the theoretical framework of this study, revolutionary movements 
decrease competition within the power bloc, or at least dramatically weaken one of the 
competing sides, and open up space for an authoritarian agent. This agent could be a 
leader from the bureaucratic ranks or a bureaucratic institution of the regime in general. 
Hence the greater the revolutionary intensity of social action, the greater the bureaucratic 
pressure for exclusionary and repressive measures such as martial law, party bans, and 
restriction of individual liberties. Parties of Order either surrender to the proposals of the 
authoritarian agent, or become victims of the exclusionary-repressive measures. 
 When revolutionary intensity is low, the bureaucracy slowly retreats from its 
insistence on exclusionary measures. If the regime is already in a democratic quadrant, 
then those who attempt to impose exclusionary measures are blocked by the parties. 
During times of high competition within the power bloc, factions within the bloc 
need to mobilize the masses to gain the upper hand in the struggle. Hence high 
competition corresponds to an increase in party efforts aimed at mass mobilization, 
However. once a movement acquires a revolutionary character, the party’s support 
declines rapidly given the revolutionary fears of the bourgeoisie. 
Military coups are also a possibility during times of high competition. However, 
in such cases, the coups are not top-down planned actions but projects of a politicized 
fraction in the army in close collaboration with political parties. Hence coup plotters are 
subordinate to party politics, whereas in the case of high revolutionary activity, party 





between the actors of the regime are reduced to a secondary status and all actors within 
the power bloc unite against the movements. And parties having an existence 
independent of the bureaucracy lose ground. The bureaucracy (or the strong leader) 
marches step-by-step to an exclusionary repressive regime. The key factor dominating 
political life is security. 
In Zone 3, parties play the most prominent role possible for them. The absence of 
revolutionary movements gives them confidence in asserting democratic demands. They 
mobilize the masses for a regime change by utilizing democratic and religious values, 
depending on the direction they want to move the regime. The dominating factor and 
political keyword is democracy, 
 In Zone 4, both factors are present. Although the rise of revolutionary 
movements dilutes inter-capitalist competition, other dynamics related to the logic of 
inter-capitalist and inter-state competition stimulate the internal struggles. In this zone 
both the bureaucracy and the parties are active. Whereas the bureaucracy presses for 
exclusionary measures, different factions of the power bloc try to resolve the 
contradictions by mobilizing the masses. However, due to high intensity of revolutionary 
action, parties are much weaker and less assertive about democratic demands, whereas 
the bureaucracy is more directly involved in politics due to high competition. 
Zone 1: Inclusionary Moves via External Pressure  
The examples for this zone are the periods 1943-1950 and 1980-1983. In both 
cases, revolutionary action was almost completely absent and there was no obvious 
competition within the power bloc. However, no competition does not mean no 
aggravation for the oppressed. In the early 1980’s, both workers and Kurds suffered from 
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economic, social and political consequences of the regime (Cürükkaya, 2014; Geniş, 
1994; Nebiler, 1990). Similarly, in the 1940’s the regime lost its legitimacy not only in 
the eyes of the popular classes, but also in the eyes of the land-owning classes and the 
urban bourgeoisie (Karaömerlioglu, 2006, pp. 96-97), 
The 1945 transition primarily occurred as a result of the initiative of a foresighted 
leader, İsmet İnönü (VanderLippe, 2012). The formation of an opposition party was also 
suggested by İnönü (Albayrak, 2004, pp. 126-133). The lack of actual opposition 
mounted by the ‘opposition’ party was so blatant that several observers suspected and 
even accused the opposition of having colluded with the ruling party (F. Çakmak, pp. 3-
4,13-14). Similarly, inter-party and intra-party struggles did not precede but followed the 
decision to move to a relatively inclusive zone. The tempo of these struggles also 
depended on the tempo of the transition, 
Like in 1945. the inclusive move in 1982 was the initiative of the junta leaders. In 
fact, their intention was not to establish a non-parliamentary order, but to redesign the 
existing regime in an exclusionary fashion. Compared to 1945, their control over the 
transition was even stricter (Tachau & Heper, 1983, pp. 28-32). 
An important difference between these two transitions was their duration. In the 
former case, the transition to parliamentary democracy took twenty years, whereas the 
latter transition occurred in three years. In 1925, the regime did not have a prepared road 
map for democratization. Bureaucratic rule appeared as if it would never end. In contrast, 
right after the coup in 1980, the junta announced a timetable for democratization91.  
91 For the international constraints faced by the generals, see (Dagi, 1996). 
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Certainly the intensity of social struggles in 1925 and their mass character as 
discussed in Chapter 4 was a crucial reason for the different durations. But there were 
factors related to the embeddedness of the political agents in the capitalist system as well. 
The first factor was the closeness of the relationship between the Turkish army and the 
US in 1980 compared to the RPP’s relationship with the UK or the US in the 1920s. After 
WWI, partly because of the disintegration of the inter-state system, and partly out of fear 
of a Soviet confrontation, the Turkish state did not join international institutions and 
instead tried to come together with neighboring states through pacts. Turkey was even 
hesitant about the membership in the League of Nations and joined it as late as 1932 
(Ulusan, 2008, pp. 245-247). In contrast, Turkey in the 1980’s was a member of almost 
all international organizations, the only NATO member sharing a border with the Soviet 
Union, and an extremely dependent American ally. The US had also completely 
restructured the Turkish army in the 1950s (Akyaz, 2002, pp. 52-55). Second, as 
explained in the previous chapters, the armed forces’ alliance with members of the 
capitalist class was much more developed in 1980 than in the 1920s, when the 
bourgeoisie had been subordinate to the army. Moreover, in 1980, the army itself was 
acting as a prominent capitalist group. 
All these factors corroborate the thesis in the first chapter. The more integrated 
the actors of the power bloc are with networks of capital accumulation, the stronger is the 
pressure for minimal democratization.  
Zone 2: Parties as Scapegoats 
The 1924-25 period leading to the exclusionary coup occurred in Zone. At the 
time, the Kemalist regime was able to weaken and eliminate its rivals in the power bloc 
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despite confronting strong resistance from the Kurdish population. Thanks to the 
Armenian massacre and population exchange with Greece, it became impossible to speak 
of a non-Muslim bourgeoisie. The monarchist opposition as well as the CUP faction were 
either in exile or excluded from the political system completely. In this sense we could 
talk of a relatively unified coalition of the bourgeoisie and landowning classes. 
The decline of competition was accompanied by the decline of bourgeois 
opposition on the parliamentary plane, Initially, the opposition to Kemal was comprised 
of four political actors, but the Porte had been eliminated through the resistance, and the 
liberal opposition and the CUP members were pacified right afterwards. Hence the only 
candidate for opposition was from Kemal’s own ranks and without a coherent ideology. 
The party –PRP- was the voice of the opposition. Comparing the programs of RPP and 
PRP would not reveal a significant difference. As discussed in Chapter 2, what the PRP’s 
supporters feared were Kemal’s dictatorial tendencies. 
The 1925 coup had a pattern that, mutatis mutandis, would also be observed in the 
process leading up to the 1980 coup: an uprising paralyzing the parliamentary functioning 
of the state, local martial law, generalization of the martial law, and finally the coup. Yet 
at the same time, 1925 grew out from within the parliament and liquidated one wing of 
the bourgeois opposition. Such liquidation could only be possible with the demagogy 
about collaborators in the parliament.  
Kemal’s immediate reaction to the Kurdish insurgency is in line with the 
framework employed in this study. As already noted in the previous chapters, in June 
1925 he dissolved the opposition with one decree without wasting time in political 
activities (Gürlevik, 2009, pp. 110-113). Of course Kemal had not been alone in his 
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insistence on banning the PRP, several deputies of the RPP had also been insisting on 
radical measures against the PRP since the beginning of the uprising. In the following 
months, the independence tribunals, revitalized for the third time for trying the Kurdish 
rebels, decreed the closure of the PRP’s local branches, although there was no legal 
decision concerning the closure of the PRP itself.  
 The 1925 coup is an exemplary case of how a revolutionary movement silences 
opposition and competition within the power bloc. After the insurgency, the PRP was at a 
crossroads. Support for Kemal’s repressive measures would eventually hurt the party by 
changing the balance of the power in favor of the Kemalists, Resistance against 
exclusionary politics would bring the party on the same plane as the insurgents. For the 
PRP, neither its political background nor its organizational capacity permitted it the 
second option. The party made a hopeless and brief attempt to find a third way: 
supporting martial law for Kurdistan but opposing its generalization to all Turkey, under 
the guise of the Maintenance Law. Failing that, the noose around the PRP tightened 
gradually and finally forced the party to surrender to the repressive policies of the 
Kemalists (Zürcher, 2007, pp. 115-119)92. 
Banning the PRP and other oppositional organizations was only the first step 
towards the exclusionary period. Over the next two years, the opposition party was not 
only liquidated but the leading cadres of the opposition were labeled as traitors and 
completely excluded from political life. Eventually, not only social movements but also 
the bourgeois opposition suffered a heavy blow. 
92  Kansu(1990, pp. 1086-1087) writes about the PRP’s “stout opposition” to the Law of Maintenance and 
Order. However, he does not mention the same party’s approval of the martial law for Kurdistan.  
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The two peculiarities of the 1973-80 period were: (1) the high frequency of 
martial law decisions in comparison with other periods (2) the short tenure of 
governments established within these seven years (Table 6-1 and 6-2). 
TABLE 6-1 MARTIAL LAW IN ISTANBUL, IZMIR AND ANKARA 
 
1946-1960 1961-1980 1983-2014 
İstanbul 27* 80 24 
 
16.3%** 37.2% 6.5% 
Ankara 7 77 9 
 
4.2% 35.8% 2.4% 
İzmir 6 38 22 
 
3.6% 17.7% 6.0% 
* months ** share in the period 
Source Üskül (1989)  
 
Instead of building a causal link between these developments and explaining the 
resilience of the martial law regime with the rise of revolutionary movements, studies of 
Turkish political history consider both of these phenomena as the combined consequence 
of the electoral system and imprudent actions of the leaders of center-left and center-
right. As per this narrative, the election system was responsible for the political crisis 
because it gave way to small parties and made it very difficult for a central party to rule 
without coalitions. The party leaders, Ecevit and Demirel, were responsible for the crisis 
because they refused to form a coalition with the two parties on the center left and right 
with a joint vote of approximately 75% (Özbudun, 1995, pp. 236-237; Sunar & Sayarı, 




TABLE 6-2 AVERAGE LIFETIME OF OTTOMAN-TURKISH CABINETS IN DIFFERENT MODES 
OF DEMOCRACY (1908-2014) 
 
1908-1920 1920-60 1960-1980 1980-2014 
Duration (in months) 125 481 244 406 
Number of Cabinets Formed 20 28 20 18 
Average Cabinet Life (in months) 6 17 12 23 
Source: (Hükümetler ve Programları)     
The first obvious shortcoming of such an account is its assumption concerning the 
link between fragmentation and political crisis. True, the 1977-80 years were the most 
fragmented phase of the 1960-80 era. However, the 1980’s and 1990’s were much more 
fragmented than the 1970’s. Therefore fragmentation can occur in other electoral systems 
as well and does not necessarily lead to a political crisis. 
More interestingly, after 1971, hegemonic members of the ruling coalition pressed 
first for a coalition between the two center parties and later, after their disillusionment 
with Ecevit, for a strong government, expressing their distaste for coalitions taken 
hostage by small parties. This should be considered a sign of the decreasing level of 
competition within the power bloc ("Egeli Sanayicilerden Bir Kısmı Seçim Hükümeti Bir 
Kısmı da CHP-AP koalisyonu istedi," 1980; Güzelsarı & Aydın, 2010; "Koçman: 
"Meclisler İşlevlerini Yerine Getirecekse Seçime Gidilmesi Yerinde Olur"," 1980; 
"TÜSİAD: "AET'ye tam üyelik için hemen başvurulmasını istiyoruz"," 1980)93. 
The internal structures of both parties after the 1971 memorandum were more 
akin to each other compared to the pre-1971 period. The JP got rid of the hawks who 
93 For a sarcastic analysis of these developments see (Avcıoğlu, 1980) 
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advocated a more uncompromising attitude against the army, whereas those with a more 
statist attitude left the RPP and formed another party. As a result, despite the commonly 
accepted argument about ideological polarization, convergence from opposite directions 
made collaboration much more likely. 
What made collaboration between the RPP and JP impossible was not ideological 
but political polarization, and the rise of the revolutionary wave in Turkey. In the 1970’s, 
the JP could openly defend interests of the industrialists and voice the fears of the rural 
segments of the population. And its strategy during the 1960’s and 1970’s was not to 
fight with the army, but to try and harness it to debilitate the revolutionary movements 
The RPP’s rise on the other hand requires more attention. Typically, the rise of 
the RPP is recounted as a narrative of Turkish society leaning towards the left of the 
political spectrum. However, no explanation for the causes of these left leaning 
tendencies is provided. Actually, what was responsible for a climate change in Turkish 
politics was the rise of the revolutionary movements. Without the support of the 
revolutionary organizations, it would be impossible to speak of Ecevit’s rise. 
However, revolutionary support for Ecevit was contingent upon Ecevit’s 
uncompromising attitude towards Demirel. Hence, those who explain the political crisis 
with reference to quarrels between Ecevit and Demirel forget the fact that the RPP’s 
political future as a strong center-left party depended on its uncompromising opposition 
to the JP. For the RPP, cooperation with the JP would mean the loss of a significant 
portion of its votes. 
The RPP’s opposition to the JP can be summarized in two terms: (I) opposition to 
increasing police and military control in daily life; and (2) opposition to ending the 
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populist income distribution of the ISI period. However, the rise of the revolutionary 
movement, mentioned generally as the rise of “political violence”, gradually broke the 
RPP’s attitude in the 1970’s and after the Maraş Massaccre in December 1978, the RPP 
surrendered to the bureaucratic pressure for martial law94. 
The RPP’s real power without the support of revolutionary organizations became 
obvious in the 1979 elections, when it lost 40% of its votes, with only 10% going to the 
JP. The remaining 30% went to socialist parties and revolutionary groups that had 
boycotted the elections ("TİP, TSİP ve TBP liderleri oy kullanabildi," 1979). This 
election led to the collapse of the RPP and after its resignation from government, the 
political crisis deepened because the party with the most seats became the opposition 
party. The fragile coalition of the remaining parties was too ineffective to struggle against 
the revolutionary movements. 
After 1979, it was already too late to return to a parliamentary solution to the 
crisis. Half of Turkey was under martial law, and the generals started making plans for a 
military coup to re-shape the political system. 
One of the three differences between the 1925 exclusive transition and the 1980 
coup was the slow progress of an authoritarian regime and the almost routinization of 
martial law. This slow speed is also related to the intensity of revolutionary action. In 
1925, what the Ankara government confronted was partial state collapse. In the late 
1970’s however, regardless of the intensity of revolutionary movements, that was never 
the case. Second, RPP’s leader Ecevit resisted authoritarian and exclusionary measures 
longer than the leading cadre of the PRP. Due to the inclusionary political system, 
94 For the change in the RPP’s attitude about the martial law, see (Üskül, 1989, pp. 259-288) 
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Ecevit’s political fate depended more on the support of revolutionary and socialist 
organizations than the political opposition in the 1920’s. As a result he had to insist on an 
anti-martial law stance and populist policies that made a coalition with the Justice Party 
impossible and led eventually to the paralysis of the parliament. 
The third difference is related to the balance of the institutions in the regime. In 
1925, the parliament was the strongest institution, and although Mustafa Kemal as 
president was not a deputy, the coup had to emerge from within the parliament. In 
contrast, since the post-1960 parliaments had already been subordinated by bureaucratic 
institutions, the parliament was not the battleground and a resort to internal collaborators 
demagogy was not necessary. The military’s strategy was to discredit the parliament to 
the point of paralysis and then condemn its “inability to fight terrorism”. In fact this third 
difference helped further the de-politicization of society. 
Zone 3: The Self-Confident Power Bloc 
 The years between 1945 and 1960 correspond to a period of increasing 
competition within the power bloc without a significant increase in the level of 
revolutionary activity. During this time, parties supported by factions of the power bloc 
were involved in social protests. 
The Democrat Party (DP) was the first political agent to use democratic demands 
to mobilize mass support. Thanks to the DP, demonstrations became part of daily 
political life in Turkey. In fact, increasing levels of popular discontent prepared a fertile 
ground for massive demonstrations. Thus the DP did not need extra effort for mass 
mobilization. In fact, it could be said that the DP’s efforts went in the opposite direction. 
as it tried to decrease the level of mobilization and tame the anger of the masses--a 
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decision that led to a great upheaval in the party and ended with the resignation of 21 out 
of the 64 deputies from the party (Albayrak, 2004, pp. 126-133).  
After the DP acquired governmental posts, democratic demands lost their function 
for the party. The DP fulfilled very few of the democratic promises promoted in its 
campaign. 
The real mobilization started from 1955 with the intensification of competition in 
the power bloc. The first step was to transform the RPP from a statist bureaucratic 
institution into a political party with the ability to contact the masses. The second step 
from 1957 onwards was to undermine the DP’s monopoly of democratic demands. This 
included propagandist publishing as well as exposing the anti-democratic attitude of the 
government. The third step was to organize mass meetings similar to the ones organized 
by the DP one decade ago. After the DP-run government amended the laws regulating 
public meetings and demonstration, the RPP’s attempts to go to the masses evolved easily 
into provocative confrontations. The DP tried to counter the opposition’s attempts at 
mobilization by establishing the Vatan Cephesi, (the home [patriotic] front) (Uyar, 2001). 
Finally, during the last months of the DP government, the RPP started providing active 
support to social protests by the students (Albayrak, 2004, pp. 514-538).  
There is no clear evidence that RPP leaders were among the conspirators of the 
coup. On the contrary, the existing evidence is against this allegation. Nonetheless, 
regardless of its intentions, the RPP pushed mass mobilization up to the point of regime 
crisis. Of course, the level of popular mobilization, let alone revolutionary mobilization, 
was far too low to enforce a regime change. Yet, it was precisely this weakness that 
286 
 
encouraged members of the power bloc to highlight and project the political unrest and 
use it as a justification for the coup.  
Ironically, the causal relationship between coups and social movements in 1960 is 
the reverse of the same relationship in 1925 and 1980. This time, politicization and 
mobilization on the eve of the coup paved the way for the second wave of social unrest. 
Zone 4: Après Moi le Déluge 
Periods with intense revolutionary action and a high level of competition within 
the power bloc correspond to Zone 4. In Turkish history, the long struggle between 1912 
and 1924, with shifting alliances, can be said to fall in Zone 4. 
In this zone, we expect to see increasing bureaucratic pressure for exclusionary 
practices due to intense revolutionary activity. We also expect more attempts at 
mobilization by the Parties of Order. 
Although the political agents of this struggle varied over time, we can observe a 
growing pressure coming from the bureaucracy for exclusion between 1912 and 1924.  
In the first phase, it was the CUP that established stronger contacts with the bureaucracy 
and pressed for exclusionary practices. What the CUP articulated were actually the 
demands of high-ranking bureaucrats95. The first proposal came in 1911 right after the 
start of the Balkan insurgency. The cabinet supported by the CUP wanted to change the 
constitution and weaken the parliament. But the composition of the parliament was an 
obstacle, so the CUP-bureaucracy alliance dismissed the parliament and called for new 
elections. 
95 For the relationship between Mahmut Şevket Paşa and the CUP see Tunaya (2000, pp. 173-192). 
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The elections, however, had to ensure de facto exclusion of the opposition from 
the parliament to serve the purpose. And the CUP-bureaucracy alliance used various 
pressure tactics, including physical violence, during the elections to keep the opposition 
out of the parliament. Finally, after the 1913 coup, in the midst of the Balkan War, all 
members of the opposition were arrested for their alleged involvement in the 
assassination of the Grand Vizier. Analogous to what happened in such instances in Zone 
I, the opposition could not resist the nationalist fervor emerging after the loss of Edirne 
and assassination of the Grand Vizier. 
The Armenian bourgeoisie and its political representatives followed a similar 
path. According to official Turkish history, since the Armenians including their 
bourgeoisie supported the separatist movements en bloc, the Ottoman state planned a 
massacre of the Armenian population. Actually, contrary to popular myths, despite the 
growth of revolutionary movements in Armenia, the Armenian political organizations 
supported the CUP and the Armenian bourgeoisie in Istanbul had not been particularly 
fond of the Armenian revolutionaries (Ter Minassian, 1996). The position of the church 
was no different.  
Unlike the 1925 and 1980 coups, the opposition in this instance did try to 
mobilize the masses, but their support was weak and hesitant. In other words, the 
increasing intensity of Armenian revolutionary movements forced the parties of the 
Armenian bourgeoisie, who were in a fragile position, to cooperate with the CUP. After 
the massacre of Adana in 1909, the Armenian bourgeoisie unambiguously sided with the 





After the fall of the CUP cabinet as a result of the defeat in WWI, the coexistence 
of bureaucratic proposals for exclusion and mobilization of the masses re-emerged. This 
time the mobilization was more dramatic and assumed the form of civil war. During the 
so-called war of independence, the armies of Ankara government did not fight against the 
armies of imperial powers. Their battles were either against the Porte, the liberal-
monarchist faction of the power bloc, or against the Armenian and Greek bourgeoisie. 
Among all rival factions within the power bloc, the Porte was the most serious 
initiator of mass mobilization given the resources it commanded. During the civil war, 
the Porte tried to trigger various revolts with the aim of weakening the Ankara 
government. Ankara on the other hand used the revolts and the occupation as a means to 
silence the opposition of the Porte. Mustafa Kemal and his friends invoked threats to 
national security to garner support for their proposal to concentrate all powers in one 
office. Banning political parties like the Turkish Communist Party, excluding deputies 
from ministries, and obtaining extra-executive prerogatives were steps leading towards an 
increasingly authoritarian regime (Akın, 2001, pp. 82-84, 217-231; Tunçay, 1967, pp. 
123-130). 
In this sense, the 1920-21 coup shared the pattern of the 1925 and 1980 coups: 
emergence of a revolutionary situation (rise of revolutionary movements in the case of 
1976-80 period), responded to with a discourse of national security by the bureaucratic 
components of the power bloc, and eventually military measures pacifying the 
opposition. Due to the elected-non-elected balance, the 1920-21 coup also grew from 





The Low Competition-Low Revolution zone is generally the period after the 
eradication of revolutionary movements and consolidation of the power bloc. This zone is 
generally a fertile ground for heightened competition within the power bloc, which would 
move political struggles to a different zone (High Competition-Low Revolution). On this 
terrain, members of the power bloc exhibit maximal ability for mobilizing masses and 
politicizing the society. However, the calm created by the absence of revolutionary 
movements is temporary. The politicization plus the inclusionary promises prepare the 
conditions for a revolutionary surge, 
The revolutionary surge can shift the political arena to two different locations. 
The first alternative is to threaten members of the power bloc and lessen their competition 
(Low Competition-High Revolution). Here, the civil society rapidly depoliticizes and the 
parliament as an institution becomes paralyzed. Nothing could hinder the regime from 
using its bureaucratic apparatus to isolate and smash the movements and to consolidate 
its dominance over the competing factions. 
The revolutionary surge can actually lead to a different scenario as well. During 
hegemonic crises when international competitive pressures increase, the revolutionary 
threat is not sufficient to mollify the competition (High Competition-High Revolution). 
This is the period when bourgeois factions fight each other with the most radical 
measures and make use of massacres and wars. Capital accumulation via dispossession is 
also part of this process. However, due to the fearful nature of the property-owning 
classes, this competition cannot last forever. Eventually one side retreats from the 
competition and accepts its subordinate position. In this way the regime moves back to 






Figure 6-5 Change of the Political Terrain during Hegemonic Stability 
 
Figure 6-6 illustrates the concrete trajectory of the Ottoman-Turkish political 
terrain between the first and second big regime changes. As we can see, it is quite similar 
to the ideo-typical trajectory during a hegemonic crisis. The difference is caused by the 





In Figure 6-7, we can observe the trajectory from 1960 onwards. The difference 
between Figures 6-5 and 6-7 is more striking. After the exclusionary coup in 1980, the 
repressive policies effectively smashed the revolutionary movements. But a few years 
later, we observe a comparable surge which lasted for another ten years and then 
retreated hand-in-hand with increasing competition within the power bloc. As we 
discussed in chapter 4, the reason for this erratic pattern is the de-synchronized behavior 
of the waves in western Turkey and in Kurdistan. The retreat in Turkey is accompanied 
by a rise in Kurdistan.  
The difference between the two movements of the political terrains gives a better 
idea of the differences between the 1908 and 1960 regime changes. The hostile 
international climate transformed the post-1908 revolutionary surge into a series of civil 
wars, mass uprisings and massacres. Whereas the stable international conditions after 
1960 helped the regime overcome the revolutionary crisis, and end the competition not 
through a violent series of dispossessions, but with a modus vivendi. 
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Chapter 7  
Conclusion: The Deepening Crisis  
and  
the Three Paths of Regime Change 
“One day my mortal body will turn to dust, but the  
Turkish Republic will stand forever” 
(Mustafa Kemal) 
 
“Mortals are immortals, and immortals are mortals, 
the one living the other’s death and dying the other’s 
life” 
(Heraclitus) 
I started working on this dissertation in July 2003, only eight months after the 
JDP’s sweeping electoral victory, and four months after the lifetime political ban on 
Tayyip Erdoğan was lifted and he became the prime minister. That was the time when US 
President Bush would laud Turkey as a model democracy (White House, 2004), and a 
Financial Times editorial (2003) praised Turkey’s “Quiet Revolution” and Erdoğan’s 
dedication to democracy. That was also the time when public opinion surveys indicated 
that the military was seen as the most reliable institution in Turkey (Group, 2004, p. 
C25), just as a lot of ink was being spilled in academia over the long expected awakening 
of the Turkish civil society and the hope of getting rid of military tutelage or juristocracy 
(İnsel, 2003; Kanra, 2005; Öniş & Keyman, 2003).  
A little over a decade later, as I conclude this dissertation, Erdoğan is again in the 
headlines. This time he is on the cover of the June 2013 issue of The Economist  
photomontaged as Sultan Selim III with a title describing him as “Democrat or Sultan?” 
In the same month, not long after posting a picture of President Obama holding a baseball 
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bat while talking on the telephone with Erdoğan (Daily Mail, 2013), the White House 
issued fifteen warnings to the Turkish government regarding human rights abuses and 
violation of democratic liberties (Tanış, 2013). A few months later, when Erdoğan’s 
telephone conversation with his son about how to hide and distribute tens of millions of 
euros and dollars stored in his family residence was leaked, he almost surpassed Obama 
in one night and became a YouTube star amongst world politicians96. And lest we forget 
the military, in January 2014, approximately a quarter of Turkish generals, including the 
former Commander-in-Chief, are serving life sentences for allegedly planning a coup 
against the government. Much like his representation in the American media, Erdoğan’s 
stance has changed over the course of these trials. Six years ago he was calling himself 
the prosecutor of these trials ("'Evet Ergenekon'un savcısıyım'," 2008), whereas in 2014 
his circle of advisors term these trials a conspiracy against the army and are attempting to 
find ways for a re-trial (Akdoğan, 2013). Erdoğan’s campaign succeeded right before the 
local elections in March 2014, and all of the generals have since been released (Dombey, 
2014a). 
In academia, descriptions and explanations for the JDP’s ‘democratic revolution’ 
seem to be out of fashion. The new trend is to comment on Erdoğan’s rising 
authoritarianism (Özbudun, 2014, p. 4; Taşpınar, 2014, pp. 49-51). For some, the 
distinction between him and Vladmir Putin is rapidly blurring (Öniş, 2013, p. 103). One 
of the most cited recent articles about Turkey is titled ‘The Democratic Coup’ (Ozan O 
96 Obama’s most popular video on YouTube has been watched three million times (Amanda, 2012), 
whereas Erdoğan’s clip was watched more than two million times within twenty four hours (Dombey, 
2014b). As of today, despite the censorship and existence of many cloned versions it has been watched 
more than five million times. 
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Varol, 2012) and published in the Harvard Law Review; it compares the Egyptian coup 
in 2011 with the Turkish coup in 1960 and the Portuguese coup in 1974.  
Apparently, a lot of things have changed over the last decade, except for 
Erdoğan’s prime ministership. With the exception of hard-core Erdoğanists, observers of 
all shades of opinion seem to agree that Turkey is in deep political crisis (Atılbaz, 2014; 
Cemal, 2013; Çakır, 2014; Göktürk, 2014; Koru, 2014). According to a special report 
published by Freedom House (Corke, Finkel, Kramer, Robbins, & Schenkkan, 2014): 
“The crisis of democracy in Turkey is not a future problem—it is right here, right now” 
(p. 1). Moreover, with his recent candidacy for the presidency, Erdoğan has made it clear 
that he has no intention of abating the crisis. Nevertheless, there is not the slightest hint of 
a consensus regarding the contours of the crisis, and the direction, explanation, and 
desirability of the upcoming transformation. Therefore, the conclusion of this dissertation 
seems to be an appropriate place to try to answer the oft-repeated question: “Where is 
Turkey going?” 
In its analysis of Turkish regimes, the literature on democratization with its 
premises derived from modernization theory and its Turkish variants share similar 
assumptions: a stagnant civil society and the absence of social dynamics necessary for 
democratization. The state, an entity above and beyond all social classes, is either too 
weak and therefore could not confront the social relations antagonistic to democracy, or 
too strong and strangled civil society’s modest and hesitant attempts at democracy. As a 




This study challenged these dominant theses in three ways: with its multi-
dimensional conceptualization of Turkish political regimes, its historical analysis of the 
variation of Turkish regimes, and finally its rejection of the stagnant and/or weak civil 
society assumption. 
Combined with the maximalist definition of democracy, a one-dimensional 
analysis of Turkish regimes could only observe an oscillatory move between the poles of 
autocracy and democracy, better said a regime stuck in the middle. It is not possible to 
analyze the variation in the trajectory of the regime within this framework. This study 
used a two-dimensional conceptualization of democratic regimes to show that during the 
last century, the Turkish political regime, far from being ‘trapped’, actually experienced 
four different modalities of democracy. 
In light of this analysis, coups, generally condemned (or applauded) for 
terminating democratic practices, acquire a different meaning--that is, political 
instruments for the transformation of the regime from one mode to another. In contrast to 
the widespread belief, coups have not been a symptom of democratic immaturity, but a 
necessary condition for moving from one regime to another in the absence of a 
revolutionary constitutional assembly. 
The literature on Turkey has not progressed beyond the assumptions of the 
modernization-democratization paradigm due to its static (ahistorical) perspective that 
does not take variation across time into account. The current literature finds that present-
day Turkey is - albeit to an insufficient degree - more democratic than the Ottoman 
Empire in 1908. In contrast, the historical analysis provided in this study illustrates that, 





absence of social movements. On the contrary, two interrelated social dynamics were 
responsible for this change: competition within the power bloc due to capitalist 
accumulation, and revolutionary social movements. In other words, the key factor behind 
regime changes was the strength of the civil society, not its weakness. 
Between 1908 and 2014, the Turkish political regime traversed all the modes of 
democracy conceptualized in this study (Figure 7-1). The 1908 coup moved the regime 
from the non-parliamentary exclusionary zone to the parliamentary and inclusionary 
zone. The subsequent changes in 1921, 1960 and 1980 also occurred as a result of coups, 
but there are important variations amongst these regime changes. The military coups in 
1908 and 1960 signaled significant changes by moving the position of the regime along 
both axes of our four-dimensional framework. The coups in 1921 and 1980 on the other 
hand, merely pushed the regime towards the exclusionary pole. Hence it makes more 
sense to conceive the 1921 and 1980 regime changes as a transfer from one sub-phase to 
another of the 1908 and 1960 regimes respectively.  
The leading force behind the regime changes is competition within the power bloc 
related to the waves of capital accumulation. The incompatibility of the social formation 
emerging from these waves with the regime established by the dominant bloc resulted in 
regime changes.  
What preceded the 1908 transformation was a wave of capital accumulation that 
created a non-Muslim bourgeoisie and its Muslim variant in an infant stage (Figure 7-2). 
The contradiction between their growing strength and their exclusion from the dominant 
bloc constituting the Sultan and the Porte bureaucracy, gave fuel to coup attempts of 
frustrated low-ranked bureaucrats, who were also excluded from the dominant bloc. 
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The first big regime change in 1908 neither ended the crisis within the power bloc 
nor replaced the already crumbling dominant class with a new one. However, it moved 
the regime on to a new terrain which enabled the excluded members of the power bloc to 
challenge the dominant bloc directly and to attempt to consolidate their own dominance. 
As argued in chapter 1 and shown in Chapter 5, this regime change could only 
take place in the absence of revolutionary movements. However, the politicization 
preceding the 1908 coup and its subsequent escalation led to a surge in social 
movements- first reformist and then revolutionary in character. The first wave of 
revolutionary movements was comprised only of the Macedonian, Arabic, Pontic, 
Armenian, and Kurdish separatist movements. Due to the forced migration of the 
Ottoman labor force, which was overwhelmingly Christian, the labor movement which 
had made a quick reformist start right after the 1908 movement, declined in importance. 
The systematic threats posed by the separatist revolutionary movements were 
countered by members of the power bloc first with a protective coup in 1913, and then 
with a transformative and exclusionary coup in 1920-21. The coup in 1913 signaled the 
end of the first period of politicization and inclusion, and the beginning of a long period 
of de-politicization and exclusion. It was at the same time a period of consolidation 
because the new power bloc - the bureaucracy and its junior partner the nascent Muslim-
bourgeoisie - could only win its battles against the revolutionary movements and 
consolidate its dominance after these coups. In this sense, the Turkish National 
Assembly, the founding of which is generally celebrated as a revolutionary and 
democratic turning point in Turkish political history, was rather an exclusionary and 











The world historical time of the competition within the Ottoman power bloc also 
determined its fate. Owing to the British hegemonic crisis and escalating inter-state and 
worldwide inter-capitalist competition, the revolutionary surge after 1908 did not pacify 
the domestic competition within the power bloc. On the contrary, it assumed the most 
extreme form, which also shaped the nature of capitalist accumulation in the subsequent 
phase–-accumulation by dispossession. The non-Muslim bourgeoisie was expropriated 
through confiscations, taxes, exiles, and massacres. In short, due to the fateful 
combination of failed revolutionary movements and national and international inter-
capitalist competition, the non-Muslim bourgeoisie disappeared from the political scene 
instead of being strengthened or joining the power bloc. As a result, in the new dominant 
bloc, the coalition of the previously excluded segments of the bureaucracy and the 
Muslim agricultural capitalists carried disproportionate weight. 
The protective coup in 1925, through which the Kemalist dominant bloc 
eliminated all rivals, intensified the dispossession process and warfare against 
revolutionary movements. By the end of WWII, the Kemalist alliance had succeeded in 
stamping out all revolutionary movements and transferring non-Muslim wealth to 
Muslim capitalists. However, in an exemplary dialectical way, the success of the 
Kemalist regime prepared the conditions for its own dissolution. 
With the disappearance of the revolutionary threat and strengthening of 
agricultural capitalists, the Kemalist bureaucracy had to loosen the conditions restricting 
multi-party competition. The regime’s return in 1946 to the position where it was in 1921 
signaled not only the end of the long interregnum beginning with the 1925 coup but also 
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the beginning of a new wave of competition within the power bloc, It was at the same 
time the beginning of the second wave of inclusion and politicization, which would 
shortly turn into a regime crisis. 
The crisis preceding the 1960 transformation shared the essential features of the 
pre-1908 crisis, It was caused by the demise of the old dominant coalition, wherein the 
pillars of the old regime could neither adsorb the tensions and conflicts of the emerging 
social formation, nor fulfill the institutional needs of the new wave of accumulation. Like 
in the previous crisis, the competitive pressure intensified politicization, which, in the 
absence of revolutionary movements, encouraged coup attempts by frustrated low-ranked 
soldiers. And like the one in 1908, the 1960 coup changed the regime along the 
parliament-bureaucracy axis, the major relevant problem in the bourgeois struggle for 
democratization. Likewise, as the price for politicization of masses and in order to fulfill 
the democratic promises of the coup plotters and backers, the starting point of the regime 
was an inclusionary zone reminiscent of the 1908-21 regime. 
Moreover, as it was during the period following the 1908 coup, the consolidation 
of the new dominant bloc –the coalition between the embourgeoisified army and the 
industrialists- could start only after the minor regime change in 1980. Likewise, the 1971 
coup was the end of the second wave of politicization and the beginning of the second 
phase of de-politicization which continued until the second balancing coup in 1999. 
Finally, with the 1960 coup, the politicization wave reached the popular classes 
and gave an impulse first to reformist and later to revolutionary social movements. In a 
manner similar to the first phase of de-politicization, members of the power bloc 
responded to the revolutionary movements with an exclusionary coup in 1980 and fought 
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the movements in the exclusionary zone until the decline of the revolutionary wave in 
1997. 
However, despite these essential similarities, the 1960 transformation was not a 
mere repetition of 1908. The most obvious difference between the two periods was the 
economic and political context of the capitalist world-system. Contrary to the first quarter 
of the twentieth century, its third quarter was a period of hegemonic stability, with a 
significantly reduced degree of inter-capitalist and inter-state competition. Hence the 
threat posed by the revolutionary movements was sufficient to decrease the intensity of 
competition within the power bloc. As a result, the second phase of politicization did not 
occur in a hostile environment like the former. 
Second, the type of accumulation was different. The 1908 coup followed a phase 
of accumulation of the privileged, in which the non-Muslim bourgeoisie controlled the 
credit mechanisms, and enjoyed a favored position in foreign trade. Given its economic 
position, this bourgeoisie was more assertive and involved in political activities. 
Additionally, the privileged and protected position of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie vis-a-
vis the Muslim bourgeoisie made the competition even more aggressive.  
In contrast, the bourgeoisie before the 1960 coup was the product of dispossession 
and property transfer and therefore less assertive and more state dependent. So the 
bureaucracy played a major role during the crisis of this regime. Second, since all 
segments of the pre-1960 bourgeoisie had benefited from the accumulation-by-
dispossession, the conflict within the power bloc was smoother and easier to reconcile. 
Third, although the dispossession process transferred wealth, it did not lead to wealth 
concentration, which made another wave of dispossession unnecessary. The goal of the 
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post-1960 dominant bloc was similar to that of the pre-1908 bourgeoisie: obtaining 
control of credit mechanisms and monopolies. Therefore, the post-1960 accumulation 
was another episode of privileged accumulation by the military-industrial bourgeoisie 
alliance. 
The status of revolutionary movements was different for the two coups as well. 
After the 1878 coup, Sultan Abdülhamid’s bureaucratic despotism had considerably 
weakened the revolutionary movements. However, the organizations were still active, 
even if they were in a vegetative mode. They even provided a reminder of their continued 
existence in the form of the explosive 1903 Ilinden uprising. So the reformist presence 
was short-lived in the first wave of politicization, and only two years after the regime 
change, revolutionary movements started to dominate the political struggles.  
In contrast, because of the success of the Kemalist dominant bloc in completely erasing 
the resistance and dealing with the rebels with “the bronze hand of the Republic”, the 
1960 transition was bourgeois-dominated. Relatedly, reformist movements had a longer 
presence and dominance during the second wave of politicization. 
A second difference concerning the revolutionary movements was mass 
participation. As illustrated in chapters 4 and 5, between 1960 and 1998, the labor 
movement was an integral component of aggregate social movements. However, most of 
them were reformist movements. Although the revolutionary movements had a wide 
mass base, what characterized the second revolutionary surge was not mass uprisings but 
group action: urban and rural versions of guerilla warfare. As we saw in Chapter 5, this 
type of unrest evokes a ‘milder’ form of repression and therefore the state did not attempt 
massacres and complete annihilation of the local population along with the rebels after 
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the 1980 coup. Even in western Turkey, where the defeat was obvious, the revolutionary 
organizations survived. In Kurdistan, one could not even speak of a defeat. In its fight 
against Kurdish separatism under an exclusionary bureaucratic democracy, the most the 
state could achieve was to force the PKK to a draw. The PKK withdrew from guerilla 
warfare and people’s war as a strategy, but kept it as a tactic in its action repertoire. 
What Now? 
Hegel once remarked that the precondition for an object to change is its being 
both A and ~A, i.e., to violate the principle of self-identity97. This is probably the most 
accurate description of the Turkish regime. On the one hand, in terms of its institutional 
structure, the Turkish regime has the most exclusionary and bureaucratic form of 
democracy. On the other hand, in terms of discourses, goals, demands and to a certain 
extent attempts. Turkey is one of the most democratic places in the world. All significant 
actors of the regime express their longing for a parliamentary inclusionary regime. This 
contradiction brings us back to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter. 
From the summary of regime change patterns, it seems that Turkey has long been 
in the third wave of politicization. As we saw in Chapter 3, competition within the power 
bloc has been intensifying since the mid-1990s. After financialization and integration 
with global capital, the existing institutional framework is no longer compatible with the 
needs of TÜSİAD (association of industrialists). Another consequence of financialization 
has been the emergence of new industrial capital in Anatolia, with a nationalist and 
Islamist orientation. The exclusion of this fraction from the dominant bloc is the second 
97 Something moves not because at one moment of time it is here and at another there, but because at one 
and the same moment it is here and not here (Hegel, 1969, p. 440). 
309 
 
                                                          
dynamic behind the present competitive wave. The third source of competition within the 
power bloc is TÜSİAD’s control of credit mechanisms and its access to monopolies. 
The dismantling of the institutions of the second protective coup in 1999 paved 
the way for a new crisis, with the failure of all attempts to reform the regime. These 
attempts were geared towards discrediting and dismantling the building blocks of the 
regime, and replacing them piece-by-piece in place of a complete overhaul. In other 
words, after having exhausted the inclusionary and exclusionary modes of the 
bureaucratic 1960s regime, Turkey is approaching the third big regime change. The 
direction of this change, as this analysis suggests, is towards an election-based 
inclusionary regime. Yet how and under whose agency this change would be 
accomplished is another question. 
As I discussed in the first chapter, Giovanni Arrighi (1990b) distinguishes three 
different paths of labor movements in capitalist countries: British, Russian and German. 
The British path corresponds to the peaceful way of reform, where the capitalist class has 
both the economic means and political capacity to absorb labor unrest and to integrate the 
workers into the system. In the Russian path, in contrast, the capitalists cannot even feed 
the rapidly growing number of workers. This incapacity paves the way for a revolution, 
The German path, on the other hand, lies in between reform and revolution. The 
capitalists have a certain amount of wealth and political capacity, but not sufficient to 
fulfill the workers’ demands and to cushion the systemic shocks. In the German path, 
workers do revolt and fail because the majority of workers still pin their hopes on the 
promises of reform. Failed revolutions invite fascist regimes and coups. 
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Mutatis mutandis, these three paths could be considered as three alternative roads 
to different democracies. The Turkish regime appears to be a stable follower of the 
German path from one mode of democracy to another. But this does not mean that 
Turkey is destined to remain on this path in the event of a future political crisis. In 
contrast, the three alternatives present themselves as concrete political projects today. 
Today, the British road could be labeled as the “Great Consensus” scenario. In 
this case the two major competitors in the power bloc - TÜSİAD and the Anatolian 
capital - would form a new dominant bloc, with a new parliamentary and inclusionary 
regime and would force the parties to cooperate for a brand new constitution. This 
peaceful version of regime change can occur in two ways: by forcing Erdoğan to a 
compromise or by eliminating Erdoğan and restructuring the political landscape. 
The German path can be named as “the reoccurrence” scenario. In this version, as 
it was during the pre-1908 crisis, politicization would grow, the political arena would 
polarize further and Turkey would leap to a parliamentary regime with a coup. It could 
either be a military coup involving popular mobilization –similar to what happened in 
Egypt in 2011 or in Turkey in 1908, 1971 and 1997, or a temporary autogolpe, with 
which Erdoğan à la Chavez might try to establish a Bolivarian Republic with Islamic 
tones. Nevertheless, none of these alternatives would be able to end the increasing 
competition within the power bloc. Moreover, the coupling of hegemonic crisis in the 
capitalist world-system with the high organizational and political capacity of 
revolutionary movements will ignite a new anti-systemic fire, which might end up in 
drastic massacres and dispossession, or result in a revolutionary victory. 
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The third scenario is the Russian path which could be termed as “From 1908 Back 
to 1905”. As noted in Chapter 2, what differentiated the 1908 [Ottoman] Revolution from 
its Russian variant in 1905 was the absence of revolutionary mass uprisings. If Turkey 
were to follow the “Russian path”, the subsequent transformation of the regime would 
compensate for the missing mass element during the bourgeois revolution. The conflicts 
within the power bloc and the geopolitical interstate tensions are too big to reconcile and 
therefore the politicization and polarization would continue to intensify. However, the 
fear of revolutionary mobilization combined with the current paralysis of the military 
restrains all competing actors from a coup. As a result, increasing politicization sparks off 
revolutionary uprising without awaiting entry to the parliamentary zone. In case of 
failure, this path would merge with the German path. However, if the uprisings succeed 
in changing the regime in a revolutionary way, then Turkey will be on a completely new 
path. It would at the same time mean a rupture from the vicious Heraclitian cycles of 
mortal factions of the power bloc under the seemingly immortal Ottoman-Turkish state 
structure. 
What is important to note, however, is the main argument of this study: although 
the processes leading to regime crisis are initiated by competition within the power bloc, 
the resolution of the crisis is determined by the revolutionary movements. What will 
matter are their choices in the deepening crisis and their preparedness for the “battle of 
democracy”.  
And what is the role of an understanding of the social roots of regime change in 
Turkey in this battle? For a long time, at least since Tugan Baranovsky, sociology has 
provided a comfortable and prestigious shelter for retired revolutionaries. If my analysis 
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in this study and assessment of the three alternatives is correct then the call of the third 
alternative to the student of historical sociology could not be any different from the last 
sentence of the incomplete The State and Revolution, whose author never regretted 
politics as a vocation: “It is more pleasant and useful to go through the "experience of 









  APPENDIX A
CONSTRUCTION OF THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS DATABASE 1945-2014 
The construction of the Social Movements Database used in Chapter 4-6 involved the 
following phases: 
a) A pilot study for scanning the daily newspaper Cumhuriyet (December 2004 -  
May 2005) 
b) Scanning and reading the newspaper articles for every other day from 1945-2014 
(June 2005 –September 2005) 
c) Digitizing, storing and naming the newspaper articles (September 2005-October 
2005) 
d) Recording the “Mentions” of Collective Action from the digital images in the 
database (October 2005-June 2006; June 2012; and December 2013-June 2014) 
The first phase was completed by the author and one assistant. For the second 
and third phases, the author worked with four assistants. For the different 
steps of the last phase, the author worked with one coder. Given the 
immense scope of the project, inter-coder reliability was tested only at the 
beginning of each phase. Different years were coded by one person. At the 
end of the project, the author went over the Microsoft Access database to 
compare and re-check the “suspicious” records and to clean the database. 
Following are the translated versions of the instructions for each process 
distributed to the assistants. 
Instructions for Scanning 
1. Check the dates from the calendar to find the newspapers to be scanned 
2. Substitute the missing issues according to the following ranking: 
a. The newspaper of the day before 
b. The newspaper of the day after 
c. The newspaper of 3 days before 
d. The newspaper of 3 days after 
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3. Scan and record each article separately. To be classified as an article, a title is 
necessary. Do not scan opinion pages, columns, commentaries, cartoons and 
pages devoted to foreign news, culture, television, or entertainment. 
4. To complete a scan it is necessary to read: 
a. The first paragraph 
b. The first paragraph below the photograph 
c. The title 
d. The spots 
5. If you notice one of the keywords in Table below, read the entire article 
6. Record the article if it mentions at least one instance of collective action (CA) 
related to the key word.  
7. Do not record the article if 
a. The event has not taken place at the time of the reporting  
b. The time interval between the event reported and the published article 
is more than one year 
8. Do not record unidentified, alleged but denied 
bombings/explosions/assassinations/kidnappings. Record the article if an act of 
robbery and murder is in a report that satisfies conditions 6 and 7.  
9. To be recorded, an article does not need to be explicitly about CA. 
a. It might refer to previous CA’s to provide background information for the 
article. 
b. It might quote a person, who mentions the CA  
10. If an event is recorded several times in a single issue, then record each article 
separately. 
11. Record photographs as an independent article only if the CA has not been 
mentioned in any of the articles of that issue. 
12. Record an article about CA not satisfying the conditions 6 and 7, if the issue 
contains another article about the same CA that contains the necessary 





TABLE A 1 KEYWORDS USED DURING SCANNING 
Keyword Translation Keyword Translation 
Grev Strike Kurşunlama 
Shooting/Throwing 
bullets 
Çatışma Confrontation Baskın Raid 
Miting Rally Anma/Kutlama Commemoration 
Protesto Protest Molotof Kokteyli Molotov cocktail 



























To report sick 
(collectively) 






Eylem Action Şehit Etme/Olma Martyr 
Basın Açıklaması Press Declaration Dayak Beating 
Konuşma Speech Pusu Ambush 
Toplanma Gathering Yol Kapatma Road blockage 





Gösteri Demonstration Şenlik Festival 
Yaralama Wounding Sakal Bırakma Grow a Beard 
Kavga Brawl Afiş Asma Hanging Banner 
Bildiri Dağıtımı Leaflet Distribution İşgal Occupation 
Bombalama Bombing   




Instructions for Recording the Articles 
What needs to be recorded is the articles not the information it contains. 







Instructions for Creating the Digital Images 
14. To prevent confusion take the picture of the issue identifying the date of the 
article whenever you switch from one article to another. 
15. Take the picture of each item in the record sheet with multiple pictures if 
necessary. Name the picture as follows: C/Last two digits of the 
year/month/day/number of the article for that day/letter if multiple pictures are 
taken. 
Instructions for Recording on Collective Action Events 
16. Use criteria 6 and 7 to decide whether a CA should be recorded or not 
17. If the same CA is mentioned in the same article several times, record it only once. 
If a CA is mentioned in several article of the same issue, record it multiple times. 
18. Record the more specific event if an article refers to a CA with varying degrees of 
specificity.  
a. For example,  
i. If an article published at the end of Decembers refers to “student 
protests” in 1968 then record the mention without giving a specific 
month 
ii. If the same article contains another mention about the boycott 
wave in May, then record only the second mention without 
specifying the day 
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iii. If the same article also contains information about the boycott on 
May 24 at Istanbul University Faculty of Law, then record only 
this last mention 
b.  If a mentioned event has information about the location and the type of 
action then no other specifics for recording are necessary 
19. Generally a mentioned action has a variety of repertoires. In this case no separate 
recording is necessary. All different elements of the repertoire are to be recorded 
as one entry. 
20. However, if the CA transforms into another event during its course, then an 
additional recording is necessary. 
a. For example after the funeral of a student killed as a result of a fascist 
attack, some university students might not end the protest and choose to 
walk to their university district and attack the bookstores associated with 
the fascists. In this case the development of the funeral should be recorded 
as two separate mentions. 
Recording Detailed Information of Collective Action Events 
21. For coding, use Microsoft Access form ToplumsalHareketlerFrmAna. 
22. For each record the following information need to be entered: 
a. Name of the Coder 
b. Name of the Newspaper 
c. Year/Month/Day (Day of the report not the event) 
d. Location (city) 
e. Location 2 (everything else) 
f. Type of Action: should not be interpreted, but recorded as expressed by 
the newspaper. Record all reported types 
g. Demands: not all slogans and speeches but keywords from them 
h. Identity the participants as expressed by the newspaper; all participating 
organizations need to be entered 
i. Clash with security forces 
j. Destruction of property 
k. Detention 
i. Yes/No 
ii. Number of participants 
iii. Number of other civilians 
l. Wounded 
i. Yes/No 
ii. Number of participants 





ii. Number of participants 




  APPENDIX B
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS DATABASE: DATA COLLECTED AND MISSING 
DATA 
Scanning a daily from 1945-2014 every other day has been a time consuming 
project. The average time taken for scanning, recording, and digitizing a newspaper issue 
is 10 minutes and again a coder’s average speed varies between 10-20 entries per hour. 
Hence a basic calculation from the following two tables (plus the deleted entries) reveals 
that the total amount of time spent for the data collection in this project was between 
5500-6500 working hours, something between 700-800 full working days. I started this 
project with support from an NSF grant (Eren, 2004), which enabled me to collect the 
data with a team. However after the grant money ran out. I had to collect the data 
individually and I was not able to the finish the entire data collection process. Table 1 
provides basic information about the data collection process. Table 2 shows the current 
stage of the research. 
Table 3 illustrates the monthly distribution and average monthly value per year of 
the digitized records. Table 4 does the same job for the coded months. Looking at the 
averages in Table 5 reveals that there are significant differences among the averages of 
different months over the years 1946-2004. However, as the counting numbers hint, the 
difference is less related to intrinsic differences among months than the fact that months 
with high average are predominantly concentrated in the ‘intense’ phases of social 
movements.  
In this dissertation, when preparing the figures and comparing standardized 
scores. I utilized my incomplete data in two ways. By dividing the number of mentions 
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recorded in one year by the number of months coded in that year. I obtained a monthly 
average for each year. This average was the basis of my comparison. In Chapter 4, to 
depict the waves I compared monthly values between 1945-2014, a dataset that is almost 
complete. Yet whether these limited samples can inform us about the “general trend” is a 
question worth asking. 
Since I have digitized 95% of the articles for 1946-2004, looking at the 
correlation between monthly averages of the coded mentions for each year and the 
monthly averages of the digitized reports can inform us whether the coded months are 
reliable indicators of the general trend or not. As the correlations in Table 8 indicate, 
despite incomplete dataset, the monthly averages of the coded reports are highly 
correlated with the monthly average of digitized records (0.87). Similarly, the correlation 
between the average coding in May (June) and the monthly average for each month is 
also high (.88 and .75 respectively). These results give us a significant degree of 





TABLE B 1 DATA COLLECTION PROCESS: BASIC FACTS 
Total Number of Newspapers to be Scanned 
1 January 1946-1 July 2014 
12509  
Number of Months Scanned and Recorded 739 (89.9%) 
Number of Months Digitized 716 (74.4%) 
Number of Months Coded 478   (58.2%) 
Estimated Amount of Entries 50432  
Number of All Entries Coded  33098 (55.7%) 
Number of Classifiable Entries Coded 28113 (84.9%) 
Estimated Number of Entries (Until Dec 2004) 37634  
Number of Classifiable Entries Coded 26408 (70.2%) 
Entry Per Issue ≈  2.94  
Classifiable Entry Per Issue ≈ 2.5  
Number of Pictures Taken 31.079  
Picture Per Issue ≈ 2.76  
Number of Digitized Articles (Until December 
2004) 
9574  
Number of Digitized Articles Per Month  13.6  





TABLE B 2 CURRENT STATUS OF THE RESEARCH 
       4: Coded 3: Digitized 
       2: Scanning and Recording 1:  Nothing 
 MONTHS 
YEARS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1946 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
1947 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
1948 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
1949 3 3 4 4 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
1950 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
1951 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
1952 2 2 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 3 3 
1953 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 3 3 
1954 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 3 3 
1955 4 4 4 4 1 1 2 2 4 4 3 3 
1956 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 3 3 
1957 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 3 3 
1958 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 3 3 
1959 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
1960 2 2 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
1961 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
1962 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
1963 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
1964 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
1965 3 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 3 3 
1966 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
1967 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
1968 4 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
1969 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
1970 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
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YEARS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1971 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
1972 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
1973 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
1974 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
1975 3 3 4 4 3 4 1 3 4 4 3 3 
1976 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 
1977 4 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 
1978 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
1979 3 3 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 
1980 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
1981 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 
1982 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 4 3 3 3 
1983 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 
1984 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
1985 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
1986 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
1987 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
1988 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
1989 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
1990 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
1991 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
1992 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
1993 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
1994 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 
1995 4 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 
1996 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
1997 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
1998 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 
1999 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 
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YEARS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
2000 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 
2001 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 
2002 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 
2003 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 
2004 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 
2005 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 3 3 1 1 
2006 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 3 3 1 1 
2007 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 3 3 1 1 
2008 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 3 3 1 1 
2009 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 3 3 1 1 
2010 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 3 3 1 1 
2011 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 3 3 1 1 
2012 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2013 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 





TABLE B 3 MONTHLY NUMBER OF RECORDED ARTICLES: 1946-2004 
MONTHS 
Years 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 Average 
1946 3   1  1 33 4 3 4 5  6.75 
1947   3 10 2 15   6  3 8 6.71 
1948 8 6 1 7 10 16 2 7 2 17 3 10 7.42 
1949   5 5         5 
1950 12  16 30 51 5 15 10 4 2 2 2 13.55 
1951 2  29 2 26 22 6 9 49 13 11 6 15.91 
1952   4 4 35 8   27 45 31 39 24.13 
1953 36 18 14 7 10 10   24 21 15 13 16.8 
1954 13 12 13 69 13 7   12 18 24 15 19.6 
1955 5 4 4 11     31 6 11 13 10.63 
1956 16 15 20 18 22 35   5 13 11 15 17 
1957 6 2 7 9 33 16   11 131 28 39 28.2 
1958  19 10 11 21 33   22 19 34 18 20.78 
1959 12 23 24 21 33 25 18 11 7 24 14 16 19 
1960   24 18 17 58 24 11 8 45 11 41 25.7 
1961 26 27 23 21 36 12 54 59 61 52 37 42 37.5 
1962 53 33 19 42 51 16 39 21 29 56 37 28 35.33 
1963 32 24 43 23 15 18    6 20 23 22.67 
1964 19 18 20 22 13 26 16 19 11 10 12 11 16.42 
1965 54 10 49 23 48 39   27 56 28 40 37.4 
1966 16 20 23 34 26 28 23 17 16 27 31 9 22.5 
1967 57 28 21 12 10 13 8 19 14 24 37 16 21.58 
1968 9 25 15 30 29 113 86 42 28 19 51 31 39.83 
1969 107 96 44 59 65 63 62 75 80 43 45 95 69.5 
1970 69 3 29 88 105 152 69 64 37 65 100 83 72 
1971 170 114 131 63 63 33 30 22 21 30 17 19 59.42 
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Years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Average 
1972 7 9 15 22 46 41 15 8 9 15 5 13 17.08 
1973 32 14 22 10 11 7 43 43 55 20 9 10 23 
1974 6 10 24 14 29 28 14  8 28 45 43 22.64 
1975 88 64 65 78 28 68  133 51 111 93 64 76.64 
1976 143 69 69 69 81 92 52 33 64 79 67 89 75.58 
1977 84 87 85 79 186 97 54 56 42 72 85 114 86.75 
1978 86 83 106 88 101 86 105 90 115 120 68 112 96.67 
1979 60 113 70 93 90 88   151 122 78 101 96.6 
1980 139 131 106 85 101 89 181 103 54 41 35 29 91.17 
1981 42 36 18 45 26 8 12 13 33 19 5 20 23.08 
1982 7 6 17 15 1 14 3 37 13 11 13 36 14.42 
1983 30 8 22 21 75 28 17 20 23 59 40 18 30.08 
1984 9 5 80 20 2 10 11 13 13 67 18 17 22.08 
1985 4 6 31 13 21 18 9 15 35 33 7 15 17.25 
1986 20 22 38 33 8 18 22 25 11 11 31 23 21.83 
1987 39 33 21 68 70 46 79 128 54 19 29 39 52.08 
1988 43 40 56 67 54 52 33 36 74 44 91 41 52.58 
1989 14 41 142 69 78 55 53 94 49 57 39 40 60.92 
1990 73 40 95 77 78 74 61 67 49 82 99 104 74.92 
1991 70 36 51 60 66 58 78 77 82 107 66 81 69.33 
1992 98 73 148 61 61 66 106 127 78 114 77 88 91.42 
1993 80 95 58 65 68 74 136 77 182 114  53 91.09 
1994 100 81 95 92 49 92 68 52 64 98 23 64 73.17 
1995 111 154 115 120 85 118 98 76 102 66 47 68 96.67 
1996 79 70 78 69 131 78 149 77 85 84 127 86 92.75 
1997 126 114 146 80 83 72 97 65 73 63 83 81 90.25 
1998 64 80 105 84 135 82 110 90 75 96 105 63 90.75 
1999 82 82 113 112 89 52 100 36 34 128 41 69 78.17 
2000 31 50 71 37 96 43 72 59 37 79 76 172 68.58 














Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 (AVEP) (EYT) 
1946 2        2 1   1.67 20 
1947   5 2 1 13   1    4.4 53 
1948 5 5  4 7    1 10   5.33 64 
1949   3 3         3 36 
1950 5  6 11 30 1    1   9 108 
1951 1  20 1 2 8   19    8.5 102 
1952   2 5  4   6 8   5 60 
1953 14 6 2 4  2   3 2   4.71 57 
1954 1 2 5 41 2     1   8.67 104 
1955 3 1  5     39 1   9.8 118 
1956 3 3 12 7 7 9    5   6.57 79 
1957  1 1 4 5 3   6 130   21.43 257 
1958 10 5 3 7 9 22   8 9   9.13 110 
1959 5  14 9 13 9   8 11   9.86 118 
1960   21 39 11 38   7 10   21 252 
1961   16 15 14 7   3 32   14.5 174 
1962   10 13 17 8   18 42   18 216 
1963   34 17 5 7   3 2   11.33 136 
1964   11 12 3 10   7 7   8.33 100 
1965  3 49 17 9 17   27 35   22.43 269 
1966   16 36 37 19   10 34   25.33 304 
1967   20 12 10 12   12 31   16.17 194 
1968 5  12 18 5 161   30 24   36.43 437 
1969   41 101  59   52 28   56.2 674 
1970   28 4 89 119   63 43   57.67 692 
1971 67 65 104 11 24 13   7 25   39.5 474 
1972   7 17 16 6   5 23   12.33 148 
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Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 (AVEP) (EYT) 
1973   6 1 6 2   43 18   12.67 152 
1974   19 45 17 25   5 30   23.5 282 
1975   108 108  55   40 67   75.6 907 
1976   151 83  57   100 86 81  93 1116 
1977 165 22 192 160 193    53    130.83 1570 
1978   263 235 201 191   471 252   268.83 3226 
1979   153 163 160 182   252 180 77 186 169.13 2030 
1980   256 246 192        231.33 2776 
1981   7 18 37        20.67 248 
1982    4     7    5.5 66 
1983   1 1 5    8    3.75 45 
1984 2 4 25 6 1    3 23   9.14 110 
1985 6 2 7 5 15 10 22 15 7 4 4 7 8.67 104 
1986 7 11 7 3 7 20 21 13 7 5 30 24 12.92 155 
1987 45 36 11 111 99 63 135 154 58 29 31 59 69.25 831 
1988 35 57 39 87 81 72 43 38 82 50 325 66 81.25 975 
1989   282 279  59   63 109   158.4 1901 
1990 79 36 127 175 103 117 122 76 46 96 221 144 111.83 1342 
1991 168 32 122 71 138 165 135 73 23 148 149 121 112.08 1345 
1992 104 75 180 96 87 75 98 176 100 103 82 99 106.25 1275 
1993 141 85 151 77 103 158 234 133 120 170 90 52 126.17 1514 
1994 110 109 118 111 72  148   117 29 59 97 1164 
1995 112  180 190 118  129 113 163 121 43 87 125.6 1507 
1996 76 64 113 113 154 162 233 139 98 94 118 156 126.67 1520 
1997 75 120 69 70 78 61 94 69 77 83 105 120 85.08 1021 
1998   171 87 120 52   97 70 75 80 94 1128 
1999 75 105 99 112 84 56   52 91 42 63 77.9 935 
2000 46 36 72 17 65 40   44 82 125 363 89 1068 
2001 111 72 86   68   78 39 48 17 64.88 779 
2002 31 38 45 39 63 27   53 78 31 31 43.6 523 
2003 68 30 66 29 51    57 65 48 85 55.44 665 
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Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 (AVEP) (EYT) 
2004 33 46 94 30 63 97   83 48 48  60.22 723 
2005     76 58       67 804 
2006     92 66       79 948 
2007     109 46       77.5 930 
2008     77 58       67.5 810 
2009     67 53       60 720 
2010     89 87       88 1056 
2011     85 83       84 1008 
2012     85 147       116 1392 
2013     131 461       296 3552 
2014     124 161       142.5 1710 





TABLE B 5 AVERAGE, MEDIAN AND STD OF MONTHLY COLLECTIVE ACTION MENTIONS 
 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC 
Coded 
Months 32 28 55 57 48 45 12 11 52 51 21 19 
Averages 
(Dec 2004 




34 34 28 18 27 27 125.5 76 28.5 34 75 80 
STD (Dec 








34 34 28 18 63 53 125.5 76 28.5 34 75 80 
STD (June 
2014) 





TABLE B 6 CORRELATION OF MONTHLY RECORDED ARTICLES (1946-2004) 
 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC AVRG 
JAN 1             
FEB 0.83 1            
MAR 0.68 0.76 1           
APR 0.71 0.78 0.73 1          
MAY 0.56 0.62 0.61 0.71 1         
JUN 0.58 0.59 0.54 0.72 0.69 1        
JUL 0.61 0.7 0.58 0.71 0.66 0.66 1       
AUG 0.47 0.49 0.53 0.61 0.48 0.56 0.78 1      
SEP 0.51 0.67 0.5 0.63 0.53 0.56 0.71 0.61 1     
OCT 0.47 0.46 0.54 0.56 0.53 0.51 0.62 0.57 0.6 1    
NOV 0.48 0.42 0.52 0.61 0.72 0.69 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.64 1   
DEC 0.48 0.49 0.52 0.53 0.68 0.62 0.5 0.54 0.52 0.68 0.75 1  
AVRG* 0.79 0.84 0.8 0.87 0.82 0.81 0.86 0.77 0.78 0.75 0.8 0.77 1 
* Denotes the average monthly value of coded mentions in a year  
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TABLE B 7 CORRELATION OF MONTHLY CODED COLLECTIVE ACTION MENTIONS (1946-
2004) 
 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC AVRG 
JAN 1             
FEB 0.58 1            
MAR 0.89 0.58 1           
APR 0.73 0.55 0.88 1          
MAY 0.86 0.48 0.88 0.89 1         
JUN 0.65 0.47 0.62 0.61 0.82 1        
JUL 0.67 0.45 0.59 0.48 0.78 0.86 1       
AUG 0.52 0.46 0.61 0.54 0.65 0.49 0.71 1      
SEP 0.59 0.72 0.68 0.67 0.73 0.69 0.55 0.64 1     
OCT 0.9 0.58 0.79 0.72 0.83 0.73 0.74 0.51 0.79 1    




0.01 0.17 1   
DEC 0.07 -
0.02 
0.24 0.1 0.34 0.28 0.5 0.41 0.2 0.36 0.33 1  
AVRG* 0.88 0.67 0.92 0.9 0.94 0.81 0.8 0.68 0.85 0.9 0.34 0.48 1 
* Denotes the average monthly value of coded mentions in a year 
TABLE B 8 CORRELATION FOR SELECT VARIABLES 
  ENT05 ENT06 REP05 REP06 AVRGENT AVGREP 
ENT05 1 
     ENT06 0.82 1
    REP05 0.84 0.62 1
   REP06 0.7 0.79 0.69 1
  AVRGENT 0.94 0.81 0.72 0.7 1
 AVRGREP 0.88 0.75 0.82 0.81 0.87 1
ENT05: Number of codings for the month May (1946 -2014) 
ENT06: Number of codings for the month June (1946 -2014) 
REP05: Number of digitized reports for the month May (1946 -2014) 
REP06: : Number of digitized reports for the month May (1946 -2014) 
AVRGENT: Average Number of Monthly Coded Entries in a year (1946 -2014) 
AVRGREP: Average Number of Monthly Recorded Reports in a year (1946 -2014)
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  APPENDIX C
OPERATIONALIZATION OF CONCEPTS IN CREATING SUBTYPES OF 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
 
To distinguish between the eight types of movements in chapters 4-6, I have 
relied on information from the original two social movement databases I created for this 
dissertation--(1) Social Movements Database 1 (see Appendices A and B) and Social 
Movements Database 2 (see Appendix E). Due to the low quality of reporting, the 
information acquired from the database is limited, but it is still possible to operationalize 
the criteria for distinguishing among these movement types developed in Chapter 5. 
Independence 
This criterion distinguishes whether a social action is organized or supported by 
independent groups or political instruments of the power bloc, the latter being grouped 
under the label ‘Parties of Order’ (PO). To distinguish between independent and 
dependent social movements. I use the participants in the action as the criterion. If an 
institution of the state is recorded amongst the participants, then the action is considered a 
dependent action belonging to the domain of PO. Since outlawing parties is a frequent 
practice, very few parties can continue their political life with the same name. Therefore, 
parties which consider themselves inheritors of an outlawed PO are also considered PO. 
Similarly, parties or associations that have coup leaders, generals, or top-level 
bureaucrats in their leading cadre, are also considered PO, as are associations that have 
organic ties with the PO. Table 1 provides a list of political organizations whose 
participation therein is considered sufficient to label a social action as a dependent action. 
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For the pre-1945 period, I have also added actions/movements where PO involvement is 
claimed by more than one scholar. 
‘Independence’ is a more problematic concept because in several cases, even 
“independent” organizations have affiliations with the state or leading capitalist factions. 
More frequently, political parties prefer to obscure their involvement in sensitive political 
issues, and give the impression that there exists an independent political opposition about 
the issue. Hence, while interpreting the data about the independence of movements, one 
should keep in mind that although the data provide information about the explicit 
involvement of PO, they do not say anything about their indirect and implicit 
involvement. 
 




Adana Massacre 95 
Idealists 683 
 






March 31 23 
SDPP 268 
 
Tax Revolts 15 
NAP 184 
 
Free Party 29 
TPP 148 
   DLP 137 
   MP 114 
   fascists 90 
   KTA 83 
   WP 50 




Here I look at the action type and search for several keywords to distinguish 
between the mass or group character of an event. Below is the list of each category with 
the most frequent coding. 
TABLE C 2 
Mass Participation Group Action 
Protests 2512 Hunger Strike 1589 
March 2115 Confrontation 1564 
Gatherig 1661 Attack 1524 
Strike 1519 Murder 826 
Rally 1348 Firin 799 
Demonstration 1005 Death Fast 559 
Evetn 998 Raid 514 
Boycott 847 Press Declaration 497 
Action 758 Bombing 468 
Resistance 693 Protest Placate 433 
Work Stoppage 611 Wounding 420 
Celebration 321 Sit-in 374 
Occupation 311 Brawl 341 
Reporting sick 303 Operation 201 
Shutter down 271 Explosions 199 
Forum 182 Petition 143 






Compared to previous categories, the presence or absence of violence can be 
distinguished relatively clearly. To begin with, certain actions, as presented in Table C 3 
involve violence by definition. Moreover, since violence is always worth reporting, 
information about violent incidents in demonstrations, marches and other events is 
available in the news. Due to the definition of violence in Chapter 5, all demonstrations 
attacked by the police are considered violent actions. 
TABLE C 3 
Violent Actions 

















TABLE C 4 NUMBER OF RECORDED EVENTS DIVIDED IN 8 SUBTYPES: 1876-1945 
 
All MVI MVi MvI mVI Mvi mVi mvI mvi 
1876 35 25 0 9 0 0 0 0 1 
1877 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1878 30 27 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
1879 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 
1880 4 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 
1881 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1882 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1883 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1884 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1885 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1886 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1887 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1888 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1889 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1890 4 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
 
1891 15 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1892 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1893 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
1894 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1895 72 65 2 2 3 0 0 0 0 
1896 43 37 1 0 3 0 0 2 
 
1897 34 33 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1898 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1899 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1900 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1901 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1902 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1903 62 62 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1904 19 14 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
1905 20 16 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 
1906 44 7 19 11 3 0 0 2 2 
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 All MVI MVi MvI mVI Mvi mVi mvI mvi 
1907 34 8 16 3 5 0 1 1 
 
1908 211 6 19 122 3 51 8 2 
 
1909 197 6 118 38 5 14 4 1 0 
1910 50 25 0 20 0 1 1 3 
 
1911 41 25 0 14 0 2 0 0 0 
1912 57 33 1 11 0 7 0 5 
 
1913 9 6 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
1914 17 13 0 3 0 0 0 1 
 
1915 93 88 0 1 0 0 0 4 
 
1916 19 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1917 12 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1918 23 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1919 38 3 28 6 0 1 0 0 0 
1920 65 12 40 11 0 0 0 2 
 
1921 70 65 0 4 0 0 0 1 
 
1922 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
1923 7 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 
1924 3 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
1925 96 89 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 
1926 15 13 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
1927 15 11 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 
1928 6 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 
1929 8 7 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1930 114 83 0 2 0 29 0 0 0 
1931 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1932 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
1933 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1934 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1935 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1936 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1937 22 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1938 29 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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 All MVI MVi MvI mVI Mvi mVi mvI mvi 
1939 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1940 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1941 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1942 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1943 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1944 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 




TABLE C 5 NUMBER OF RECORDED EVENTS DIVIDED IN 8 SUBTYPES: 1946-2014 
 Coded 
Months 
ALL MVI MVi mvI Mvi mVI mVi mvI mvi 
1946 8 5 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 
1947 8 22 0 0 16 0 1 0 0 0 
1948 8 32 0 0 20 1 2 0 2 0 
1949 2 6 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 
1950 8 54 0 0 15 24 1 0 6 0 
1951 8 51 0 1 10 12 4 1 12 0 
1952 6 25 0 0 8 3 4 1 1 0 
1953 8 33 3 0 5 5 8 0 1 0 
1954 8 52 0 2 5 33 4 0 0 0 
1955 6 49 2 12 8 6 3 1 0 0 
1956 8 46 2 0 7 22 6 0 0 0 
1957 8 150 1 3 11 100 6 6 1 0 
1958 8 73 5 1 35 0 20 0 5 0 
1959 8 69 1 1 21 3 15 4 11 1 
1960 6 126 6 2 75 2 12 5 3 1 
1961 6 87 8 4 26 12 17 0 4 0 
1962 6 108 6 0 48 2 14 1 15 1 
1963 6 68 5 0 29 4 12 2 4 3 
1964 6 50 6 0 22 0 15 2 2 0 
1965 7 158 10 1 100 1 15 0 19 1 
1966 6 152 7 0 81 7 14 1 28 1 
1967 6 97 11 1 31 4 18 1 21 2 
1968 6 255 51 0 111 1 19 20 28 2 
1969 6 281 63 3 105 8 40 11 28 2 
1970 5 346 75 7 162 7 37 12 27 2 
1971 7 430 132 3 153 3 105 16 17 3 
1972 6 74 2 1 37 2 22 1 2 0 
1973 6 76 3 3 11 9 13 8 4 0 
1974 6 141 24 3 37 12 22 11 14 2 





ALL MVI MVi mvI Mvi mVI mVi mvI mvi 
1976 6 558 107 34 142 20 81 122 23 6 
1977 5 785 86 55 140 49 130 205 41 9 
1978 6 1613 155 71 205 57 380 518 79 37 
1979 8 1353 144 28 186 44 501 265 58 24 
1980 3 694 47 2 139 3 352 59 40 3 
1981 4 62 1 0 1 0 54 0 2 0 
1982 4 11 1 0 0 0 8 0 1 0 
1983 6 15 0 0 0 0 9 0 2 0 
1984 7 64 1 0 22 0 15 2 7 0 
1985 12 104 7 1 44 4 41 1 2 1 
1986 12 155 18 1 39 6 46 3 37 0 
1987 12 831 65 3 266 64 237 6 157 3 
1988 12 975 111 1 232 26 199 11 334 13 
1989 5 792 47 1 424 58 104 12 76 5 
1990 12 1342 131 2 525 48 249 3 304 4 
1991 12 1345 153 0 546 72 326 4 189 4 
1992 12 1275 162 7 373 27 472 10 133 5 
1993 12 1514 102 3 429 17 643 4 256 8 
1994 9 874 54 2 214 51 388 11 90 7 
1995 10 1256 156 5 422 33 348 26 182 18 
1996 12 1520 172 6 356 26 508 44 309 13 
1997 12 1021 122 8 363 46 264 25 155 21 
1998 8 752 90 7 273 19 160 43 117 5 
1999 10 779 102 5 192 50 230 30 83 10 
2000 10 890 98 3 233 32 232 19 225 6 
2001 8 519 54 0 160 11 129 7 104 9 
2002 10 436 50 5 149 52 80 6 67 2 
2003 9 499 50 2 207 19 98 6 81 11 
2004 10 542 42 2 222 50 99 4 81 11 
2005 2 134 14 0 58 5 19 0 24 5 





ALL MVI MVi mvI Mvi mVI mVi mvI mvi 
2007 2 155 20 5 33 11 50 2 29 0 
2008 2 135 10 2 45 7 21 1 22 1 
2009 2 120 9 0 42 2 22 1 22 2 
2010 2 176 9 0 73 5 45 0 22 3 
2011 2 168 19 0 54 16 33 5 24 2 
2012 2 232 25 4 61 8 50 1 39 6 
2013 2 593 126 12 173 34 43 6 66 7 




  APPENDIX D
LIST OF POLITICAL PARTIES 1908-2014 
TABLE D 1 LIST OF POLITICAL PARTIES 1908-2014 
Name of the 
Party Founded Closed Banned Phase1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
İttihat ve Terakki 
Cemiyeti 1889 1918 No Active    
Osmanlı Ahrar 




1909 1909 Yes Active    
Osmanlı 




1909 1911 No Active    
Ahali Fırkası 1910 1911 No Active    
Osmanlı Sosyalist 
Fırkası 1910 1913 Yes Active    
Hürriyet ve İtilaf 




1918 1919 Yes Active    
Teceddüt Fırkası 1918 1919 Yes Active    
Sosyal Demokrat 
Fırkası 1918 1920 No Active    
Ahali İktisat 
Fırkası 1918 1920 No Active    
Mesai Fırkası 1919 1920 No Active    
Hürriyet ve İtilaf 1919 1920 No Active    
Sulh ve Selameti 
Osmaniye Fırkası 1919 1920 No Active    
Türkiye Sosyalist 
Fırkası 1919 1922 No Active    
Osmanlı Çiftçiler 
Derneği 1919 1923 No Active    
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Name of the 
Party Founded Closed Banned Phase1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
Türkiye İşçi ve 
Çiftçi Sosyalist 
Fırkası 
1919 1924 No Active    
Milli Ahrar 
Fırkası 1919 N/A No Active Active   
Milli Türk 




1920 1921 Yes  Active   
Halk İştirakiyun 












1930 1930 Yes  Active   
Türk 
Cumhuriyet 
Amele ve Çiftçi 
Partisi 




1930 1930 Yes  Active   
Milli Kalkınma 
Partisi 1945 1958 No  Active   
Türkiye Sosyalist 
Partisi 1946 1946 Yes  Active   
Türkiye Sosyalist 
Emekçi ve Köylü 
Partisi 
1946 1946 Yes  Active   
İslam Koruma 
Partisi 1946 1946 Yes  Active   
Liberal 
Demokrat Parti 1946 1952 No  Active   
Yalnız Vatan İçin 
Partisi 1946 1952 No  Active   
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Name of the 
Party Founded Closed Banned Phase1 Phase 2 Phase 3  
Demokrat Parti 1946 1960 Yes  Active   
Türkiye İşçi ve 
Çiftçi Partisi 1946 1950 No  Active   
Türkiye 
Yükselme Partisi 1948 1953 No  Active   
Millet Partisi 1948 1954 Yes  Active   
Türkiye Sosyalist 
Partisi 1950 1952 Yes  Active   
Liberal Köylü 
Partisi 1950 1952 No  Active   
Demokrat İşçi 
Partisi 1950 1954 No  Active   
İslam Demokrat 
Partisi 1951 1952 Yes  Active   
Türkiye Köylü 
Partisi 1952 1958 No  Active   
Vatan Partisi 1954 1957 Yes  Active   
Milliyetçi 






1954 1981 Yes  Active Active Active 
Hürriyet Partisi 1955 1958 No  Active   
Türkiye İşçi 
Partisi 1961 1971 Yes   Active  
Yeni Türkiye 
Partisi 1961 1973 No   Active  
Adalet Partisi 1961 1981 Yes   Active Active 
Millet Partisi 1962 1981 Yes   Active Active 
(Türkiye) Birlik 






1967 1981 Yes   Active Active 
Milli Nizam 
Partisi 1970 1971 Yes   Active Active 
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Name of the 
Party Founded Closed Banned Phase1 Phase 2 Phase 3  
Demokratik Parti 1970 1981 Yes   Active Active 
Milli Selamet 
Partisi 1972 1981 Yes   Active Active 
Türkiye Sosyalist 
İşçi Partisi 1974 1981 Yes   Active Active 
Türkiye Emekçi 
Partisi 1975 1980 Yes   Active Active 
Vatan Partisi 1975 1981 Yes   Active Active 
Türkiye İşçi 
Partisi 1975 1981 Yes   Active Active 
Sosyalist 
(Devrim) Partisi 1975 1981 Yes   Active Active 
Nizam Partisi 1977 1981 Yes   Active Active 
Türkiye İşçi 
Köylü Partisi** 1978 1981 Yes   Active Active 
Sosyalist Vatan 
Partisi** 1979 1981 Yes   Active Active 
Hürriyetçi Millet 
Partisi** 1979 1981 Yes   Active Active 
Hür Demokratlar 
Partisi** 1980 1981 Yes   Active Active 
Büyük Türkiye 
Partisi 1983 1983 Yes    Active 
(Türkiye) Huzur 
Partisi 1983 1983 Yes    Active 




1983 1986 No    Active 






1983 1995 No    Active 
Refah Partisi 1983 1998 Yes    Active 
Anavatan Partisi 1983 2007 No    Active 
Doğru Yol Partisi 1983 Active No    Active 
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Name of the 













1984 Active No    Active 
Demokratik Sol 
Parti 1985 Active No    Active 
Büyük Anadolu 
Partisi 1986 1992 No    Active 
Sosyalist Parti 1988 1992 Yes    Active 
Türkiye Birleşik 
Komünist Partisi 1990 1991 Yes    Active 
Halkın Emek 
Partisi 1990 1993 Yes    Active 
Sosyalist Birlik 




1992 1993 Yes    Active 
Sosyalist Türkiye 
Partisi 1992 1993 Yes    Active 
Sosyalist Devrim 
Partisi 1992 1995 No    Active 
Demokrat Parti 1992 2005 No    Active 
İşçi Partisi 1992 Active No    Active 
Cumhuriyet Halk 




1992 Active No    Active 
Demokrasi 
Partisi 1993 1994 Yes    Active 
Yeni Parti 1993 1997 No    Active 
Büyük Birlik 
Partisi 1993 Active No    Active 
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Name of the 





1993 Active No    Active 
Yeni Demokrasi 









1994 Active No    Active 
Liberal 
(Demokrat) Parti 1994 Active No    Active 
Demokrasi ve 
Değişim Partisi 1995 1996 Yes    Active 
Emek Partisi 1996 1997 Yes    Active 
Demokratik 
Barış Hareketi 1996 1998 Yes    Active 
Barış Partisi 1996 1999 No    Active 
Demokrasi ve 
Barış Partisi 1996 2002 No    Active 
Emek Partisi 
(Emeğin Partisi) 1996 Active No    Active 
Demokratik Kitle 
Partisi 1997 1999 Yes    Active 
Fazilet Partisi 1997 2001 Yes    Active 
Demokratik Halk 





1997 Active No    Active 
Değişen Türkiye 
Partisi 1998 2002 No    Active 
Aydınlık Türkiye 
Partisi 1998 Active No    Active 
Saadet Partisi 2001 Active No    Active 
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Name of the 
Party Founded Closed Banned Phase1 Phase 2 Phase 3  
Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi 2001 Active No    Active 
Bağımsız Türkiye 
Partisi 2001 Active No    Active 
Yeni Türkiye 




2002 Active No    Active 
Yurt partisi 2002 Active No    Active 
Demokratik 
Toplum Partisi 2005 2009 Yes    Active 
Doğru Yol Partisi 
2 2007 Active No    Active 
Hak ve Eşitlik 




2008 Active No    Active 
Halkın Sesi 




2010 Active No    Active 
*Not all parties are included in this list. If a party is dissolved by the state – with the exception of those  
dissolved because of their inactivity - it is still included. But for all other parties the condition for being 
included is participation in the elections. 
** Although being dissolved by the state these parties are not included to the list. Because two of them did 
not participate to the Senate election in 1979 and the other two did not have meaningful time span for 
being active. Their inclusion however will support the thesis of the second chapter further. 
Although these parties were dissolved by the state, they are not included in our list. Two of them did not 
participate in the 1979 Senate elections, and the other two did not have a meaningful tim-span to be 
considered politically active. Their inclusion however would support the thesis of the second chapter 
further. 





  APPENDIX E
SOURCES REVIEWED FOR THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS DATABASE 2 




(Adanır, 2001) (Genelkurmay 
belgelerinde Kürt 
isyanları, 1992) 
(Long, 1983) (Simonyan, 2012) 
(Akbayar, 2008) (Genelkurmay 
belgelerinde Kürt 
isyanları-II, 1992) 




(Akçora, 1994) (Gürkan, 1971) (McCarthy, 2006) (Sotirovic, 2009) 
(Y. Aktar, 1990) (Güzel, 1983) (Meininger, 1977) (Sönmez, 2007) 
(Antonius, 1981) (Hajdarpasic, 
2011) 
(Millman, 1980) (Şenışık) 
(Aysal) (Jelavich, 1983) (Murphy, 2008) (Tallon, 2012) 
(Aslan et al.) (Kabacalı, 1990) (Ochsenwald, 
1973) 
(Tokay, 1994) 
(M. Aydın, 1989) (Kalman, 1996) (R. Olson & 
Rumbold, 1989) 
(S. Toprak, 2011) 
(Bağçeci, 2008) (Kaiser, 2010) (Öz, 1999) (Tsirkinides, 1999) 
(Bjørnlund, 2008) (Kansu, 1997) (Özçelik, 2001) (Vovchenko, 2008) 
(Burma, 2012) (Kars, 1997) (Özsoy & Eriş, 
2007) 
(Walker, 1980) 
(Daskalov, 2004) (Katardžiev, 1980) (Provence) (Wilhite, 2003) 
(Dersimi, 1952) (Kayali, 1997) (Reid, 2000) (Yerasimos) 
(Doinov, 1979) (Khristov, 1983) (Eugene Lawrence 
Rogan, 1991) 
(Yıldırım, 2013) 
(H. Doğan, 2000) (Kobal) (Roudometof, 
1996) 
(Yıldız, 2006) 
(O. Doğan, 2011) (Kosev, 1977) (Saliba, 1972)  
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1963). Cumhuriyet.  
70 bin işçi direnişe geçti. (1970, June 16, 1963). Cumhuriyet.  
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